Abstract
An essential feature of the contractarian conception of justice is that the basic structure of society is the first subject of justice. The contract view begins by trying to work out a theory of justice for this special but plainly very important case; and the conception of justice that results has a certain regulative primacy with respect to the principles and standards appropriate for other cases. The basic structure is understood as the way in which the major social institutions fit together into one system, and how they assign fundamental rights and duties and shape the division of advantages that arises through social cooperation. Thus the political constitution, the legally recognized forms of property, and the organization of the economy, and the nature of the family, all belong to the basic structure. The initial objective of the theory is to find a conception, the first principles of which provide reasonable guidelines for the classical and familiar questions of social justice in connection with this complex of institutions. These questions define the data, so to speak, for which the theory seeks an account. There is no attempt to formulate first principles that apply equally to all subjects. Rather, on this view, a theory must develop principles for the relevant subjects step by step in some appropriate sequence.
This essay is a considerable revision of a paper with the same title presented at the meetings of the American Philosphical Association (Pacific Division) at Portland, Oregon in March 1977 and reprinted in the American Philosophical Quarterly, 14 (April 1977). Sections II and Iii are new. I am indebted to Joshua Cohen, Joshua Rabinowitz, T.M. Scanlon, and Quentin Skinner for valuable discussions on the topic of this paper. To Burton Dreben I am grateful for many improvements; and to Thomas Hill and Hugo Bedau for their instructive comments.
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Notes
In A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971) the basic structure was regarded as the primary subject and discussion focused on this case. See pp. 7ff. But the reasons for this choice of subject and its consequences were not sufficiently explained. Here I want to make good this lack.
I am grateful to Hugo Bedau for pointing out to me the need to emphasize this. In his comments on the earlier version of this paper he noted that the last paragraph of § 2 of A Theory of Justice is particularly misleading in this respect.
See Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (London, 1907).
This fact is regarded as an objection to these principles by J. Harsanyi, ‘Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality,’ American Political Science Review, 69 (June, 1975), 594–606. I cannot reply adequately to Harsanyi’s forceful objections here, but I note the following: the maximin principle was never proposed as a basis for morality; in the form of the difference principle it is one principle constrained by others that applies to the basic structure; and when this principle is seen in this limited role as a criterion of background justice, its implications in normal cases (see footnote 9 below) are not, I believe, implausible. Finally, confining the application of the principles of justice to the basic structure does not imply, contrary to Harsanyi’s suggestion (see p. 605), that only the number of persons involved determines which principles hold for a given case. On this, see the last paragraph in this Section.
I follow the account in Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York, Basic Books, 1974).
I distinguish here and elsewhere below between an as-if historical and an as-if non-historical process (or procedure). In both cases the process is hypothetical in the sense that the process has not actually occurred, or may not have occurred. But as-if historical processes can occur: they are not thought to be excluded by fundamental social laws or natural facts. Thus on the libertarian view, if everyone were to follow the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer, and they can follow them, then the as-if historical process leading to the formation of the state would be realized. By contrast, an as-if non-historical process, for example, the procedure leading up to the agreement in the original position, cannot take place. See below Section VI, p. 58.
These principles are discussed in A Theory of Justice §§ 11-13, and elsewhere. A summary statement, including the principle of just savings and priority rules, is given on pp. 30 2f.
The reason for doing this is that, as a first approximation, the problem of social justice concerns the basic structure as a closed background system. To start with the society of nations would seem merely to push one step further back the task of finding a theory of background justice. At some level there must exist a closed background system, and it is this subject for which we want a theory. We are better prepared to take up this problem for a society (illustrated by nations) conceived as a more or less self-sufficient scheme of social cooperation and as possessing a more or less complete culture. If we are successful in the case of a society, we can try to extent and to adjust our initial theory as further inquiry requires.
The normal range is specified as follows: since the fundamental problem of justice concerns the relations among those who are full and active participants in society, and directly or indirectly associated together over the course of a whole life, it is reasonable to assume that every one has physical needs and psychological capacities within some normal range. Thus the problem of special health care and how to treat the mentally defective are laid aside. If we can work out a viable theory for the normal range, we can attempt to handle these other cases later.
For this way of putting the distinction between a thicker and a thinner veil of ignorance I am indebted to Joshua Rabinowitz.
This formulation of the conditions for the agreement on a just savings principle differs from that in A Theory of Justice, pp. 128f and 291f. There it is not required that the parties must want the previous generations to have followed the principle they adopt as contemporaries. Therefore, assuming that generations are mutually disinterested, nothing constrains them from refusing to make any savings at all. To cope with this difficulty it was stipulated that the parties care for their descendants. While this is a reasonable stipulation, the requirement above has the virtue that it removes the difficulty without changing the motivation assumption. It also preserves the present time of entry interpretation of the original position and coheres with the strict compliance condition and ideal theory generally. I am indebted to Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit for this revision; it is also proposed by Jane English who notes the connection with ideal theory. See her ‘Justice Between Generations’, Philosophical Studies, 31 (1977), 98.
These goods are defined as things that, from the standpoint of the original position, it is rational for the parties to want whatever their final ends (which are unknown to them). They serve as generalized means, so to speak, for realizing all, or most all, rational systems of aims. See A Theory of Justice, pp. 92-95, 396f, 433f.
One aim of Sections VII-VIII is to indicate a reply to David Gauthier’s illuminating critique of the difference principle, ‘Justice and Natural Endowment’, Social Theory and Practice, 3 (1974), 3-26. I refer to his discussion here because his argument depends on being able to distinguish between what is acquired by individuals as members of society and what would have been acquired by them in a state of nature. If this distinction has no useful meaning, then I believe that the way is cleared to meeting Gauthier’s objection. Of course, much more needs to be said. In any case, I fully agree with his remarks on pp. 25f and much of my discussion is designed to show how a Kantian contract view can be stated to accord with them.
See A Theory of Justice, pp. 136, 147; cf 80.
The worth of citizens in a well ordered society is always equal because in such a society everyone is assumed to comply with just institutions and to fulfill their duties and obligations moved, when appropriate, by a sufficiently strong sense of justice. Inequalities do not arise from unequal moral worth; their explanation lies elsewhere.
See below, the second paragraph of Section IX.
These remarks are stated a bit more fully in ‘Reply to Alexander and Musgrave’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 88 (November, 1974), 639-643.
On pure procedural justice, see A Theory of Justice, pp. 84-89, 310-315; and also pp. 64, 66, 72ff, 79, 274-280, 305-310.
Ibid., p. 88.
For this and other measures of inequality, see A. K. Sen, On Economic Inequality (New York, W. W. Norton, 1973). Chapter 2.
See A Theory of Justice, pp. 224-227, 277f, 534-537, 543-546.
See The Philosophy of Right, trans T. M. Knox (Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1942), pp. 58f, 70f, 156f, 186.
See Second Treatise of Government, reading together § § 140 and 158.
For this way of seeing the historical aspect of Locke’s theory I am indebted to Quentin Skinner.
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Rawls, J. (1978). The Basic Structure as Subject. In: Goldman, A.I., Kim, J. (eds) Values and Morals. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7634-5_4
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