Abstract
Harold I. Brown’s articulation of the “new philosophy of science”1 is particularly welcome because it systematically pulls together various strands of the post-positivist philosophy of science literature. The new philosophy of science Brown presents, drawing on the work of Kuhn, Toulmin, Hanson, Lakatos, Polanyi, and others, but effectively structured, enhanced, and defended by Brown, replaces logical empiricism’s fundamental presuppositions of Principia logic and observation-based empiricism with a new approach which emphasizes the theory-ladenness of perception, the unavoidability of paradigmatic presuppositions, conceptual change and scientific revolutions, dialectic (as opposed to algorithmic) reasoning as the model of rational thinking in science, and a sharp rejection of the discovery/justification distinction. Brown develops a new epistemology of science to compliment and underlie the new philosophy of science, including alternative conceptions of rationality, scientific knowledge, truth, objectivity, and relativism. As with Kuhn, Brown’s discussion of relativism cannot be helpfully separated from the rest of his presentation. Consequently, in what follows we shall concern ourselves with the entire Brownian conception of the new epistemology and philosophy of science.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Brown, Perception, Theory and Commitment. All references to Brown in this chapter are to this book unless otherwise noted.
Ibid., p. 11.
Ibid. , p. 10.
Ibid., p. 26.
Ibid. , p. 37.
Ibid., p. 29.
I have argued against the new philosophy of science’s tendency to conflate the attempt to understand the empistemic status of scientific claims with the attempt to understand the dynamics of the scientific enterprise as a whole in my ‘Justification, Discovery, and the Naturalizing of Epistemology.’
Actually Brown suggest that he is not criticizing the logical empiricists for their failure to attend to actual scientific theories and research, but only seeking to explain that failure by tracing it to the “empiricist assumption that all scientific knowledge consists of generalizations from experience” (30). However, since Brown takes the assumption to be a faulty one, his discussion does seem to be a criticism. We shall discuss the possibility of criticizing assumptions and presuppositions, given the new epistemology of science, presently.
Brown, pp. 35–36.
Ibid., p. 36.
In fact it should be kept in mind that Goodman’s work on induction is in large part an attempt to solve the problem of distinguishing accidental from lawlike generalizations. Cf. Scheffler, The Anatomy of Inquiry, pp. 295–314.
Brown argues that older laws (e.g. Galileo’s) are not strictly speaking deducible from newer (e.g. Newton’s) laws. This is clearly right. We may all agree with Brown that, typically, a new law says something significant that the old law does not, and, from the point of view of understanding nature, indicates some weakness in the old law. To use Brown’s example, for Galileo falling bodies fall with constant acceleration, while for Newton, acceleration increases steadily (in fact, is inversely proportional to the square of the distance from the body to the earth’s center) . Nevertheless, there ig a clear sense in which the old law constitutes a “limiting case” of the newer law. In the example here considered, when the body’s fall is relatively short, the increase in acceleration is negligible, and so the two laws predict (approximately) the same fall time. We can explain the success of Galileo’s law for small distances, and its failure for large distances, by noting that that law’s account of acceleration is mistaken in just such a way that the mistake is neglible for small distances, but significant for larger distances. Thus we can agree with Brown that the old law is not entailed by the new law, but there is still a clear sense in which the old law constitutes a limiting case of the new law, and in which the new law provides an explanation for the old law’s success (in a limited domain) and for its failure. Cf. Kordig, ‘Scientific Transitions, Meaning Invariance, and Derivability.’
Brown, p. 66.
Ibid. , p. 63. This despite the fact that Brown cites a passage from Hempel which claims that Galileo’s and Newton’s laws are inconsistent (62) .
Ibid. , p. 63.
Ibid., p. 64. Emphasis mine.
Cf. Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity, pp. 121–124. I shall return to this theme below.
Brown, p. 64.
Cf. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 169. Kuhn puts the point in terms of problem-solving ability, but it is clear that he is committed to some cumulativity across revolutions, though not cumulativity of theoretical propositions. The same is true of logical empiricism.
Brown, p. 87.
Ibid., p. 100.
Ibid., p. 101.
Ibid., p. 105.
Ibid. Note the resemblance between Brown’s paradigmatic propositions and Lakatos’ “hard core.” Cf. Lakatos, ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.’
Brown, p. 105.
Ibid. , p. 106.
