Abstract
In this chapter I shall attempt to set out Hilbert’s Program in a way that is more revealing than previous treatments. Specificially, I shall try to improve upon preceding accounts of Hilbert’s Porgram in each of the following respects: (1) in isolating and developing the distinctive form of mathematical instrumentalism which is basic to Hilbert’s Program, (2) in defining the central problems which must be overcome in order to successfully defend any form of mathematical instrumentalism, (3) in showing how Hilbert’s finitism can be related to his instrumentalism by natural and illuminating means, and (4) in identifying some important philosophical implications of the program which have hitherto not been brought to light.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
For Frege, a judgement is the acknowledgement of the truth of a thought (cf. Frege [1903], p. 86; [1928], p. 539).
Cf. Putnam [1971], pp. 38–43.
The statement of these two theses and the ensuing conclusion is taken from Hart [1979], pp. 154–5.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1986 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Detlefsen, M. (1986). The Philosophical Fundamentals of Hilbert’s Program. In: Hilbert’s Program. Synthese Library, vol 182. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7731-1_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7731-1_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-8420-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-7731-1
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive