Abstract
In order to describe the U.S. strategic defense apparatus it is necessary first to evaluate the Russian threat. This of course is the function of U.S. intelligence and no doubt intensive effort is directed to this end. However, while the public literature provides much information about U.S. systems it provides little about the Russian ones. For this reason, in this chapter we use the U.S. offense capability to obtain some perspective about what the strategic defense problem is all about. Following chapters will be devoted to the U.S. strategic defense systems.
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References
Eds., “The SALT-free Weapons”, Science and the Citizen, Scientific American, May, 1975.
A. H. Quanbeck and B. M. Blechman, Strategic Forces: Issues for the Mid-Seventies, The Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 1973. The Institute publishes studies in the form of monograms. This study summarizes the present and projected state of strategic forces.
D. Fink, “Strategic Warfare”, Science and Technology, October, 1968. Explains how engineering a strategic force requires continual interactions between offense and defense to find the level of strength that deters attack without triggering further rounds of escalation.
S. Tilson, “The Antiballistic Missile”, IEEE Spectrum, August, 1969. Presents a report on a debate on the ABM controversy by G. Rathjens who argues against and D. Brennan who argues for the ABM.
H. York, “Military Technology and National Security”, Scientific American, August, 1969. Analyzes the ABM debate in the context of a larger dilemma: the futility of searching for technological solutions to what is essentially a political problem.
A. Frye and J. Foster, “Defense Policy and World Environment”, Astronautics and Aeronautics, August, 1970. Authors present their respective viewpoints on defense policy.
UPI, “Army Missile Intercepted by ABM System”, news item, 31 August, 1970.
P. Friel, “The Merits of a Limited Ballistic Missile Defense”, Astronautics and Aeronautics, October, 1970. Discusses an area ABM system and covers the possible response of the Soviet Union to the deployment of Safeguard.
R. L. Garwin and H. A. Bethe, “Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems”, Scientific American, March, 1968. The authors argue that offensive tactics and cheap penetration aids could nullify the effectiveness of a light ABM system and any other visualized so far.
H. York, “Multiple Warhead Missiles”, Scientific American, November, 1973. MIRVs increase the number of strategic nuclear weapons and now threaten the stability of the nuclear balance of power. Their history shows why they present special problems of arms control.
H. Scoville, Jr., “The Limitations of Offensive Weapons”, Scientific American, January, 1971. It is argued that the best possible outcome that can be expected to emerge from the current (1971) strategic arms limitations talks (SALT) would be a freeze on the existing offensive forces of both sides.
T. Greenwood, “Reconnaissance and Arms Control”, Scientific American, February, 1973. Reconnaissance satellites are the chief means relied on by the USA and the USSR to verify each others compliance with the SALT I accords. What bearing will they and related systems have on SALT II?
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Ed., The Military Balance, Inst. of Strategic Services, 18 Adam Street, London W.C.2. Contains an excellent survey of strategic offense and defense systems.
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R. Pretty, ed., Jane’s Weapons Systems 1977–78, ISBN 531-03284-1, Franklin Watts Inc., 730 Fifth Ave, New York, NY 10019, 1978. Covers missiles of every type; aircraft armament, radars, sonars, torpedoes, EW equipment, including active, passive, deception and noise jammers, monitoring and DF systems. Gives individual description of every missile, drone, RPV, fire-control system, armed vehicles, underwater equipment, reconnaissance equipment, etc.
K. Gatland, Missiles and Rockets, Macmillan, New York, 1978. Gives eighty color pictures of world’s ballistic missiles, chiefly military, including cutaway and exploded views, with engines, carriers, silos, etc. The Russian Delta-class nuclear submarine “seems to have become operational in January 1973” with a missile range of 4,000 nautical miles, not enough to reach the USA from the Barentz Sea.
“Red A-Subs cruise closer to U.S.”, Associated Press, 9 June 1975.
