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Dissolution of the European Consensus

  • Chapter
The Roman Question and the Powers, 1848–1865

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Abstract

Drouyn de Lhuys, having dealt with Italy in certain terms, by describing the uselessness of further negotiations on the Roman question, turned to London. Perhaps his intention was to separate Italy from England’s influence, though in his first correspondence he confessed that he “despaired of establishing an understanding” with England. He hoped that differences on Italy would not go beyond discussion, the more so as his political views led him “to concert with England on all other questions and particularly on those connected with the East.” 1 This lure of concessions by France in the east was shrugged off by Russell and Palmerston for both ministers were still moved by the severity of Drouyn’s circular of the 18th. It was Palmerston’s intention to send a new note to France, condemning the occupation of Rome.2 But this was a usual practice of England, only made more significant by the new step it had just taken in its Roman policy. As early as September Russell had taken up discussions with his Roman envoy, Odo Russell, who was in London on leave, so as to arrive at a project for removing the pope from Rome.3 The foreign secretary admitted to have no great hope for achieving such a purpose, but it was clear to the English statesmen generally that the willing departure of the pontiff from Rome would remove the pretext France claimed for its continued occupation of the city.

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  52. The principles were as follows:

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  53. mutual good will (z) an internal policy which would not disfigure foreign policy (3) a good understanding to be established between the foreign minister and the minister of war, on instructions to be given to the military authority in Rome (4) respect to be tendered to the pontifical authority (5) limitation of powers in connection with the declaration and mainte-nance of martial law (6) a more decorous comportment toward the soldiers of the pope.

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  54. This note, emphasizing French conduct as a foreign power in occupation, could be of interest to the papacy. Among these general principles the most nagging problem for Franco-Vatican relations was the question of priorities in authority at Rome, a problem not dealt with definitively until November 1863, when the emperor intervened personally by calling Drouyn, Baroche, Randon, and General Montebello into conference. “The aim of this conference,” as expressed in a minute, “was to put an end to the doubts raised for some time over the extent of the rights of the French division in the pontifical states.” After some discussion these rights were specified and introduced by a preamble: “The French division is at Rome invested with all powers of an army in campaign. As a consequence of this great fundamental principle which the existence of French armies abroad rests upon, the following rights have been recognized:

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  55. right of command (command of French and pontifical troops), (2) right of disarmament (and as a natural consequence, right to give permission for the carrying of arms), (3) right to judge by French councils of war crimes or misdemeanors concerning the security of the army, and the security of the soldiers in particular [this last right was expanded to include the processes of martial law along the frontier]. Proceedings of the conference held by the emperor at the palace of St. Cloud, 4 Nov. 1863, AMAE, Mémoires et documents, Rome, 124: 333-334.

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  83. This did not mean that Austria opposed a Catholic guarantee for the papacy. Drouyn had acknowledged in January from a “very confidential source,” that the courts of Madrid and Munich, through the initiative of Austria, prepared “to guarantee to the Holy Father the remainder of the territory in which he still exercises his temporal power, in the event France should withdraw its troops from the pontifical states” (Drouyn to La Tour d’Auvergne, Paris, 27 Jan. 1863, ciphered despatch, AMAE, CP, Rome, roar: 103 [copies sent in cipher to Gramont at Vienna, Barrot at Madrid, and the minister at Munich]).

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  109. Ibid, 248-255, passim

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  115. “The political edifice of Europe,” Napoleon wrote the sovereigns, “resting on the foundations of the negotiations of Vienna in 1815, is collapsing altogether.” The purpose of the congress would be “to order the present and secure the future” (Les origines diplomatiques de la guerre de 1870–1871, recueil de documents publié par le ministère des affaires étrangères [cited henceforth as Les origines] (Paris, 191o), I, 1).

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  118. Pirri, Documenti, 254–257 editor’s note.

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  120. Francis Joseph to Napoleon III, 17 November 1863, ibid, fols. 69–7o.

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  121. William I to Napoleon III, 17 November 1863, ibid., 66–68.

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  123. “Your Majesty will have learnt,” Palmerston wrote the King of the Belgians the previous March, “that we have declined to fall into the trap the emperor of the French laid for us, by his scheme for a violent identical note to be presented to the government of Prussia. It was intended that, the demands of such a note being refused or evaded, a pretense would thereby have been afforded to France for an occupation of the Prussian Rhenish provinces” (Palmerston to the King of the Belgians, 94 Piccadilly Circus, 13 March 1863, Palmerston papers, private letter book [1863], fol. 80). Palmerston’s hard feelings were immensely aggravated later in the same year when Clarendon, returning from the Frankfort Conference of German princes, stopped at Paris on his way to London. An angry meeting then occurred between the English envoy and Drouyn de Lhuys, followed by a frank and uncomfor table audience with Napoleon. The emperor and the envoy debated most questions of Europe which were at issue, both charging the other with bad faith, both criticizing the misconstructions in the other’s motives. Led at last to the subject of Rome, Napoleon was frank but adamant. In Clarendon’s view the emperor intended to make the pope “Italiano” [Clarendon’s quotations]. Until this was accomplished the emperor would not insist again upon reform of the papacy. He had, said Napoleon to Clarendon, “taken no engagements beyond the present pope’s life” (Clarendon to Russell, Chantilly, 31 Aug. 1863, private, Clarendon papers, C 104, fols. 2o6—z I I, passim)

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  124. Verbali dei ministri, 1861–1867, I, 73-75.

