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Distribution According to Desert

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Giving Desert Its Due

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 2))

Abstract

Under the general conception of justice as equilibrium, desert is relevant to justice in distribution only where it expresses an actual burden, that is, when it involves some effort, sacrifice, work, risk, responsibility, inconvenience and so forth, when it is linked with an expenditure of energy and time. It is only this sort of ‘desert’ which should be in justice compensated by social benefits. The general underlying aim of this conception of desert is to screen out all those factors that are ‘unearned’, that are beyond human control, that are dictated by dumb luck, and for which a person cannot claim any credit. Only this notion of desert is consistent with justice considered as an introduction of a conscious moral order into human affairs. Even though, for practical reasons, rewarding according to results, or social contribution, may be sometimes more productive, and certainly easier, from the point of view of justice in distribution it is only the bearing of burdens which calls for compensation aimed at bringing about the equilibrium of advantages and burdens.

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Notes

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  1. Department of Jurisprudence, University of Sydney, Australia

    Wojciech Sadurski

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© 1985 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Sadurski, W. (1985). Distribution According to Desert. In: Giving Desert Its Due. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7706-9_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7706-9_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-8412-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-7706-9

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