Abstract
Without at length going into the perennial problem of jurisprudence respecting the nature and definition of law, we may take it as agreed that law contains norms 1), which claim to be binding and call for enforcement and realization in the external world 2). Moreover every legal system has its remedial or procedural norms 3), that is to say, that part of the law which treats of the procedure by which legal rights are protected and duties enforced and controversies in regard thereto settled.
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References
By norms is meant propositions which do not purport to state facts but to set up standards to which conduct ought to conform. That law is normative is generally agreed; controversy is confined to dispute with respect to the differentia specifica between law and other social norms. Verdross, Verfassung 1. But see Laun, Recht und Sittlichkeit, 2ed. 1927; Radbruch, Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie, 1915, 54, who regard law unsupported by moral obligation as a mere threat that force will be exerted under certain specified circumstances. See also Pollock, Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics, 1882, 49–50; Sander in 10 Archiv, d. öff. Rt. (n. F.) (1926) 193; Holmes, J. in Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. (1909) 347, 356.
Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 1925, 125; Schultze 52; Sir John Fischer Williams, Chapters, 1, 2. Chiovenda 44–5: „Le norme giuridiche tendono ad attuarsi. La coazione è inerente all’idea del diritto, non nel senso che per aversi diritto si debba poterlo effetivamente attuare, ma nel senso che esse tende ad attuarsi con tutte le forze che sono di fatto a sua disposizione”. E. Huber, Recht und Rechtsverwirklichung, 1921 242: „Nun ist die Rechtsordnung ihrem Wesen nach dazu bestimmt, verwirklicht zu werden”. Scholten, Algemeen Deel Assers Handleiding, 1931, 130: „Uit zijn aard vraagt het recht om verwerkelijking”.
Just as Jèze maintains that every state has an administrative law. Principes généraux du Droit administratif, 1925, I, 1. This does not mean that the science of procedure is developed in every legal system. Prozessrechtswissenschaft as we now know it did not arise until the middle of the nineteenth century in Germany. Neuner 11; Binder 1–4. It has since flourished in Italy, but more feebly in France. Vizioz (1927) 165 ff., Millar 5. For the contrast between international law and its science, see Verdross, Règles, 30 Rec. 1929—V, 275. According to Kunz, On the theoretical Basis of the Law of Nations, Transactions of the Grotius Society (1925) 10: 115, there has always been international law but the science began with Grotius.
A legal system might forbid self-help, but furnish no judicial remedy whatever. (That is in fact the case if interim protection is not available, and the ordinary judicial procedure is too cumbersone to be of value to plaintiff). A similar situation would arise in international law if war were renounced without any provision for pacific settlement of disputes. Abandonment of war as a means of settling controversies does not necessitate establishment of an alternative mode of settlement. Pollard, The League of Nations, 1918, 50; Sir John Fischer Williams, in 10 Int. Aff. (1931) 343. Nevertheless prohibition of private war and provision for the administration of justice should go hand in hand. Kunz 47; Telders 7. Otherwise injustice with impunity would be permitted. Dumbauld, Automatic Arbitration, 12 World Tomorrow (1929) 72. The peace movement in its early stages concerned itself with promoting pacific settlement, and did not demand outright renunciation of war. Dumbauld, in 30 P.A.W., November 1, 1929, 152.
All French treatises treat in turn organisation judiciare, compétence, procédure proprement dite. Pigeau, the first professor of procedure and collaborator in drafting the code, wrote: „Pour obtenir la justice, il faut la réclamer; on doit ensuite instruire le juge de la justice de sa prétention; lorsqu’il est éclairé, il doit décider. Si les juges se sont trompés ou ont été trompés, le condamné doit avoir le droit de demander la réformation de leur décision. S’il ne le fait ou si, l’ayant fait, la décision est maintenue, et qu’il ne veuille pas l’exécuter, il faut l’y contraindre. La procédure est donc composée de cinq parties principales: la demande ou réclamation, l’instruction, le jugement, les voies à prendre contre le jugement, et l’exécution du jugement”. Pigeau considered this order as established by the nature of things; and „depuis plus d’un siècle, les processualistes français n’ont pas cessé de transmettre pieusement cette révélation”. Vizioz (1928) 29–31.
Cf. Schüle 57.
Pollock, Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics, 1882, 58–9; Millar 94–5, 145; Schultze 88.
