Abstract
In this chapter, I want to show how players can use the dialogue rules to keep order within their epistemic alternatives. Let us first consider how one may check for the consistency of one’s assumptions. Let the topic of interest be the question
-
(1)
Who won? about which the subject already holds the assumptions
-
(2)
A is a player, B is a player, A is not B, and A won. Then someone comes and suggests to him
-
(3)
B is the player who won. The player wants to see if he can accept (3) along with his other assumptions. In order to know, he has to explain what (3) actually means. Applying (C.the), he tries the explanation
-
(4)
A is a player who won, any player who won is A and B is A. But a simple application of (Cand) forces him to infer ‘B is A’, contradicting his earlier assumptions. So that explanation will not work. The only alternative explanation is
-
(5)
B is a player who won, any player who won is B, and B is B. This time there is a problem with the second conjunct, for (C.any) allows the inference
-
(6)
If A is a player who won, A is B.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Bibliography
Boër, S. and W. Lycan, ‘Invited inferences and other unwelcome guests’, Papers in Linguistics 6 (1973), 483–505.
Castaneda, H., ‘On the logic of self-knowledge’, Noûs 1 (1967), 9–21.
Castaneda, H., ‘On the logic of attributing self-knowledge to others’, Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), 439–456.
Castaneda, H., ‘On knowing (or believing) that one knows (or believes)’, Synthese 21 (1970), 187–203.
Collins, A., Unconscious belief, Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969), 667–680.
Geach, P., On beliefs about oneself, Analysis 18 (1957), 23–24.
Geis, M., and A. Zwicky, ‘On invited inferences’, Linguistic Inquiry 2/4 (1971).
Ginet, G, ‘What must be added to knowing to obtain knowing that one knows’, Synthese 21 (1970), 113–186.
Gordon, D. and G. Lakoff, ‘Conversational postulates’, CLS 7, Chicago Linguistic Society, Chicago 1971, 63–84.
Grice, P., ‘Further notes on logic and conversation’, in P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9: Pragmatics, Academic Press, New York 1978, pp. 113–127.
Harnish, R., ‘Logical form and implicature’, in T. Bever, J. Katz and D. Langendoen (eds.), An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Ability, Harvester Press, Sussex 1977.
Hilpinen, R., ‘Knowing that one knows and the classical definition of knowledge’, Synthese 21 (1970), 109–132.
Hintikka, J., ‘Knowing oneself and other problems of epistemic logic’, Theoria 32 (1966), 1–13.
Hintikka, J., ‘On attributions of “self-knowledge”’, Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 73–87.
Hintikka, J., ‘Knowing that one knows reviewed’, Synthese 21 (1970), 141–161.
Horn, L., ‘Greek Grice : A brief survey of protoconversational rules in the history of logic’, CLS 9, Chicago Linguistic Society, 1973, 205–214.
Hungerland, I., ‘Contextual implication’, Inquiry 3 (1960), 211–258.
Johnson-Laird, P. and M. Steedman, ‘The psychology of syllogisms’, Cognitive Psychology 10 (1978), 64–99.
Johnson-Laird, P., ‘Models of deduction’, in R. Falmagne (ed.), Reasoning: Representations and Processes in Adults and Children, Erlbaum, Hillsdale N.J.
Karttunen, L., and S. Peters, ‘Conventional implicature’, in Goh and D. Dinneen (eds.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 11: Presupposition, Academic Press, New York 1979, pp. 1–56.
Kummer, W., ‘Aspects of a theory of argumentation’, in E. Giilich and W. Raible (eds.), Textsorten, Athenäum, Frankfurt 1972, pp. 25–50.
Kummer, W., ‘Pragmatic implication’, in J. Petöfi and H. Rieser (eds.), Studies in Text Grammar, D. Reidel, Dordrecht 1973, pp. 96–112.
Lakoff, G., ‘Pragmatics and natural logic’, in E. Keenan (ed.), Formal Semantics of Natural Languages, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1975.
Lehrer, K., ‘Believing that one knows’, Synthese 21 (1970), 133–140.
Morgan, J., ‘Conversational postulates revisited’, Language 53 (1977), 277–284.
Ochs Keenan, E., ‘The universality of conversational postulates’, Language in Society 5 (1976), 67–80.
Pailthorp, C., ‘Hintikka and knowing that one knows’, Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967), 487–500.
Sadock, J., ‘Modus brevis: The truncated argument’, CLS 13, Chicago Linguistic Society, Chicago, Ill. 1977, 545–554.
Sadock, J., ‘On testing for conversational implicature’, in P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9: Pragmatics, Academic Press, New York 1978, pp. 281–297.
de Sousa, R., ‘Knowledge, consistent belief, and self-consciousness’, Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 66–73.
Walker, R., ‘Conversational implicatures’, in S. Blackburn (ed.), Meaning, Reference and Necessity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1975, 133–181.
Wiggins, D., ‘On knowing, knowing that one knows and consciousness’, in E. Saarinen et al. (eds.), Essays in Honour of Jaakko Hintikka, D. Reidel, Dordrecht 1979, pp. 237–248.
Wilson, D., and D. Sperber, ‘On Grice’s theory of conversation’, in P. Werth (ed.), Conversation, Speech and Discourse, Croom Helm 1981.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1983 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Carlson, L. (1983). Logic of Dialogue. In: Dialogue Games. Synthese Language Library, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-3963-0_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-3963-0_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-1951-5
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-3963-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive