Reparations or Hegemony? The Background and Development of Poincaré’s Ruhr Policy

Abstract

Any appraisal of French policy in dealing with the Ruhr must be predicated upon a general understanding of the French governmental system as it prevailed under the Third Republic. This may be described as cabinet government without a clear-cut two party system and a dominant majority party — a cabinet government based on coalitions which were constantly shifting, as blocs in the Chamber of Deputies transfered their allegiance from one coalition to another. There was a dual executive with a president, who was generally weak and ineffective, and a premier whose fortunes depended in large part upon his leadership of the majority coalition in the Chamber, a possible vote of no confidence either in the Chamber or the Senate, and the fluctuations of public opinion throughout France.

Note carefully what I tell you. In six months, a year, five years, ten years, when they wish and as they wish, the Boches will invade us.” Georges Clemenceau (1927)

Poincaré fought his case with determination, with obstinacy, blind to any interest other than that of France in the narrowest sense. He was not far from complete success. He was also not far from compromising the whole future of European pacification. His aim was to make France supreme on the continent, supported by satellite allies in Eastern and Central Europe, viscount D’Abernon (1930)