Rules as to execution form part of remedial law, whether the proceeding is entrusted to the courts as in Austria (Exekutionsordnung § 3) or to the executive branch of government, as in the United States, where on a celebrated occasion the President, Andrew Jackson, displeased with a decision rendered by the eminent Chief Justice is reported to have said: „John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it”. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, 1922, II, 219. See Schultze 534.
Such as Mandatsverfahren, or the Swiss procedure „zur schnellen Handhabung klaren Rechtes”. See p. 56–7 infra; Zürich ZPO § 292 (1).
Where a plain, downright violation of international law is committed, it serves no useful purpose to apply to a court of law and justice for a decision as to what the law is. What is needed is a police jurisdiction to repress the wrongful conduct. When there are no doubtful or disputed questions at issue, arbitration is of no value, van Vollenhoven, The Three Stages in the Evolution of the Law of Nations, 1919, 43–4. Cf. Arnold 633.
See however § 13 of the Covenant.
Vizioz (1927) 165–70, 260; Binder 1; Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts, V (1841) 2, 4; Bethmann-Hollweg 208–9.
Binder 118. So in C. J. Can. § 1667: „Quodlibet jus non solum actione munitur, nisi aliud expresse cautum sit, sed etiam exceptione, quae semper competit et est suapte natura perpetua”. But even in a developed legal system some rights may have no remedy, because the injury may be too trifling, or enforcement impracticable. Cf. Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal Action, 27 Int. J. Eth. (1917) 150–167; Hahl v. Sugo, 169 N.Y. 109 (1901); Jèze, in 35 RGDIP (1928) 82–3, citing Principes I, 279, 280 (3ed. 1925). As to naturalis obligatio, see Scholtens, De geschiedenis der natuurlijke verbintenis sinds het romeinsche recht, 1931.
See Morgan, Introduction to the Study of Law, 1926; Maitland, Equity and the Forms of Action, 1909; Chitty, Pleading and Parties to Actions, 1809; Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 1913; Shipman, Handbook of Common Law Pleading, 3ed. 1923; Clark, the Code Cause of Action, 33 Yale LJ (1924) 817–837; Mc Caskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 Yale LJ (1925) 614–651.
Windscheid 3, 229. Roman law was thus akin to the English common law system of forms of action before the modern reforms.
Bruns pointed out that it held good in Roman law only for praetorian law but not for the jus Quiritium. When the lex said ita jus esto, it created rights directly, and not actions. An action was of course the corollary of such a right. But when the praetor granted an action not founded on a law, it was an action and nothing more. There was no right apart from the action. Binder 21–22.
Muther, Actio 11, 48.
Binder 115.
Binder 33, 280.
Chiovenda 101: „La norma che concede Pazione non è certo formale, perchè garantisce un bene della vita”. But it is a norma processuale. Just as Kriegsrecht includes not only Recht im Kriege, but also Recht zum Krieg, so diritto processuale includes more than procedimento.
Chiovenda 662; cf. Bülow 2.
Goldschmidt declares that this idea is unfruitful, because no rights or duties arise out of the relation itself. Zivilprozessrecht 4. See also Schultze 290. Morelli 175 considers the concept inapplicable in international law, but Salvioli 65 ff. adopts it.
Chiovenda 46: „L’azione è un bene e un diritto per sè stante”. Kohler, in 33 ZZP 218: „Wir haben das Zivilrecht als wirkendes Element aus dem Prozess hinausgetrieben”. Mortara, Commentario, 2ed. II, 561: „L’Azione è un diritto, vale a dire un diritto per se stante, che non si confonde con la pretesa che ne forma oggetto… si puô definire l’azione….: il diritto di provocare l’esercizio dell’autorità giurisdizionale dello stato, o in genere degli organi alVuopo abilitati, contro le violazioni che stimiamo patite, per qualsiasi fatto altrui, positivo o negativo, da un diritto che noi affermiamo appartenerci”. (Italics ours).
Binder 2; Chiovenda ix.
Binder 1; Degenkolb 2.
Binder 6, 125; Bekker II, 252: „Wo Aktion und Anspruch beide völlig selbständig auftreten, muss ihr Zusammensein als Zufälligkeit gelten”.
