Abstract
The aims of this book were twofold. First, my aim was to demonstrate the relevance of the categories of social justice to legal theory. I have attempted to show that the principles of legal justice cannot stand on their own unless based upon an antecedently accepted set of judgments about social justice. Accordingly, my second aim was to propose and defend a particular conception of social justice.
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Notes
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972 ), p. 302.
See, inter alia,J. J. C. Smart, ‘Distributive Justice and Utilitarianism’, in John Arthur and William H. Shaw, eds., Justice and Economic Distribution (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1978), esp. pp. 106–107.
Rawls, op. cit.,p. 244.
Ibid.,p. 9.
Ibid.,p. 244, see also pp. 203–204.
Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’, Philosophical Review 76 (1967), pp. 312–324.
See Norman Daniels, ‘Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty’, in Norman Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls ( Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975 ), p. 261.
See, in particular Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in his Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); Joel Feinberg, ‘The Idea of a Free Man’, in his Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 3–9; Neil MacCormick, Legal Right and Social Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 9–12, 38–43.
For a thoughful criticism of this distinction, see Daniels, op. cit.; see also Kai Nielsen, ‘Radical Egalitarian Justice: Justice as Equality’, Social Theory and Practice 5 (1979), p. 216.
Rawls, op. cit.,p. 204.
Brian Barry, Political Argument ( London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963 ), pp. 43–44.
See Chapter 5 above.
John Stuart Mill, ‘Utilitarianism’, in Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Essay on Bentham, ed. by Mary Warnock ( London: Collins, 1962 ), p. 320.
Ibid.,p. 314.
Ibid.,p. 315.
Ibid.,p. 315.
Smart, op. cit.,p. 104, footnote omitted.
Ibid., p. 105, footnote omitted.
Lauchlan Chipman, ‘Equality Before (and After) the Law’, Quadrant, March 1980, p. 48.
Alan H. Goldman, Justice and Reverse Discrimination ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979 ), p. 42.
See John Kleinig, Punishment and Desert (The Hague: Martinus A. Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 86–87, who tries to defend ‘practicality’ as an element of justice in law.
See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by C. B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981, 1st ed. 1651), p. 388.
Hirabayashi v. United States,320 U.S. 81 (1943).
Korematsu v. United States,323 U.S. 214 (1944).
U.S. 81, 107 (Douglas, J., concurring).
U.S. 214,216 (Black, J., delivering the opinion of the Court).
Ibid.,p. 223.
Ibid.,p. 244 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Ibid.,p. 244.
Ibid., p. 246.
Melvin J. Lerner, The Belief in a Just World ( New York and London: Plenum Press, 1980 ).
See Jennifer L. Hochschild, What’s Fair? American Beliefs about Distributive Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981). One of her respondents, ‘Bruce’, believes that “the pay structure in the ideal society would ‘be very concerned about skill, contribution, risk and effort.’ Nurses should earn more than performers. Boring jobs should have high pay and short hours; perhaps ‘the more interesting, exciting the job is, the less you ought to be paid. ” (p. 41).
Michael Walzer, ‘Philosophy and Democracy’, Political Theory 9 (1981), p. 393. From this description it does not follow that Walzer advocates this view.
John Rawls, ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’, Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980), p. 518.
W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930 ), p. 156.
See Rawls, A Theory ... , op. cit.,pp. 42–43.
See Scott Gordon, Welfare, Justice, and Freedom ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1980 ), pp. 153–189.
Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty ( London: Oxford University Press, 1969 ), p. 171.
Ibid.,pp. 167–172.
James S. Fishkin, Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Family ( New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983 ), p. 193.
Ibid.
Rawls,A Theory ... , op. cit.,pp. 126–128.
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature,ed. by P. S. Ardall (London: Fontana, 1972), Bk III, Part II, Section II, esp. p. 224.
William A. Galston, Justice and the Human Good (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 6, see also pp. 116–120.
What we are interested in, is not whether the hypothesis of abundance is realistic but whether abundance cancels the relevance of justice talk.
The Mahavamsa or the Great Chronicle of Ceylon,trans. by Wilhelm Geiger (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 199. I am grateful to Prof. C. G. Weeramantry for directing my attention to this text.
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Sadurski, W. (1985). Beyond Social Justice. In: Giving Desert Its Due. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7706-9_10
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