The Austro-Hungarian Dilemma

Abstract

War in its initial stages generally has the effect of fostering an atmosphere of unity within each of the belligerent powers. The Burgfriede in Germany, the French Union Sacré, and the closing of ranks in the British Isles all testified to solidarity in the face of crisis. Superficially the Dual Monarchy experienced the same unity. Professions of loyalty to the Hapsburgs came from every national group. Mobilization proceeded with a minimum of incidents. Enthusiasm for victory was in the air. The professional pessimists in Vienna admitted their surprise at the vitality of the state, and former skeptics acclaimed the ‘Austrian Miracle.’ ¹ Ominous, however, was the fact that the Austrian parliament, of all the legislative bodies in the belligerent nations, had not been called into session to debate or ratify the decision for war. From the outset Hungary declared her virtual administrative independence, although the Tisza regime ruled with the aid of the War Service Act of 1913 and the secret War Surveillance Office. Identical secret and unconstitutional measures at once changed the temper of government in Austria. The diplomats had failed to preserve the Monarchy by peaceful means; now the generals, supported by the civilian bureaucracy, sought to perpetuate its existence by force. Assuming an eventual victory, and for the immediate purposes of military efficiency, they introduced a ruthless and destructive rule by usurpation of civil authority, by centralization and Germanization. Five of the eight major nationalities of the Monarchy—the Czechs, Slovaks, Roumanians, Serbians, and Italians—were from the very outset suspect of high treason and subject to execution, persecution, and confiscation of their national literatures. These nationalities had ample reason to fear a victorious Austria-Hungary, little matter whether it stood alone or was integrated into some form of Mitteleuropa.²