Morelli 182–3 accepts the „abstract” view of the action for international law, because disputes between states may be decided in accordance with standards differing from the law in force.
Modern civil procedure regards defense against an action as a privilege of the defendant, not a duty. „Einlassungszwang” really does not exist. Wach, in 14 Krit. Viert. (1872) 605; cf. Wach, Defensionspflicht und Klagerecht, 6 Grünhuts Zt. (1879) 515–558. Kunz 49 sees an „Einlassungszwang” in the duty of members of the League to bring their disputes before the Council. League procedure thus differs from judicial proceedings. See p. 27 infra.
Cf. Star Busmann, I, 149.
Cf. Duguit, Traité de Droit constitutionnel, 2ed. 1922, II, 322: „L’action, c’est la possibilité de demander au juge de résoudre une question de droit et de prendre une décision qui soit la conséquence logique de la solution qu’il donne à la question de droit”.
The existence of such rules we have seen to be a characteristic mark of judicial, as distinguished from political or administrative, discretion. See p. 4 supra.
Neuner 10. Normally the second class of rules is identical with substantive law, except for the limitations mentioned in note 1, p. 12 supra.
Miscarriage of justice by reason of impossibility to ascertain the true facts is a perennial peril. But it is also possible for a tribunal to be bound to decide a case according to a rule of law (Entscheidungsnorm) which in fact is not the law governing the case. Thus a common law court without equity powers can not give equitable relief, though the rules of equity be in fact part of the law of the land; a national court may be obliged to convict a foreigner for a crime committed abroad, where the national law was not in force; article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, according to Strupp, leads to a decision based on law different from that applicable to the case before submission to that tribunal. Note 1, p. 177 infra.
Star Busmann I, 159 considers this doctrine to be of slight utility.
For an appraisal of Hellwig’s rigorously logical system of procedural science, see Binder 4; Stein, in Der Zivilprozess: Vier Vorträge, 83.
See note 1, p. 12 supra.
Thus the Swiss federal court, which has separate sections for public and private law cases, in a recent decision (R.O. 56–11, no. 55, 1 July 1930, 318, at 322) adhered to the present practice of the court in treating as a private law case (Zivilsache) a question of procedural law regarding interim protection, though two pages further on it speaks of „den publizistischen Rechtsschutzanspruch auf vorsorgliche Verfügungen”, recognizing that in theory the topic would be classified under public law.
Note 1, p. 4 supra.
P. 8 supra. What we call procedural law deals with what Anzilotti treats in vol. 3 of his Corso, and now describes as „attuazione del diritto nella comunità internazionale”. Corso, 3ed. 1928, v. Morelli 208–9 rejects the maintenance of law or rights as the function of international jurisdiction. He lays stress on solution of controversies, whether in accordance with law or otherwise.
See note 6, p. 13 supra.
Anzilotti, Corso, 3ed. 1928, 270 contends that international organs are organs of the states concerned. Nevertheless they are created by an agreement based on international law, and the view of Verdross, Verfassung 79 is to be preferred.
Telders 10 regards article 11 of the Covenant as a provision of public order, exacting peace in the interest of all nations, even if the two parties fighting have agreed voluntarily to disregard an arbitral award and resort to war. But this hardly means that article 11 is different in quality from other rules of international law. It merely modifies former practice in that it gives members of the League a legally recognized interest, not only in wars immediately concerning them, but in all wars or threats of war. Just as a state may possess rights in territory not adjacent to its own, so it may have rights that peace be preserved in territory far from its own.
International law admits self-help to a much greater degree than the law of any modern civilized state. Anzilotti, Corso, 3 ed. 1928, 44: „un apparato istituzionale per la realizzazione coattiva del diritto…. manca in gran parte o è rudimentale…. (divenendo cosi normale quel fatto dell’ auto-tutela, che nelle organizzazioni statali è una figura rigorosamente eccezionale)”. See p. 9 supra.
See Mortara, in note 6, p. 13 supra.
Chiovenda 226: „Il potere giuridico d’ottenere uno di questi provvedimenti è una forma per sè stante d’azione (azione assicurativa); ed è mera azione, che non può considerarsi come accessorio del diritto cautelato, perchè essa esista come potere attuale quando ancora non si sa se il diritto cautelato esista; e mentre il convenuto non ha alcun obbligo di cautela prima del provvedimento del giudice”.
