The Traditional Law Concerning the Responsibility of The State for Actions of Private Persons

  • Manuel R. García-Mora

Abstract

The international responsibility of the state for wrongful acts of private persons against foreign nations is a phase of the general law of international responsibility under international law. While the rules concerning certain areas of state responsibility are well established,1 its liability for hostile actions of individuals remains to be defined.2 It is perhaps for this reason that most discussions of state responsibility deal with fairly well accepted doctrines, such as responsibility for unauthorized acts of governmental officials or for acts of individuals resulting in injury to aliens. In discussing state liability involving actions of private persons against other nations, authoritative guidance will therefore be sought in more settled branches of the law. Inadvertence to these preliminary matters may explain the inconclusiveness of attempted solutions to the problem, and the almost insuperable difficulties which it raises.

Keywords

Private Individual Private Person World Community International Obligation Foreign Nation 
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References

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Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands 1962

Authors and Affiliations

  • Manuel R. García-Mora
    • 1
  1. 1.Fordham UniversityUSA

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