Abstract
By normative or deontic judgements I mean judgements which formulate normative situations, such as rights and duties. This is not intended as a definition of ‘normative judgement’, but as an initial indication of where I am heading.
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Notes
Moore, 1903, p.viii, ix.
For a logic of value judgements, see Rescher, 1969.
When H. Kelsen, 1979, passim, characterizes the ‘validity of a norm as the specific way of existence of this norm, he can’, by ‘norm’, only be aiming at a ‘normative situation’, and not at a ‘normative judgement’. His opposition to a ‘logic of norms’ becomes to this extent an opposition to a ‘logic of normative situations’, at which point he is right, but which is irrelevant for the application of logic in law.
Which does not alter the fact that the indication of the norm-subjects must remain implicitly present, if the meaning of the normative judgement is to have the minimum required clearness.
This does not imply my taking a stand in the old controversy between determinism and indeterminism. The fact that directives presuppose a human liberty does not mean that this liberty ought to exist in ‘reality’ as well. It only means that we will stop referring to directives and norms with regard to particular acts, if it becomes clear to us that these acts cannot be influenced by these directives.
Austin, 1962, p.99.
This use of ‘normative statement’ was proposed by G.H. von Wright, 1963, p.l.
A description such as this of normative resp. factual judgements does not exclude 1. (the possibility) that judgements exist which are neither normative nor factual, and 2. (the possibility) that judgements exist which are both normative and factual. The latter may particularly be the case with value judgements, which in the present context (though not in the context of the development of a logic of normative judgements, cf. section 2) may be counted among the normative judgements. ‘John is an impolite bo/ on the one hand expresses a negative appreciation of John, but on the other hand connects this negative appreciation to the statement that John expresses a particular type of behaviour’. The fact that, as it was set forth in the foregoing section, pronouncements in which normative situations are indicated can be used for giving norms as well as for stating norms does not in itself imply an overlapping. For although the same pronouncement is at issue here, it concerns different judgements with not completely similar meanings. The question whether a normative statement is to be called a factual judgement depends on what one wishes to aim at by ‘factual state of affairs’. In the context which is at issue here it is, for obvious reasons, more useful not to count normative statements among factual judgements.
G. Hudson, 1969.
Cf. Anderson, 1956, in Rescher, 1967, p.147 ff., Anderson, 1958–1 and Anderson, 1958–2. In this and in the following sections I will not discuss the question whether it is possible to reduce a formal system of deontic logic to a certain formal system of modal logic. Anderson demonstrates that the so-called standard system of deontic logic (cf. chapter V) can be reduced in this way, with which I agree. The problem which I will discuss, and with which I will use Anderson’s definitions of obligation, permission and prohibition, is whether it is possible to reduce normative judgements to factual judgements. For the sake of honesty it has to be noted that Anderson did not claim that this reduction ought to be possible as well.
At first sight Anderson’s analysis may seem only to be applicable to the so-called sanction theories (which reduce norms to sanctioned expressions of the will). But given Anderson’s broad definition of ‘sanction’ it is also applicable to reductions of a different nature of norms (normative judgements) to facts (factual judgements).
Anderson, 1958–1, p.85.
Cf. Anderson, 1956, in Rescher, 1967, p.170, 171: ‘if the sanction were not possibly false (i.e., if it were necessary), then no behaviour designed to avoid it could be succesful. The point of choosing penalties in drafting laws... is that the hope of avoiding the penalty might serve as a motivating factor in human behaviour; a “sanction” would serve no such purpose if it were not avoidable (i.e., possibly false)’.
Anderson, 1956, in Rescher, 1967, p.174.
Anderson, 1958–2, p.103. In this article Anderson uses a different symbol for this constant.
Castaneda, 1960, p.40.
Anderson, 1958–1, p.90.
Cf. def. 9.3 and def. 9.6.
In a strict sense this latter sentence is not an entirely correct interpretation: the appearing ‘not’ does not in Anderson’s definition negate the infliction of punishment, but the conjunction of the possible omission of the punishment and the infliction of the punishment. I am in fact at this point anticipating on what is to be at issue in the text. Furthermore, if the punishment is not inflicted, so if -B, then it already follows that the entire sanction (◊ -B&B) is false and therefore that the act in question is permitted.
If this omission of B is not possible then it follows that ◊-B&B has to be false in all cases (due to the falsehood of the first part of this conjunction) and that therefore, according to the definitions of Op and Fp, nothing can be obligatory or prohibited. In other words: a necessary B is not suitable for the purpose which Anderson aims at by this constant.
It follows from -B that — ◊ -B v -B, which is equivalent with -(◊-B&B).
This possibility is left open by Anderson: ‘.. we do not mean the term (sc.“S”) here to carry with it’, necessarily, the idea of a socially inflicted punishment’, 1958–1, p.86. We have already seen in the foregoing (section 9) that Anderson leaves the exact interpretation of the ‘thing wrong’ to depend on the philosophy which is adhered to and that he certainly does not find it essential for his theory.
Anderson, 1958–2, p.103.
Cf. Kalinowski, 1965, p.136. In 1972, p.154, Kalinowski faces the Andersonian reduction with the same dilemma as I am about to do in the following text.
R.A.V. van Haersolte, 1977, p.89.
This rejection of naturalism does not imply that normative judgements would not have anything to do with facts. First, they concern acts which are factually to be performed. Second, the argumentation for or against particular norms is partly dependant on facts; normative judgements are reasons for a particular behaviour and, as such, need to have a point. Anti-naturalism does not deny this, only that it would beforehand be established which fact could or could not form a point. This is not a beforehand established fact, but dependant on our valuating decisions. Third, there may be all kinds of causal (opposed to logical) relationships between the acceptance of particular norms and particular factual states of affairs.
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Soeteman, A. (1989). Normative Judgements. In: Logic in Law. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7821-9_2
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