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Realism and Phenomenology

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Abstract

My thesis in the following pages is that the terms “realism” and “phenomenology” signify inseparable aspects of a single discipline. Their intrinsic correlation is revealed by the fact that the world must be an “object of awareness” and that human consciousness is primordi-ally “awareness of the world.” My aim is to clarify this correlation as residing in the intentional nature of consciousness and to show that its understanding leads to a realism that is one with phenomenology, and vice versa.

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References

  1. For a more detailed account of the problem of the given, see Wild, John, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” in the Return to Reason (ed. by John Wild), Chicago, 1953.

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  2. For a detailed discussion of these “pervasive data” of experience, see Wild, John, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” in the Return to Reason (ed. by John Wild), Chicago, 1953.

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  3. For further consideration of these all-pervasive data as philosophical, not natural scientific, data, see loc. cit.

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  4. For further discussions of intentionality, see Francis Parker’s essay, pp. 158 ff., and Henry Veatch, pp. 179 ff. in The Return to Reason.

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  5. See below, p. 106, for a further reason why empirical psychology must fail of its object -consciousness.

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  6. See above, pp. 101–102. If reflection has thus shown the essential impossibility of a natural science of consciousness, the fact can no longer surprise us that there is no empirical psychology but only a congeries of speculative theories of mind, personality, and so forth.

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  7. Again see Parker’s essay, already cited in Note 4, above.

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© 1966 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

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Chapman, H.M. (1966). Realism and Phenomenology. In: Natanson, M. (eds) Essays in Phenomenology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-3427-7_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-3427-7_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-015-2204-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-3427-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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