Hellwig 1; Rosenberg 3; Schulte 181; Rintelen 4; Muck 3. Cf. Chiovenda 58. Another classification of actions is into declaratory, executable, or constitutive (Fest-stellungsklage, Leistungsklage, Rechtsgestaltungsklage). The action with a view to security then falls in the third group, as it modifies the existing situation by creating new rights of security. Stein, Grundriss 25–6.
See, e.g., Austrian EO § 1.
Chiovenda 137: „La sentenza che accoglie la domanda deve attuare la legge come se ciò avvenisse al momento della domanda giudiziale: la durata del processo non deve andare a detrimento dell’attore”.
Bellot 23; Walker, Grundriss des Exekutionsrechtes, 1913, 48; Muther, Sequestration 274.
Arrestprozess 79.
Kisch 76.
German-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, 29 July 1924, 5 TAM 459: „Par les mesures conservatoires les tribunaux cherchent à rémédier aux lenteurs de la justice, de manière qu’autant que possible l’issue du procès soit la même que s’il pouvait se terminer en un jour”. Cf. Glasson-Tissier, 3ed. 1925, II, 17: „La juridiction des référés aide ainsi à réaliser en partie ce principe idéal de la procédure d’après lequel le demandeur doit, s’il triomphe, avoir la situation qu’il aurait obtenue par une justice rendue immédiatement. Elle est un remède à la lenteur des procès. Grace à elle on obtient une protection provisoire qui souvent devient définitive parce que le litige se trouve supprimé; la mesure ordonnée a déjoué la fraude, paralysé la mauvaise foi”.
Schulte 25. Sicherungsverfahren is partly Erkenntnisverfahren and partly Vollstreckungsverfahren. The indication and execution of interim measures should be carefully distinguished, especially in international law, where tribunals have no power to execute their decisions. See § 13 infra.
See Hellwig 13–15.
P. 5 supra.
The analogy is mentioned by several writers, van Leer 19; Schulte 30; Goldschmidt, Zivilprozessrecht 320; Hellwig, Klagrecht 15: „Inhaltlich ist dieses privatrechtliche Notrecht des § 229 keineswegs ein Recht zur Selbstbefriedigung…. Ist der Arrest eine provisorische Sicherung, so stellen jene Selbsthilfehandlungen also nur ein Provisorium des Provisoriums dar”.
Pasquier 59 distinguishes „actes conservatoires” (actes d’administration”) from „mesures conservatoires”. If there exists a controversy, what would otherwise be a pure measure of conservation or administration becomes a measure of interim protection. Austrian ABGB § 932 (a), Italian C. Com. § 71, sale of defective animal or perishable commodities pendente lite.
Muck 5–6.
See Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 4ed. IV, § 1483 ff.
See p. 5 supra. For this reason it has been contended that where a rapid procedure is ordinarily available for cases requiring celerity, as in French commercial courts, resort to interim measures is thereby precluded. Mérignac-Miguel, II, 46. Both modes of procedure might be rendered unnecessary in some cases by making the ordinary procedure more rapid. Cf. Klein, in GZ (1911) nr. 41, p. 324.
It was introduced by Alexander III in canon law, who ordered „simpliciter et de plano, sine figura judicii, absque judiciorum et advocatorum strepitu procedere”, and developed by the Clementine „Saepe contingit” in 1306. Briegleb 15. Long before the latter, according to Wach 180, there was also a rapid procedure in Germanic law. Moreover cognitio summaria existed in Roman law. Roth 102.
Besides cases of periculum in mora, summary procedure applied to trifling claims, incidental and subsidiary points, cases nullo jure justificabili, commercial cases, those involving shipwrecked persons, poor people, domestic relations and employment. Bayer 6–14.
Schmidt 583; Ott, Zur Lehre 328–9.
P. 19 supra.
Such as that of a fiduciary for performance of his duties, of a husband for the security of his wife’s dowry. Examples are German BGB §§ 232, 1051, 843 and are enumerated in Hellwig 24, Stern 17, Seuffert 644, Wach 100, Chiovenda 225, Stein Grundriss 25. Such a claim may coexist with a right to procedural security. Schulte 16.
Thus Kohier 62.
Wach 100. This view was later abandoned by its author. Schulte 16. It would seem peculiarly inadequate to explain measures of security to secure specific performance of a non-pecuniary claim.
