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Abstract

The program suggested in this book rests upon the twin conceptions that the state is internationally responsible for hostile actions of individuals committed within its jurisdiction, and that the private person involved is similarly liable under international law. A twofold control of unlawful actions of private persons is therefore suggested, namely, one through the responsibility of the state; and, the other, through the direct responsibility of the individual. Both of these conceptions ultimately prevent hostile actions of individuals both from going unpunished and from remaining outside of the province of the law. For the immediate purpose of this book, the most important result of these conceptions is the expectation of an international community in which certain private actions affecting the good relations between nations may be effectively controlled, thus helping to realize mankind’s yearning for peace and security.

Keywords

International Criminal Court Private Action Legal Order International Crime Private Person 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

  1. 1.
    J. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, pp. 383–384 (1954).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    For a general plea in this connection, see H. J. Morgenthau, “The Dilemmas of Freedom,” Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., Vol. 51, p. 714 (1957).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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    Cf. C. Rousseau, Droit International Public, p. 374 (1953).Google Scholar
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    This is essential if legal objections are to be met. See P. M. Carjeu, “Quelques Aspects du Nouveau Projet de Statut des Nations Unies pour une Jurisdiction Criminelle Internationale,” Rev. Gén. de Droit Int. Public. Vol. 50, pp. 401Google Scholar
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    This is essential if legal objections are to be met. See P. M. Carjeu, “Quelques Aspects du Nouveau Projet de Statut des Nations Unies pour une Jurisdiction Criminelle Internationale,” Rev. Gén. de Droit Int. Public. Vol. 50, pp. 405Google Scholar
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    Borrowed from J. Stone, Aggression and World Order: A Critique of United Nations Theories of Aggression, p. 183 (1958).Google Scholar
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    Q. Wright, “Intervention, 1956,” Am. J. Int. L., Vol. 51, pp. 266 (1957).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands 1962

Authors and Affiliations

  • Manuel R. García-Mora
    • 1
  1. 1.Fordham UniversityUSA

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