Besides the ethical presuppositions of the problem of evil, there is the presupposition that God is a being who literally possesses the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience and goodness. Various proposed solutions seem to presuppose that other attributes, such as being a person or having personal traits, including that of loving his human creations, also hold of God in a literal sense and not in some non-literal, symbolic, metaphorical, or some other sense. It is therefore important to consider whether the problem of evil does presuppose the literal ascription of the former attributes to God, and if so, what in particular is involved in a literal ascription of the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience and goodness, and whether the solutions which refer to God’s personal and loving nature can consistently interpret these traits literally.
KeywordsLiteral Sense Analogous Predication Literal Interpretation Negative Theology Logical Impossibility
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 8.R. Otto, The Idea of the Holy, London, O.U.P., 1939Google Scholar
- T. McPherson “Religion as the Inexpressible”, New Essays in Philosophical Theology, London, S.C.M., 1955, pp. 131–143.Google Scholar
- 11.I. Ramsey, Religious Language, London, S.C.M., 1957, pp. 52–3Google Scholar
- 23.J. McT. E. McTaggart, Some Dogmas of Religion, London, Edward Arnold, 1930, p. 205.Google Scholar