“The SALT-free Weapons”, Science and the Citizen, Scientific American, May, 1975. It is estimated that by the middle of 1975 the USA will have emplaced approximately 8,500 strategic weapons (deliverable by land-based missiles, sea-based missiles and bombers), compared with the Russian total of perhaps 2,800. By the 1974 Vladivostok undertanding, the USA could have as many as 21,000 strategic nuclear weapons deployed by 1985. What is ignored is the vast stockpiling of “tactical”, or comparatively short-range, nuclear weapons, by both sides. The USA alone has 22,000 tactical weapons and it is believed the Russian forces in Europe have some 3,000–3,500 tactical nuclear weapons.
A. Gavshon, Which is the Strongest Nuclear Power—U.S. or Russia, Associated Press, 30 July, 1977. Provides numerical strengths of various weapons forces of opponents.
“Far Stronger”, editorial, Wall Street Journal, 29 December, 1976. Provides numerical strengths of various weapons forces of opponents.
“Missile Scoreboard”, Microwave Systems News, September, 1977.
“The silent war”, Countermeasures, March, 1975. Few basic articles exist on Electronic Warfare (EW). The general tendency for the EW community is to mask its efforts in secrecy, even to the point of not discussing information requiring no security classification. Consequently, individuals entering industry, workers in peripheral areas, and non-technical managers are relatively uninformed about EW even though they serve as program and hardware development managers. This article provides a general understanding and evaluation of the EW role, along with a glossary of associated terms.
“Communications Satellite Systems”, Session 32, WESCON, San Fransisco, 16–19 September, 1975.
F. Lightfoot et al., “An Experimental TDMA Network for Airborne Warning and Control Systems Interoperability Demonstrations: Part I”, Microwave Systems News, December/January, 1976. With its TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access) communication system AWACS has demonstrated improved operational capability in such areas as surveillance, control, detection of penetrating aircraft, distribution of radar tracking information to surface C2 centers, and control of friendly interceptors.
“Defense Satellite Communications in the 1980s”, Countermeasures, December/January, 1976. The defense satellite communications system (DSCS) is a worldwide military command-and-control communications network in use by the USA. Because of an unsuccessful attempt in May 1975 to deploy two additional satellites, new direction and urgency has taken over the program. Other improvements in the launch weight capability of the Titan IIIC launch vehicles, redesign of the satellite payload, improvements in the capability and effectiveness of the electronics, and the advent of the space shuttle as a primary launch vehicle have added new dimensions to the DSCS.
“Airborne Navonics”, Countermeasures, February, 1976. Airborne EW, a concept which began in World War II, has matured into an essential element of fleet defense and air control operations because of the added capabilities afforded by electronics. The E-2C aircraft, a veritable storehouse of computers, sensors, displays, and communications equipment, incorporates the latest airborne Navonics (naval electronics) technology to complete its mission as an airborne EW&C platform for the U.S. Navy fleet operations throughout the world.
W. Shockley, “The E-4 Airborne Command Post”, Countermeasures, July, 1976. Airborne command-and-control systems are used for both strategic and tactical applications. In strategic situations, these systems are used by top-level command personnel to monitor worldwide military operations and allow integrated command of all friendly forces. In tactical applications, airborne command-and-control systems are used by local area commanders to monitor battlefield operations and control the ground and airborne forces under their command.
L. Pashall, “Command Control and Technology”, Countermeasures, July, 1976. Lt. General L. Paschall, U.S. Air Force, is Director, Defense Communications Agency (DCA). As Director, General Paschall is responsible for management and direction of the worldwide Defense Communication System. He is also responsible for system engineering and technical support to the National Military Command System, and for provision of technical support to the worldwide military command-and-control standard automatic data-processing systems. In his capacity as Manager, National Communications System, he is responsible for providing effective direction to the worldwide National Communications System, which includes the communications facilities of the various Federal agencies. The Director, DCA, is also Chairman, Military Communications-Electronics Board, providing a liaison point for joint and international communications matters. In this article General Paschall gives an overview of the Defense Communications System (DCS).
B. Walsh, “An Eagle in the Sky”, Countermeasures, July, 1976. An article on AWACS, an all-altitude surveillance, command, control, and communications airborne warning and control system.
