Abstract
In the last chapter, I showed that Hume’s arguments against the evidence of reason divide into three main groups. There is, first, an attack on abstract reasoning; second, an attack on matter-of-fact reasoning; and third, a combined attack on both types of reasoning. In the present chapter, I shall examine each of these in order and shall indicate the manner in which Hume’s theory of imagination, as I understand it, enters into each of them.
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Two points are in order here: (1) This comment about the presence of the naturalistic claim does not apply to the combined argument against both types of reasoning, for there very definitely is a naturalistic claim there; (2) there is a kind of naturalistic claim made in the attack on abstract reasoning, but it is not clear that it is made to destroy the Pyrrhonistic inference from the Pyrrhonistic claim.
Smith maintains that Hume’s “main motive in denying space and time to be infinitely divisible, and in his consequent heterodox treatment of geometry, was his desire to vindicate for reason the right to have jurisdiction in every field of possible human knowledge, with no limitation save such as is prescribed by the absence or insufficiency of the data required for dealing with them.... [Thus] in Part ii, Book I of the Treatise, Hume is not approving the depreciation of reason; he is condemning it” (Smith, op. cit., pp. 287–88.). And according to Hendel, “the Treatise makes no mention of doubts ... until we reach the subject of the external world” (Hendel, op. cit., p. 409).
In this discussion, a way is suggested to circumvent the Pyrrhonistic inference. However, this way is not by making the naturalistic claim — except perhaps in a very indirect way.
Enquiry, p. 155.
Ibid., p. 156.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 156–57.
Ibid., p. 157.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 130 (note).
Treatise I, p. 72.
Indeed, we may conceivably look upon his appeal to his doctrine regarding abstract ideas as at least an indirect expression of the naturalistic claim. See Hume’s discussion of abstract ideas, Treatise I, p. 17 ff. (esp. pp. 20–22).
He adds that these are the only arguments of any weight for the principle. The inference from this, of course, is that these are the only arguments he is obliged to refute. In TreatiseI, however, he presents two arguments in addition to those which he labels as “objections drawn from the mathematics against the indivisibility of the parts of extension” (Treatise I, p. 42).
This exact, though useless, standard is expressed in Treatise I in the following way: “lines or surfaces are equal, when the numbers of points in each are equal; and ... as the proportion of numbers varies, the proportion of the lines and surfaces is also vary’d” (Treatise I, p. 45).
Abstract, p. 195. In Treatise I, Hume, talking about the notion of equality and of this same problem of an exact standard of it in geometry, had pointed out that since “the very idea of equality is that of such a particular appearance corrected by juxta-position or a common measure, the notion of any correction beyond that we have instruments and art to make, is a mere fiction of the mind, and useless as well as incomprehensible” (Treatise I, p. 48). Nevertheless, “as sound reason convinces us that there are bodies vastly more minute than those, which appear to the senses; and as a false reason wou’d perswade us, that there are bodies infinitely more minute; we clearly perceive, that we are not possess’d of any instrument or art of measuring, which can secure us from all error and uncertainty. We are sensible, that the addition or removal of one of these minute parts, is not discernible either in the appearance of measuring; and as we imagine, that two figures, which were equal before, cannot be equal after this removal or addition, we therefore suppose some imaginary standard of equality, by which the appearances and measuring are exactly corrected, and the figures reduc’d entirely to that proportion. This standard is plainly imaginary” (ibid.). In Chapter I (p. 35), I took note of the fact that Furlong maintains that these remarks of Hume’s constitute his way of solving the paradoxes relating to the infinite divisibility of space inasmuch as they make reference to a tendency of the imagination to go beyond experience. I also objected to this claim about Hume as being, at the very least, rather misleading (cf. p. 45). My remarks in the present discussion should tend to confirm my objections to Furlong’s views. In the discussion of the Treatise, Hume was attempting to refute certain mathematical arguments for the principle of the infinite divisibility of space; he was not really trying to solve any paradoxes relating to infinite divisibility. As he was to say later in Treatise I, what he was trying to do was merely to give “the reason, why, after considering several loose standards of equality, and correcting them by each other, we proceed to imagine so correct and exact a standard of that relation, as is not liable to the least error or variation” (ibid., p. 198).
Hume himself (at one point in Treatise I) characterizes his discussion in this way, i.e., as an examination of “the foundation of mathematics” (Treatise I, p. 198).
Hendel maintains that “unless we suppose ... that imagination accounts for our actual perception of a world in space and time, through its disposition to unite and connect particular things in certain ways ultimately peculiar to human nature, we can hardly understand why this Second Part of the Treatise should have its important position in the book” (Hendel, op. cit., p. 152). This seems definitely to imply that Hume’s discussion of the ideas of space and time per se is what is central or primary in Part II, not the discussion of the doctrine of infinite divisibility. Contrary to Hendel, I maintain that we can understand the important position of this Part of Treatise I without making the supposition he makes about imagination. Nevertheless, I do maintain that Hume’s theory of imagination plays a significant role in what really is central in Part II. It seems to me that Hendel fails to observe that this Part of Treatise I is an attack on abstract reasoning.