This is apt to occur when the principal proceeding is purely an exercise of police jurisdiction (§ 6 supra) to restrain the commission of an unlawful act. As in this case the only object of the final judgment is to forbid the wrong definitively, and that of the interim order is to forbid it provisionally, the two decisions are factually equivalent in content. See p. 164 infra; and Neumann II, 1164; Schmidt 598; Stern 14; Jahn in JW(1930) 1161; Enger 37.
Indeed, the mistaken view is often advanced that a certain measure of interim protection is not permissible, because it is identical in content with what will be obtained on final judgment. See pp. 57, 87 infra. Of course that fact is an important element to be taken into consideration, but it is not decisive. Interim measures must go no further than is necessary to fulfil their purpose. P. 185 infra. But they may go as far as is necessary to fulfil that purpose, and if justified on consideration of all the pertinent elements in the case, they may not be precluded by reason of their coincidence in content with the final relief, note. See note 3, p. 186 infra. The rule that an interim measure has no influence on the final decision is a rule regarding the effect or consequences of the interim order, not a rule respecting the conditions or circumstances in which the order may be made. RGZ 9 : 336; P.B. 1904, 2e partie, 109; Gerechtshof te Amsterdam, 2 June 1922, W. 10941; Caroli 17, 47, 365 ff.; Star Busmann I, 77; Mérignac-Miguel, 2ed. II, 188.
Cf. the similar distinction between arrha and pignus. Muther Sequestration 374.
Thus when under German BGB § 1716 a needy mother obtains an order against the probable father of her illegitimate child for support during its first three months, this payment is not provisional anticipation of the duty of the father of an illegitimate child to support it until it reaches the age of 16 (BGB § 1708). The preliminary payment to relieve immediate distress may be smaller than would be required by the scale of support later to be adjudged under § 1708. It is a separate obligation imposed because the legislator has found that since in many cases, the prima facie father will be found to be the real father, it is better that he should relieve the urgent need than that the community should do so.
German ZPO §§ 708–9; French CPC § 137; Italian CPC § 363. Guggenheim 9 therefore improperly compares § 137 of the French CPC with the einstweilige Verfügung of German ZPO §§ 935 and 940, although his conclusion is correct, that French law is casuistic, like Roman law and Hungarian law. Fragistas, Das Präventionsprinzip in der Zwangsvollstreckung, 1931, 47. See pp. 33, 62, 80 infra.
German RGZ 15 : 377, 13 Nov. 1885; ZR 27 nr. 193 (Swiss, 1928).
A no. 12. § 71 infra.
This arrangement is criticised in Stein-Jonas II, 885; Schulte 113. Merkel 20 justifies it because of the function of interim protection in ensuring execution of Individualleistungen (specific performance). The practical importance of execution of the interim orders is advanced as the explanation by Stein, Grundriss 25 and Roth 3. Schulte 5 points out that there is an inner relation between the two concepts in that if execution is impossible, security is likewise impossible, whereas the possibility of obtaining a purely declaratory judgment remains unaffected. See p. 26 infra.
The full title of the Austrian law, criticised by Muck 3, 4 and defended by Ott, Zur Lehre 328, is Gesetz über das Exekutions- und Sicherungsverfahren.
Kohler 40; Meyer, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Zürcherischen Zivilprozesses im 19. Jahrhundert, 1927, 67–8.
See p. 58 infra.
Cf. § 17 (3) of the Regulations of the Central American Court of Justice of 2 December 1911. 8 Am. J. Sup. 183.
See pp. 84, 90 infra.
See p. 104 infra.
See p. 146 infra.
D no. 2, 2d add. 183.
This is made very clear in Swiss law of attachment, where different authorities are competent for granting the order and executing it. Ott 68–9; p. 52 infra. So in France civil courts alone are competent in matters as to execution of judgments, though the judgment may have been rendered by a commercial court. CPC § 442.
„Die einstweilige Verfügung setzt begrifflich voraus, dass entsprechende Sicherungsmassregeln tatsächlich getroffen werden”. Jerusalem 185; cf. Schmidt 583; p. 21 supra.