B. Walsh, “C3—The Big Picture”, Countermeasures, March, 1977.
T. Bibbens and J. Lake, “COMINT/SIGINT”, Countermeasures, July, 1976. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT) are two vital elements in the structure of Intelligence, Electronic Warfare (EW) and Command, Control and Communications (C3). SIGINT encompasses both COMINT and ELINT (electronic intelligence). ELINT is associated with the detection, identification and location of radars and similar emitters of weapons systems. COMINT is associated with communication, telemetry and other information links.
J. Fawcette, “C3: Key Challenges Face Military Planners”, Electronic Warfare, June, 1978. Spiraling costs, technological complexities loom as major obstacles at both the strategic and tactical levels.
P. Nahin, “The Laser BMD and other Radient Energy Weapons: Some Thoughts”, IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, March, 1977. Describes ABM Treaty and the particular language in it that presently excludes the deployment of a laser BMD. Eight pressure points are then presented that may cause both the Soviets and Americans to reevaluate the payoff of such ACD agreements to their overall national security, even to the extent of abrogating the Outer Space Treaty and SALT I. Next, an extended presentation of the current state of affairs in the American laser research program is given to show the magnitude of the U.S. commitment to developing radiant energy weapons technology. The paper concludes with a brief excursion into the psychological and strategic systems impact of laser weapons.
T. Tiede, “$5 billion defense site abandoned, left to decay”, NEA news item, June 1, 1977.
“Extraterrestrial Eavesdropping Seen Possible via Radar Leakage”, Microwave Systems News, June, 1978. Leakage from U.S. and Soviet BMEWS-type radars could enable extraterrestrials to detect the presence of civilization on Earth at interstellar distances.
“PAVE PAWS Tests Scrutinized”, Microwave Systems News, June, 1978. Pave Paws is a detection and early-warning system to guard against a ballistic missile (SLBM) attack on the continental U.S. It will also track satellites in orbit.
“Shell Game”, Science and the Citizen, Scientific American, March, 1977. Describes the Air Force plan to replace the present force of 1,000 Minuteman ICBMs with a more powerful and more accurate missile X which would not be confined to an identifiable launching silo but could be moved around in a random pattern.
K. Bacon, “Movable Deterrent”, Wall Street Journal, 14 March, 1978. Plan to bury missiles in vast tunnel system sparks defense debate. “MX” would alter location to elude enemy strike: Cost: up to $40 billion.
F. Kaplan, “Enhanced Radiation Weapons”, Scientific American, May, 1978. Although President Carter has deferred production of the neutron bomb, it is still an alternative of U.S. policy. It remains a weapon of doubtful utility that could result in an all-out nuclear exchange.
S. Drell and F. von Hippel, “Limited Nuclear War”, Scientific American, November 1976, and in Letters, February, 1977. The USA may be committing itself to preparing for a war limited to attacks on military bases, with relatively few civilian casualties. Would the casualties really be few, and could the war stay limited?
K. Tsipis, “The Accuracy of Strategic Missiles”, Scientific American, July, 1975. The USA has initiated the development of ultra-accurate missiles capable of destroying the land-based missile force of the USSR. The technology behind the new “counterforce” strategy is reviewed
W. Yengst, and reply by K. Tsipis, Letters, Scientific American, October, 1975.
W. Panofsky, Letters, Scientific American, December, 1975.
“65 Attack Nuclear Subs now in fleet—30 on rails”, UP news item, 25 May, 1977.
J. Moore, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships 1977–78, ISBN 531-03277-9, Franklin Watts Inc., 730 Fifth Ave, New York, N.Y. 10019.
J. Taylor, ed., Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 1977–78, ISBN 531-03278-7, Franklin Watts Inc., 730 Fifth Ave, New York, N.Y. 10019.
P. Nahin, “Can Land-Based Strategic Bombers Survive an SLBM Attack?”, IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, March, 1977. A recent study by the Brookings Institution on the B-1 bomber contains an erroneous analysis of its survivability in an SLBM attack. This issue is discussed and an alternative analysis is presented.