Treatise I, p. 136.
Ibid., p. 26.
Ibid., pp. 50–51.
Ibid., p. 52.
This contention is what Hume refers to as the first part of his “system concerning space and time” (ibid., p. 39). I am not overlooking or ignoring “the other part” of his system. It will be considered shortly. I merely wish to reiterate my view that the argument regarding infinite divisibility is primary, and the other secondary. Hume considers “the other part” of his system because it “is a consequence of” the first, and because this consequence itself requires a kind of defense — since it not only clashes with the philosopher’s view but also with the view of the vulgar. But more of this later.
Treatise I, p. 39. I am simply paraphrasing Hume’s argument here.
Ibid., p. 27.
Ibid., p. 28.
Ibid., p. 32.
Ibid. All words, excepting, “in other words” are italicized in the text.
Ibid., p. 40.
Ibid., p. 35.
Ibid., p. 39.
Actually, I have already mentioned one such discussion in this Part of Treatise I. I am referring, of course, to my abbreviated consideration of Hume’s so-called “galley-theory” (see p. 113, footnote 3).
Treatise I, p. 37. This passage mentions only space, not time. However, a passage later in Treatise I supports my contention about the latter (see ibid., p. 201).
Ibid., p. 58; see also pp. 37, 60, 65.
Ibid., p. 60.
For instance, see Enquiry I, p. 24, where Hume speaks of the thought or idea of a wound giving rise to the thought or idea of the pain attendant with it. The natural relation (or principle of association) operative here, though, is the causal relation, not the relation of resemblance.
See my Chapter I, p. 39 ff., where I deal with and attempt to counteract both Smith’s and Furlong’s views on one phase of Hume’s account, viz., his view of the involvement of imagination in the attainment of factual belief.
Enquiry I, p. 159; see also p. 76.
Ibid., p. 160.
See ibid., pp. 41–42, where Hume asserts the naturalistic counter-claim against Pyrrhonism.
Treatise I, p. 265.
Ibid., pp. 266–67.
Ibid., pp. 268–69.
I shall also have very little to say about his view on reasoning from conjecture, i.e., the “Species” of matter-of-fact reasoning other than causal reasoning.
Treatise I, pp. 78–79.
Ibid., p. 79–80.
Ibid., p. 82.
Ibid., p. 84.
It is also crucial to an understanding of the very notions of cause and effect (see ibid., p. 169).
TreatiseI, p. 88.
See ibid., pp. 82, 84.
See ibid., p. 73.
See ibid., pp. 92–93, 97, 103. At one point he even says that “all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation” (ibid., p. 103).
Ibid., pp. 88–89.
Ibid., p. 92.
See my Chapter I, pp. 54–55. It is undoubtedly remarks such as this which lead Smith to maintain that Hume holds that “reason... is nothing distinct from our natural beliefs” (Smith, “Hume’s Naturalism (I),” op. cit., p. 156; cf. also his Philosophy of Hume, pp. 100, 461).
Treatise I, p. 149. The rules themselves are formulated in Section xv of Part III of Treatise I. It is worth remarking that this opposition between imagination and judgment could scarcely be anything other than an opposition between imagination and reason, since surely the latter would qualify as the faculty of applying general rules. The word “applying” appears to be an important one, for I take it that the imagination can be influenced by rules of some generality, though it cannot apply those rules.
Enquiry I, p. 44 (note).
Ibid., pp. 86–87. This same passage is to be found in Treatise I, p. 132.
If my hypothesis about Hume’s general conception of imagination is correct (imagination being the faculty of forming, uniting and separating ideas), then it would seem to follow that all causal inferences must include some process of imagination. The reason, obviously, is that if there were some causal inferences which do not involve any uniting of ideas, there would seem to be none which do not involve the forming of them. However, see my remarks in Chapter II about the formation of ideas as part of the general conception of imagination (pp. 73–74).
Treatise I, pp. 88–89.
Ibid., p. 89. Beginning with the first “that”, all words are italicized in the text.
See Enquiry J, p. 34, where Hume asserts that he will allow that the proposition, I foresee that objects which are similar in appearance to object X will be attended with effects similar to Y, “may justly be inferred from” the proposition, I have found that X-like objects have always been attended with Y-like effects.
Treatise I, p. 134.
Ibid., p. 89.
See my Chapter I, p. 29 ff.
Treatise I, p. 95; cf. Abstract, p. 189.
Treatise I, p. 86.
Ibid., p. 154.
Ibid., p. 96.
Ibid., p. 103.
s Ibid., pp. 92, 93, 97, 140, 144, 149. 6 Ibid., p. 142.