The German-Polish mixed arbitral tribunal made an order granting interim protection where it was not clearly proved that the Polish government had already taken the action in question, and hence that the tribunal’s order would come too late. „Est-il besoin d’ajouter que, si l’Etat polonais a déjà vendu le bien du requérant, la mesure conservatoire arrivera trop tard et que le présent arrêt sera dépourvu d’objet? Mais, étant donné l’incertitude où le défendeur a laissé le Tribunal de ses intentions, le Tribunal ne croit pas devoir s’abstenir d’une mesure qui est juste si elle est utile et qui ne peut faire aucun mal si elle est inutile”. 9 TAM 324, 30 July 1924. So 6 TAM 327, 4 March 1925. On the other hand, where the order would have been of no effect, it was denied. 6 TAM 332, 3 July 1926. It is incompatible with the dignity of a judicial tribunal to make an order which will have no effect. A no. 24, 14 ; La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. U.S., 175 U.S. 423, 457 (1899), citing opinion of Taney, C.J. in Gordon v. U.S., 117 U.S. 697.
Guggenheim 13 makes a classification of provisional measures into political and judicial, a fruitless distinction in that it merely reflects the content of the decision and the nature of the procedure of which it is a part. P. 6 supra. The distinction tends to coincide, however, with that between einstweilige Verfügung to preserve peace and to ensure execution of a judgment (p. 44 infra), and that made by Judge Negulesco between measures to preserve the status quo and those to preserve the rights of the parties. D no. 2, 2d add. 192–3. The conclusion there reached that article 41 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice admits measures of the former sort seems to be based on the thought that since it protects the respective rights of both parties it wishes to maintain as a totality the existing status of their mutual rights. It obviously authorizes measures of the second sort. See pp. 137, 150, 165–6. 187 infra.
van Kuyk 366; Bort 467.
Wenger 101.
Jenks 52, 171; Patton, Foreign Attachment in Pennsylvania, 56 UPLR (1908) 137. Peine forte et dure is a curious proceeding. When a defendant will not put himself upon the country and stand trial by jury, he is bound hand and foot, with one limb extended toward each corner of the room, and on his chest are placed weights as heavy as he can bear and heavier, while his diet is musty bread and brackish water. Defendants have died in this way rather than stand trial where they would certainly have been found guilty of crimes working corruption of blood, involving confiscation of their property by the crown and disherison of their heirs.
Unlike organs of the League of Nations, which is bound to bestir itself to safeguard the peace of nations, even if thereby settlement of disputes by League machinery becomes necessary. A system is thinkable in which the mere existence of a controversy, without invocation of the court’s jurisdiction by either party, would suffice to set the wheels of justice in motion. Morelli 181.
The Central American Court of Justice on one occasion offered its services to disputant states. See p. 96 infra. The Permanent Court of International Justice extends its jurisdiction when possible so as to prevent gaps in the available judicial organization. „The Court, when it has to define its jurisdiction in relation to that of another tribunal, cannot allow its own competence to give way unless confronted with a clause which it considers sufficiently clear to prevent the possibility of a negative conflict of jurisdiction involving the danger of a denial of justice”. A no. 9, 30.
This distinction is clearly brought out by the practice of the Supreme Court of the United States. Scott, Judicial Settlement 181; Mass. v. R.I., 12 Peters 755, 761 (1838): „The practice seems to be well settled, that in suits against a State, if the State shall refuse or neglect to appear, upon due service of process, no coercive measures will be taken to compel appearance; but the complainant, or plaintiff, will be allowed to proceed ex parte”.
Habicht, Post-war Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1931, 1019: „Guaranties against Disturbance of Proceedings. A promise of the parties not to disturb the course of the procedure is generally expressed”. The Council recommended that parties to the Albanian frontiers dispute „strictly…. abstain from any act calculated to interfere with the procedure in course” (s’abstenir rigoureusement de tout acte qui pourrait troubler la marche de la procédure), OJ (1921) 725; and on another occasion recognized that „when a question is submitted to the Council for its examination, the parties should take whatever steps are necessary and useful to prevent anything occurring on their respective territories which might prejudice the examination or settlement of the question by the Council” (compromettre l’examen ou le règlement de cette question par le Conseil). OJ (1928) 909–910.