Ibid.
Brown does make a move in this direction, by noting that “the reality that exists independently of our knowledge” (108) also has a hand in determining the fate of research programs, so that the presuppositional framework is not the sole determiner of that fate. But since the only access to this independent world “is through the creation of theories and the process of theory-directed research” (108), it is difficult to see how independent reality actually acts as a constraint on research in such a way as to limit the power of presuppositions to structure and determine the results of research — especially since Brown equates that independent reality, the world, with the scientist’s “meaning structure” (111), which on Brown’s account is clearly presupposition-bound.
Ibid., p. 111.
Ibid., pp. 115–116.
Ibid., p. 118.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 120.
Cf. Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity, esp. Chapters 2 and 3.
These points will be amplified below. Here we might note that Brown often appeals to criteria of justification when discussing cases of conceptual change (e.g., pp. 112, 117), without realizing that it is propositions, not concepts, that are being justified. This is especially clear, e.g., of his discussion of Galileo’s re-analysis of “natural place” (117).
Brown, p. 120.
Brown does offer an account of the epistemic features of the new image of science; these will be considered presently.
Ibid., p. 130.
I have argued for this view in some detail in ‘Justification, Discovery, and the Naturalizing of Epistemology.’
Brown, p. 130.
Ibid. pp. 129–130.
For a clear discussion of the distinctions between discovery, plausibility, and justification, cf. Kordig, ‘Discovery and Justification.’ A helpful discussion of the methodological importance of distinguishing from among various cognitive stances one can take toward theories is that of Wykstra, ‘Toward a Historical Meta-Method for Assessing Normative Methodologies: Rationality, Serendipity, and the Robinson Crusoe Fallacy,’ esp. pp. 216–219.
Cf. Thagard, ‘Against Evolutionary Epistemology,’ esp. pp. 188–189; Nickles, ‘Scientific Problems: Three Empiricist Models,’ esp. pp. 8–9; and Gutting, ‘A Defense of the Logic of Discovery’ and ‘Science as Discovery.’
‘Justification, Discovery, and the Naturalizing of Epistemology.’
Cf. Nickles, ‘Scientific Problems: Three Empiricist Models.’
Brown, p. 133.
Ibid.
Ibid. , p. 134.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 134–139.
Ibid., p. 138.
Ibid., p. 139–140.
Ibid., p. 140.
Ibid., p. 141.
Ibid., p. 142.
Ibid., p. 144.
Ibid.
Cf. my ‘Justification, Discovery, and the Naturalizing of Epistemology.’
Brown, p. 147.
Cf. Nickles, ‘Scientific Problems: Three Empiricist Models.’
Brown, p. 147.
Ibid., p. 148.
Ibid. , p. 149. This account of rational deliberation based on Aristotle’s man of practical wisdom is further developed in Brown, ‘On Being Rational,’ esp. pp. 245–247.
Brown, p. 149.
Brown, ‘On Being Rational,’ p. 245.
Cf. Brown, pp. 145; also Brown, ‘On Being Rational.’ As argued earlier, Brown’s analysis of standard epistemology’s conception of knowledge founders on the confusion, noted above, between truth and certainty (or infallibility). To say that, for a proposition to be known it must be true, is not to say that for it to be known it must be certain. I shall say a bit more about this below.
Brown, p. 151.
Though, as noted above, it is not the case that this separates his analysis of scientific knowledge from that of the logical empiricists, since they too held scientific knowledge to be fallible. Brown argues the contrary, but his argument confuses truth (which they do take to be a necessary condition for knowledge) with certainty or infallibility (which they do not) .
Ibid., p. 152.
Ibid., emphasis added.
This point is developed further in Chapter 8.
Cf. Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity, pp. 121–124.
Brown, pp. 151–152. Cf. also Chapter 1 above, pp. 9–10.
Ibid., p. 153. As Brown justifiably complains (‘Response to Siegel’), this way of putting the point is not quite right. As the next few lines in the text note, Brown distinguishes between two senses of truth: “truth1” which Brown equates with “correct description of reality”; and “truth2” which relativizes truth to current scientific knowledge. It is only the former, not the latter, which Brown gives up on. So strictly speaking, the text and quoted passage attendant to this footnote should read: “. . . it is impossible to ‘discuss meaningfully the truth [i.e. truth1] or falsity of actual scientific theories’.” I am grateful to Brown for drawing my attention to this matter.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 154.
