Abstract
Cooperative game theory has produced quite a number of solution concepts for games in characteristic-function form. Among the most important theories are the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution (von Neumann-Morgenstern, 1944), the Shapley-value (Shapley, 1953), the bargaining set (Aumann-Maschler, 1964), and the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969). The aim of these and many other solution concepts has been normative, rather than descriptive, even if some primarily descriptive theories like equal-share analysis have been proposed (Selten, 1972).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Albers, W., Zwei Lösungskonzepte für kooperative Mehrpersonenspiele, die auf Anspruchsniveaus der Spieler basieren, OR-Verfahren XXI, pp. 1–13, Meisenheim 1975.
Aumann, R. J., and M. Maschler, The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games, in: Dresher, Shapley, Tucker (eds.), Advances in Game Theory, Ann. Math. Stud. 52, Princeton, N.J., 1964, pp. 443–476.
Cross, J. H., Some Theoretic Characteristics of Economics and Political Coalitions, in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, II (1967), pp. 184–195.
Everett, H., Recursive Games, Princeton University, Princeton 1954 (mimeographed).
Harsanyi, J. C., A Simplified Bargaining Model for n-Person Cooperative Games, International Economic Review 4 (1963), pp. 194–220.
Harsanyi, J. C., An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition, Management Science 20 (1974), pp. 1422–1495.
Kahan, J., and A. Rapoport, Test of the Bargaining Set and Kernel Models in Three-Person Games, in: Rapoport, A., (ed.), Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1974, pp. 161–192.
von Neumann, J., and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, second edition, Princeton, 1944.
Rapoport, A., and J. Kahan, Computer Controlled Research on Bargaining and Coalition Formation, in: Behavior Research Methods and Instrumentation, 6 (1974), pp. 87–93.
Schelling, Th., The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1960.
Schmeidler, D., The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Games, SIAM J. Appl. Math., 17, 1969, pp. 1163–1170.
Selten, R., Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121 (1965), Teil I, pp. 301–324, Teil II, pp. 667–689.
Selten, R., Equal Share Analysis of Characteristic Function Experiments, in H. Sauermann (ed.), Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung — Contributions to Experimental Economics, Vol. III, J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1977, pp. 130–165.
Selten, R., Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium points in Extensive Games, International Journal of Game Theory 4, (1975), pp. 25–55.
Shapley, LI., A Value for n-Person Games, in: H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker (eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. II, Ann. Math. Stud. 28, Princeton University Press, Princeton, J. J., 1953, pp. 307–317.
Shapley, Ll., On Balanced Sets and Cores, Naval Research Logistic Quarterly, 14 (1967), pp. 453–460.
Turbay, G., Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University, Houston, Texas, 1977.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1988 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Selten, R. (1988). A Noncooperative Model of Characteristic-Function Bargaining. In: Models of Strategic Rationality. Theory and Decision Library C, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7774-8_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7774-8_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-8446-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-7774-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive