Abstract
The considerations of the previous chapter indicate that the Positivist and Empiricist views can be seen as attempting to demarcate (meaningful) science from (meaningless) non-science on the basis of verifiability and confirmability respectively. Popper’s demarcation between science and non-science, on the other hand, is on the basis of falsifiability. For Popper, if there is no conceivable way that a statement can be shown to be false, while it might still be considered meaningful, it is not scientific but ‘metaphysical’.
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© 1981 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Dilworth, C. (1981). The Basis of the Popperian Conception of Science. In: Scientific Progress. Synthese Library, vol 153. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7655-0_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7655-0_4
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