Ibid., p. 100.
Ibid., p. 155.
Recall that Brown’s analysis is meant to apply to the philosophy of science as well as to science itself. Cf. ibid. , pp. 10; 127; 166.
Cf. ibid., e.g. pp. 26, 30, 36.
Ibid., p. 31.
The interested reader may wish to consult Brown’s ‘Response to Siegel’ for further discussion of the issues just treated. Unfortunately, detailed discussion of Brown’s response to the analysis of his book given above would considerably extend an already overly long chapter, and while such discussion would be highly relevant in the context of a study of the new philosophy of science, it is of marginal interest here, in that Brown’s response does not specifically address his defense of relativism.
An additional defender of Kuhn with respect to the issues we have been considering is Wolfgang Stegmüller, who in his> The Structure and Dynamics of Theories presents a reconstruction of Kuhn’s position which, Stegmüller claims, defends Kuhn from his critics (who Stegmüller labels the “critical rationalists”) . Since some philosophers have acclaimed Stegmüller’s reconstruction of Kuhn (for example, Kockelmans in his review of Stegmüller’s book), it is worthwhile here to point out that a positive assessment of Stegmüller’s reconstruction of Kuhn is problematic. While a comprehensive treatment of Stegmüller’s treatise would take us far afield, it is possible to outline briefly the implications of Stegmüller’s reconstrual of Kuhn’s position for the issues presently being considered. These can be summed up as follows: Stegmüller claims that his account of scientific theories clarifies and supports Kuhn’s view of the dynamics of theory change. However, concerning the issues we have been concerned with thus far — incommensurability, incomparability, relativism, rationality, and objectivity — Stegmüller’s reconstrual, rather than defending Kuhn from his critics, actually grants Kuhn’s critics their main points. The features of Kuhn’s original presentation of theory choice, which his critics deplored — for example, the incommensurability of competing paradigms, the non-reducibility of old paradigms to their replacements, and the relativism implied by these positions — are not features of Stegmüller’s reconstrual. On the contrary, according to that reconstrual, normal science is not irrational (p. 158); competing paradigms are not incommensurable (pp. 37, 245); progress during theory change can be objectively measured (p. 242); old paradigms are reducible to new ones (p. 216); a philosophically objectionable relativism is not maintained (pp. 154–7); and the criteria of evaluation of competing paradigms are not paradigm-bound (p. 154). In short, virtually all the aspects of Kuhn’s views that the “critical rationalists” deplore are not aspects of Stegmüller’s reconstrual of Kuhn. Stegmüller’s reconstrual does not rebut Kuhn’s critics; rather, it concedes their main points, and fails to clarify or improve Kuhn’s position concerning incommensurability, comparability, relativism, and the objectivity of scientific theory choice. As indicated, this brief treatihent of Stegmüller is hardly comprehensive, but deals only with Stegmüller’s reconstrual as it concerns the issues being considered in this volume. The reader interested in a more detailed discussion of Stegmüller’s overall view is directed to his book, and to the review of that book by Joseph J. Kockelmans. Kuhn’s attitude towards Stegmüller’s reconstrual is given in his ‘Theory-Change as Structure-Change: Comments on the Sneed Formalism.’ Stegmüller’s further developments of his view are presented in his ‘Structures and Dynamics of Theories: Some Reflections on J.D. Sneed and T.S. Kuhn,’ and his ‘Accidental (“Non-Substantial”) Theory Change and Theory Dislodgement: To What Extent Logic Can Contribute to a Better Understanding of Certain Phenomena in the Dynamics of Theories.’
One might expect, in a book like this, a discussion of Feyerabend’s (views on) relativism. But Feyerabend’s position precludes the possibility of there being any intellectual responsibility to offer such a discussion. So I am simply following his advice and exercising my “Dadaism” in refusing to consider his views here. The legitimacy, on his view, of such a refusal constitutes the cleanest objection to his view I am aware of, and exhibits the impotence of (Feyerabendian) relativism discussed in Chapter 1. Cf. Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science, Chapter 6, esp. p. 127.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1987 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Siegel, H. (1987). The Kuhn-Inspired New Philosophy of Science. In: Relativism Refuted. Synthese Library, vol 189. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7746-5_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7746-5_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-8436-1
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-7746-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive