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The Concept of Justice

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Giving Desert Its Due

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 2))

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Abstract

What is the use of defining justice? One could argue that a definition of justice should be the product of reflections about justice, rather than a starting point. In the case of evaluative concepts such as liberty, democracy and justice, the distinction between defining and advocating is extremely hard to make. Any such definition presupposes certain values and those values should be defended rather than contained in an inevitably arbitrary definition.

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Notes

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Sadurski, W. (1985). The Concept of Justice. In: Giving Desert Its Due. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7706-9_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7706-9_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-8412-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-7706-9

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