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  125. Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, 7 March 1864, Note confidentielle sur l’affaire d’Italie, HHSA, PA, IX, Frankreich, 79: 27–45, passim

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  126. Rechberg to Bach, Vienna, without date, HHSA, PA, XI, Vatikan, 205.

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  127. Bach to Rechberg, Rome, 21 Nov. 1863, telegram, ibid, 203: 476.

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  128. Same to same, Rome, 21 Nov. 1863, confidential, ibid, 486–487.

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  129. “The emperor Napoleon,” he began, “in proposing a reunion of a European congress has only realized a project that we have recognized in him for a long time. We have never been, and are not now partial to the idea of a European congress. In principle we do not believe that it has any efficacy for smoothing away difficulties. But more, we see grave inconveniences for the special interests of Austria which cannot fail to be seriously affected by the multiplicity of questions raised in a meeting of this kind. In the present circumstances, however, it would seem preferable not to offer privately at once a categorical refusal to the Emperor Napoleon…. We have been confirmed in this view by the attitude of the English government which, little inclined on its part to favor the reunion of the congress, has decided thus like us to give a dilatory response. It is important for us not to find ourselves isolated in this question, and not to cause reproaches to fall on us alone for having caused an abortive project, conceived in appearance by an aim for pacification. We would like to hope that Austria and England will not be alone in observing such an attitude and that the aim we propose will be facilitated by the line of conduct other governments will trace. It goes without saying that we attach a particular importance to the marche the imperial court of Russia will follow (Rechberg to Thun, Vienna, 19 Nov. 1863, reserved, ibid, PA, X, Russland, 53: 451-452).

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  130. Wimpffen to Russell, confidential note, undated, PRO 30/22/45. It was no doubt the question of Venetia alone which provoked England’s entente with Austria on the problem of Napoleon’s congress proposal. It was the intention of the French emperor, declared Russell, to bring both the Roman and Italian questions onto the agenda for a congress. The aim in doing this, he thought, was to preserve Rome, thus to limit Italy’s ambitions; and while none of this would be contrary to England’s fundamental policies, nor to Austria’s, it was the uncertain intentions Napoleon entertained for Venetia, which caused the government of England and Austria to draw together: neither country could accept the independence of Venetia, because in the Austrian view this spelled the end of Habsburg influence in Italy; because in the English view it was a way for France to revive its project of confederation for Italy (Wimpffen to Baron Aldenburg, London, 11 Novenber 1863, Wimpffen papers, HHSA).

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  131. Wimpffen to Russell, 12 November 2863, PRO 30/22/45.

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  132. Pingaud, “Un projet de désarmement de Napoléon III,” 11.

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  133. Palmerston to the King of the Belgians, 94 Piccadilly Circus, 13 March 1863, Palmerston papers, Private Letter Book (1863), fol. 80.

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  134. Wimpffen to Rechberg, London, 6 November 1863, HHSA, PA, VIII, England, 61: 1–2. 2 Apponyi to Rechberg, London, 21 November 1863, telegram, ibid, 6r: 432.

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  135. Queen Sophia to Lord Clarendon, The Hague, 23 January 1864, Maxwell, II, 285–286.

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  136. Russell to Cowley, Foreign Office, 25 November 1863, AMAE, CP, Angleterre, 727: 8999, passim

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  137. Palmerston to the King of the Belgians, 94 Piccadilly Circus, 15 November 1863, Palmerston papers, Private Letter Book (1863), fols. 126–132, passim This letter is reproduced in Ashley, II, 424–425.

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  138. Palmerston to Russell, 94 Piccadilly Circus, 2 December 1863, Palmerston papers, Private Letter Book (1863), fols. 133-134.

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  139. Rechberg to Bach, Vienna, 8 December 1863, HHSA, PA, XI, Vatikan, 205: 91. Napoleon’s bitterness was matched by that of the empress, who betrayed the extravagant designs of the Tuileries when she said that Austria’s intrigue for preventing the meeting of the congress absolved France of any legal responsibility for maintaining the agreements contracted at Villafranca and Zurich (Cowley to Russell, Chantilly, 29 November 1863, PRO FO 519/23). Napoleon’s remarks were more pertinent, more ominous, when he made a prediction which Nigra seconded: with the failure of the congress proposal, said the emperor, the king of Italy “would be forced to try his strength with Austria” (Same to same, Compiègne, 11 December 1863, ibid.)

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  140. France now called for a congrès restreint, a conference which was to meet (as Bismarck notified his king) “without England, to be held by the foreign ministers.” To this note King William penned a marginal addition: “How hostile would England be toward us if we arranged things with France without her!” (Bismarck to William I, Berlin, 10 December 1863 (The correspondence of William I and Bismarck with other letters from and to Prince Bismarck, trans., J. A. Ford [New York, 1903], I, 35).

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  141. L. Lipparini, Minghetti, II, 362, as cited by Demaria. 36o.

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    Ivan Scott

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Scott, I. (1969). Dissolution of the European Consensus. In: The Roman Question and the Powers, 1848–1865. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7541-6_8

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