Abstract
If truth-values can be assigned to all propositions, including those dealing with future contingent events, does it not follow that such events are not genuinely contingent? Must they not eventually occur or not occur, as the case may be, just as these propositions state, irrespective of deliberation, choice, and chance, precisely because the facts and true propositions about them must be in accord? And even if we cannot assign truth-values to propositions about future contingent events, owing to our ignorance or to some other impediment, would an omniscient being likewise be so restricted? Would he not have all the requisite knowledge of the facts prior to their occurrence so that they would be determined in advance and therefore not truly contingent? These questions, which together make up the problem of future contingents as it was known to the falāsifa of medieval Islam, elicited an unusual variety of responses from Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes. This variety is all the more noteworthy because they all proceed from a common line of interpretation regarding Aristotle’s intention in De Interpretatione 9, where the issue is first discussed. All three agree that the point of Aristotle’s discussion is to show that we cannot assign truth-values to future contingent propositions, i.e., that some statements are not yet either true or false.
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Notes
Avicenna , al-Shifā’: al-Ilāhiyyāt, G. C. Anawati (ed.), et al., Cultural Dept of the Arab League, Cairo 1960, II, 404ff.
Cf. Averroes, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, M. Bouyges (ed.), Imprimerie Catholique, Beirut 1930, p. 455.
E. Marmura, ‘Some Aspects of Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars’, Journal of the American Oriented Society 82 (1962), 292–312.
Avicenna, al-Shifaā’: al-Ilāhiyyāt Book 10:1; vf. Avicenna, Al-Najā, M. S. Kurdi (ed.), Cultural Dept of the Arab League, Cairo 1938, 302ff. Averroes, Tahâfut al-Tahâfut, p. 497.
Averroes, Aristotelis De Interpretatione… cum Averrois Cordubensis Expositione, Juntas 1574, fol. 81r E.
Ibid., fol. 82v G—I.
Averroes, Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy, G. F. Hourani (ed.), Luzac and Ca, London 1961, p. 73, (Damīma, 129 ll.2–40).
Ibid., p. 74, (Damīma,130 ll.12–15). Cf. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, pp. 462–463, 468.
Ibid., p. 74, (Damīma, 13011.15–19).
Averroes, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, pp. 345, 462.
Aristotle, Metaphysics 13: 1087a 15–21; Averroes, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 345. See also J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto 1963 (2nd edition), pp. 427–30
and Aristotle: The Collected Papers of Joseph Owens, J. R. Catan (ed.), State University of New York Press, Albany, N.Y. 1981, pp. 48–58.
Averroes, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 339.
Qur’an 34:3.
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Kogan, B.S. (1985). Some Reflections on the Problem of Future Contingency in Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes. In: Rudavsky, T. (eds) Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy. Synthese Historical Library, vol 25. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7719-9_6
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