Charles Evans Hughes and the Emergence of the Dawes Plan

Abstract

While the Wilson Administration had witnessed the gradual emergence of the French Rhine-Saar-Ruhr policy from the Armistice to the eve of the occupation of Duisburg, Düsseldorf, and Ruhrort in March, 1921, it remained for the ensuing Harding and Coolidge governments to face up to the critical challenge of the occupation of 1923 and its serious ceonomic and political implications. It was Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, described by a leading authority in American diplomatic history as “one of the ablest men who ever held that office,” who was called upon to assume the major role in steering American policy during this discouraging period.1 An overview of United States policy relative to the Ruhr and adjacent areas from March, 1921, to the acceptance ofthe Dawes Plan in 1924 is the objective of this chapter.

The action of France is, in my judgment, without authority under the Versailles Treaty. It is a defiance of international order and peace. It is an offense against humanity; what she is doing will not bring compensation but it will bring supreme suffering, not only to the Germans but to the people throughout Europe, and incalculable loss to our own people. Senator William E. Borah (January 22, 1923)