Abstract
This chapter will examine those factors which are required to determine the probability of survival of an ABM system. Survivability is defined in terms of two factors: first, the threat estimate and, second, the ABM system vulnerabilities with respect to electromagnetic, physical, and heterogeneous effects. Electromagnetic effects include all types of radar countermeasures; physical effects include blast damage, thermal and nuclear radiation; heterogeneous effects include chemical, biological, and radiological warfare, and sabotage. Several techniques for the analysis of ABM system survivability will be considered. In general, survivability analysis is made on the basis of a postulated threat and given ABM system capabilities, to arrive at a prediction for the ABM system survivability.
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References
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© 1981 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv, The Hague
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Constant, J.N. (1981). ABM System Survivability Analysis. In: Fundamentals of Strategic Weapons. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0649-6_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0649-6_4
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