„In diesen…. Fällen hat die einstweilige Verfügung nicht die Aufgabe, die spätere Prozessführung oder Exekution zu ermöglichen, sondern sie will den Berechtigten vor den Nachteilen schützen, die in der durch die Prozessführung bedingten Verspätung der Exekution liegen”. Rintelen 15; cf. Wrede 354. („Den anscheinend Berechtigten vor den Nachteilen zu schützen, die in der durch die Prozessführung bedingten Verspätung der Rechtsverwirklichung” is the object of all interim protection. Impossibility of executing the judgment is only one species of prejudice; but stands out by reason of the fact that it not only injures the aggrieved party but offends against the dignity of the court and renders ridiculous the authors of the judicial proceeding. Hence an intention to provide protection against this species of prejudice is more readily to be implied from the very act of resorting to judicial procedure, whereas protection against all harm resulting from modification of the status quo must be more clearly sanctioned by the texts governing the tribunal’s activity. Cf. Schüle 54. See pp. 181–182 infra.)
Cf. Schule 51.
Kohler 145: „Viele Verhältnisse verlangen nämlich eine kontinuirliche Regelung, weil es sich nicht um eine einmalige Leistung, sondern um einen dauernden Zustand handelt, welcher rechtlich geordnet werden soll. In solchem Falle ist es möglich, dass für die Zeit nach dem Urtheil die Vollstreckung völlig versichert ist und dass daher die Verhältnisse nach dem Urtheil keinen Grund zu einer Sicherungsmassregel abgeben würden, aber die Zeit vor dem Urtheil ist möglicher Weise eine ungeregelte, und diese ungeregelte Zeit kann möglicher Weise unleidliche Zustände mit sich führen. Das Recht ist nun aber nicht schon damit befriedigt, dass in künftiger Zeit der Zustand dem Recht entspricht, sondern es soll auch in der Zwischenzeit eine dem Rechte möglichst nahe kommende Gestaltung der Dinge erzielt werden. Auch hier hat die einstweilige Verfügung ihre Stelle; sie soll nicht für die Zukunft den Eintritt des postulierten Zustandes garantieren, sie soll dafür sorgen, dass auch einstweilen ein leidlicher modus vivendi geschaffen wird. Wie die einstweilige Verfügung die Herbeiführung eines rechtmässigen Zustandes überhaupt garantieren soll, so soll sie bewirken, dass dieser rechtmässige Zustand nicht nur für die spätere Zeit ermöglicht wird, sondern dass auch schon in der Zwischenzeit ein Zustand entsteht, welcher leidlich den Postulaten des Rechts entspricht”.
German common law, and statute law prior to unification, as well as the ZPO now in force, distinguish between measures to ensure execution and those which establish an interim regulation of the situation. Wach in 15 Krit. Viert. (1873) 372; Goldschmidt, Zivilprozessrecht 319; Schmidt 583–4, 589. The purpose of the latter type of measure is different from that of the first. „Dieser Erfolg ist nicht Schutz, auch nicht nur provisorischer Schutz des einzelnen Privatrechtsanspruches, sondern Schutz der gesamten Rechtssphäre der um ein Rechtsverhältnis streitenden Parteien, mit Beziehung auf dieses Rechtsverhältnis”. Thus in the claim of an illegitimate child for support, the injury due to lack of support does not arise out of the claim itself, but out of the child’s entire financial position; if it is in no danger of destitution, but has other sources of income, the father is not compelled to pay during the suit (Roth 50); „so wird damit ein ausserhalb des Privatrechtsverhältnisses selbst liegender Nachteil abgewendet”. If however there is danger that the father will squander his means, the case is different. „Denn dann handelt es sich um Sicherung der Vollstreckung des Privatrechtsverhältnisses selbst”. Güthe 383 likewise emphasizes that in the interim regulation of the status quo it is the relation of the controverted claim to the other interests of the party entitled which constitutes the basis of the remedy. It is the „Beziehung der Anspruchsubstanz zu den sonstigen Interessen des Berechtigten” which is „die Grundlage der einstweiligen Verfügung”. Such a measure furnishes a remedy where execution, though feasible after the judgment, would not be an adequate remedy because it would come too late, and irreparable injury to the applicant would already have occurred. Ibid. 370.
Seep. 20 supra.
Seep. 17 supra.