There is evidence indicating that the mere forming of ideas is not the only operation of imagination involved in these circumstances. It is also suggested, in places, that the uniting of ideas is involved. Perhaps the best evidence for this is to be found in Hume’s discussion of conjectural reasoning. Since what he says has the additional virtue of linking up quite well with his view of the relation between imagination and belief, I shall quote it here. He says: “‘Tis obvious in this species of reasoning, that if the transference of the past to the future were founded merely on a conclusion of the understanding, it cou’d never occasion any belief or assurance. When we transfer contrary experiments to the future, we can only repeat these contrary experiments with their particular proportions; which cou’d not produce assurance in any single event, upon which we reason, unless the fancy melted together all those images that concur, and extracted from them one single idea or image, which is intense and lively in proportion to the number of experiments from which it is deriv’d, and their superiority above their antagonists. Our past experience presents no determinate object; and as our belief, however faint, fixes itself on a determinate object, ‘tis evident that the belief arises not merely from the transference of past to future, but from some operation of the fancy conjoin’d with it. This may lead us to conceive the manner, in which that faculty enters into all our reasonings” (Treatise I, pp. 139–40). It is evident that this melting together of ideas (or images) is either just another name for the uniting of them, or, at any rate, could not take place unless there were a prior uniting of them.
See Treatise I, p. 77. However, as a result of Hume’s own analysis of the notion of a cause, it becomes clear that this notion of necessary connexion plays no legitimate part or role in the “enlightened” philosopher’s view of causation. This difference between the philosophical and the ordinary man’s notion of causation is implied in Hume’s distinction between cause as a philosophical relation and cause as a natural relation, and consequently in the exhibition of two distinct, though related, definitions of a cause (cf. ibid., pp. 160–70, 172).
Ibid., p. 156.
Ibid., p. 165.
Ibid.; cf. Enquiry I, p. 75.
Treatise I, p. 165.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 166.
Ibid., p. 267.
Ibid., p. 167; see also p. 223.
Ibid., p. 223.
Ibid., p. 235 ff.
Ibid., pp. 235–36.
Ibid., p. 167.
Ibid., p. 218.
This combined attack is not repeated in Enquiry I.
Treatise I, pp. 267–68.
Ibid., pp. 182–83.
Ibid., p. 180.
Ibid., p. 182.
The two words I have italicized here were so italicized to bring to the reader’s attention the accordance of Hume’s use of “reason” in these passages with his general conception of that faculty.
Treatise I, p. 182.
Ibid., pp. 182–83. Aside from the two occurences of the expressions “in infinitum,” all italics in this passage were italicized by me.
Ibid., p. 184.
Ibid., p. 183.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 184.
Ibid.
Ibid., We must be careful here not to confuse the evidence for a theory with the theory itself, or to claim that the theory is the foundation of the evidence existing for it. Hume’s theory of belief does not prove that we will continue to believe in certain of our judgments despite our confrontation with the Pyrrhonistic arguments, or justify this continuance in belief in any way. Rather, it is the fact that we continue to believe under these circumstances that proves (i.e., gives evidence for) Hume’s theory. It seems to me that Hume’s central point here is to convince us that there is no proof, no justification, for our continuing to believe under these circumstances, though there is of course an explanation for it. What is more, as far as justification is concerned, there is ample justification for our discontinuing to believe under these circumstances. Thus, it is an explanation of our continuing to believe, and this alone, that Hume is trying to provide. I mention this because, as we have already seen, N. K. Smith (among others) seems at times to be holding that Hume in presenting and applying his theory of belief is trying to offer some kind of justification for certain “natural” beliefs we cling to.
Ibid., p. 185.
Ibid., p. 153. A justification for my insert will be found on page 185 of Treatise I.
Ibid., p. 144.
Oddly enough, Hume addresses himself (in this very context) to a paradox which bears a resemblance to the present one. He says that we “cannot approve of that expeditious way, which some take with the sceptics, to reject at once all their arguments without enquiry or examination” (ibid., p. 186). The actual paradox which the dogmatists hold up to the sceptics may be expressed in the following argument-form (which is virtually identical with the manner in which Hume expresses it): if the sceptical arguments against reason are strong, then they prove that reason my have some force and authority; if they are weak, then they can never be sufficient to invalidate all the conclusions of reason; but the sceptical arguments against reason must be either strong or weak; hence, either these arguments prove that reason may have some force and authority or they cannot be sufficient to invalidate all the conclusions of reason. If this is the case, then it follows that these arguments may be rejected without enquiry and examination. Hume begins his reply to this by saying: “this argument is not just; because the sceptical reasonings, were it possible for them to exist, and were they not destroy’d by their subtility, wou’d be successively both strong and weak, according to the successive dispositions of the mind” [ibid.). His final position on the question seems to be that it is nature, not reason, which breaks the force of these Pyrrhonistic arguments (see ibid., p. 187). Obviously, there is a connection between their destruction by nature and their destruction by their “subtility.”
Treatise I, p. 186.
Ibid., p. 270.
Ibid.
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© 1968 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Wilbanks, J. (1968). Hume’s Theory of Imagination in the Argument of His Philosophy of the Human Understanding (I): The Attack on Reason. In: Hume’s Theory of Imagination. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0709-7_5
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