De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, II, i, 1: „Causa justa belli suscipiendi nulla esse potest nisi injuria”. II, i, 2: „Ac plane quot actionum forensium sunt fontes, totidem sunt belli: nam ubi judicia deficiunt incipit bellum. Dantur autem actiones aut ob injuriam non factam, aut ob factam. Ob non factam, ut qua petitur cautio de non of-fendendo, item damni infecti, & interdicta alia ne vis fiat. Factam, aut ut reparetur, aut ut puniatur”. So Thomasius, Dissertatio III, c. lviii: „Remedium istud violentum si adhibeatur iis, qui vinculo societatis civilis eodem non nectuntur, bellum dicitur; si iis, qui sub civile societate vivunt, actio”. Kunz 45 speaks of „der Krieg als Rechtsverfahren”; and Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht, 1899, 368 regards independent states as „Subjekte des völkerrechtlichen Aktionenrechts”, apparently having in mind diplomatic protests, reprisals, war, and other means of making resentment felt and coercing states into acting in conformity with law. But might not such means be used for coercing conduct not in accordance with rights under international law? Reprisals presuppose a violation of international law, but may not the violations against which reprisals are directed be imaginary? War is not so restricted. Hold-Ferneck, Lehrbuch 104; Dumbauld, Legal Limitations on Warmaking, 18 Geo. L. J. (1930) 83. Strisower, Der Krieg und die Völkerrechtsordnung, 1919, takes the view that under common law war is permitted only for enforcement of rights and self-defense. That such a rule of customary law might arise in future, T. R. White, Limitations upon the Initiation of War, Proc. Am. Soc. Int. Law (1925) 102; that perhaps such a rule exists at present, Scott, Proc. Am. Soc. Int. Law (1931) 213–5, cf. Mausbach, Naturrecht und Völkerrecht, 1918, 130, (the argument here being that war is permitted only when no other remedy is available, and that it can no longer truthfully be urged in good faith that a nation has no other remedy).
Capitant-Trotabas in 35 RGDIP (1928) 39: „la voie diplomatique, seule voie de droit commun en matière internationale”.
Cf. the similar effect of Binder’s view, although he professes to vindicate substantive law from the encroachments of procedure. Binder 7, 46–7, 395. See p. 13 supra.
Stowell, International Law, 1931, 34. Cf. Radbruch, Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie, 1914, 172, 178; and Sir John Fischer Williams, Treaty Revision and the Future of the League of Nations, 10 Int. Aff. (1931) 338.
J. B. Moore, Law and Organization, in International Law and Some Current Illusions, 1925, 302.
Of course the peculiar nature of international law must never be ignored. Nippold 149: „Nicht nur das materielle Völkerrecht, sondern auch das formelle, auch das Verfahren in völkerrechtlichen Streitigkeiten muss als Teil des Völkerrechts dessen Eigenart aufweisen”. The same author regards „Die Fortbildung des völkerrechtlichen Verfahrens” as „die höchste Aufgabe des heutigen Völkerrechts”. Ibid. 64.
Stein, Grundriss 71 defines Rechtspflege as „die Aufgabe, das objektive Recht durch autoritativen Ausspruch über konkrete Lebensverhältnisse oder durch ihre unmittelbare Regelung zu verwirklichen. Es gehört zum Begriff der Rechtspflege, dass sie ohne Rücksicht auf andere staatliche Interessen ausgeübt wird, d.h. nur nach Massgabe des Gesetzes, das den Willen zu einer bestimmten Gestaltung zum Ausdruck bringt. Sie tritt im Gegensatz zur Verwaltung, das ist die handelnde Betätigung der Staatsgewalt im Dienste der unmittelbaren staatlichen Interessen und Kulturbedürfnisse (d.h. zur Erfüllung der Staatsaufgaben): denn für die Verwaltung ist das Gesetz nur Richtschnur und Machtbegrenzung”. In the international field it may be contrasted with conciliatory negotiations for the settlement of political disputes, where a simple decision according to existing law would be unsatisfactory. Morgenthau 142; Strisower 63–41; Sir John Fischer Williams, Chapters, 43–48.
Morgenthau 18; J. B. Moore, International Adjudications, I, li, lxxiv, lvi.
Morgenthau 1.
P. 9 supra.
Härle in 11 Zt. f. öff. Rt. (1931) 223.
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Dumbauld, E. (1932). Interim Protection in Procedural Science. In: Interim Measures of Protection in International Controversies. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0720-2_2
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