R. Hartman, “B-52 Update”, Countermeasures, March, 1978. The B-52 update is a long-range program begun in 1969 and expected to continue into the 1980s. Cancellation of the B-l has shortened this timetable.
“B-52 Avionics to be Completely Updated”, Microwave System News, February, 1978.
“The Cruise Missile”, Wall Street Journal, 19 June, 1975.
“Buzz Bombs”, Science and the Citizen, Scientific American, 1975.
K. Bacon, “Cruise Missile’s Future”, Wall Street Journal, Vol. XCVO, No. 1. Cheap and effective weapon upsets the traditionalists and faces SALT hurdle. Better than the B-l Bomber?
“Air Launched Cruise Missile in Flight Tests”, Countermeasures, July, 1976. The first ALCM prototype was launched at 15,000 feet and flew for ten minutes and forty seconds some 70 miles.
B. Walsh, “The Dawn of a New Era—Cruise Missiles”, Countermeasures, January, 1977. The USA recently completed advanced development of a new intermediate range cruise missile that will have a positive impact on the way the military conducts its naval and land attack missions of the future. These pilotless aircraft, capable of flying only a few feet above water or any terrain, have gone through exhaustive design and evaluation by the Air Force and Navy. This month, the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council is scheduled to decide the future of cruise missiles. This article summarizes the work completed by the two services, and reviews some of the important issues being considered by the Defense Department if future development is to continue.
K. Tsipis, “Cruise Missiles”, Scientific American, February, 1977. This new category of inexpensive, highly-accurate weapons presents a difficult but not insuperable problem to arms-control negotiators.
J. Deutch et al., and reply by K. Tsipis, Letters, Scientific American, August, 1977.
Special Report, “Cruise Missile Technology”, Microwave Systems News, September, 1977. J. Fawcette, “Map-Reading Missile Takes on Soviets and B-1”. A cruise missile is merely a small, pilotless jet plane, but several advances in technology have made this simple missile a weapon the* Soviet Union fears more than our ICBMs and multi-million dollar, electronic-laden fighters and bombers. R. Davis, “Millimeter Waves: A solution that has finally found a problem”. MM wave technology has languished in the lab for about twenty years now, seeking applications that never materialized. The need for accurate delivery of ordnances, under all weather and illumination conditions, has brought about renewed interest in this field by the military. An enormous new market is developing.
“Capital Capsules”, Electronic Design, June 21, 1978. The Air launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) won’t enter service until June 1980 and won’t be fully operational until September, 1981.
“Air Force is contemplating future bombers”, Electronic Design, July 5, 1978.
J. P. Dix, “Game Theoretic Applications”, IEEE Spectrum, April, 1968. Provides a discussion of gaming based on the defense problem and develops the geometrical and Monte Carlo approaches for obtaining the solutions to this problem.
R. B. Dow, Fundamentals of Advanced Missiles, John Wiley and Sons, 1958. This is a useful engineering reference covering many subjects on a first principle basis and is recommended for reference to the material presented in this chapter. In particular, Chapter 4 gives the elementary theory of probability and discusses much of the theory of probability of killing a target. Chapter 9 presents aspects of systems engineering.
G. Merril, ed., Principles of Guided Missile Design, D. Van Nostrand, 1955. This reference is a comprehensive treatment of the principles of missile guidance and considers the fundamentals of guiding a controlled missile reliably to its target. Attention is directed to Chapter 8 for a discussion of target damage definitions. Chapters 15 and 20 discuss important aspects of systems engineering.
D. Archer, Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook 1978, ISBN 531-03275-2, Franklin Watts Inc., 730 Fifth Ave, New York, N.Y. 10019. Gives defense and political information for every country in the world. Includes key defense manufacturers and personnel; complete cabinet listings; economic data; a Who’s Who in politics and defense; glossary of defense and political acronyms; balance of payment, power, and SAM tables.
“Soviets step up sub tests”, Associated Press, 12 December, 1977.
G. Clancey, “New Breakthroughs in ASW Signal Processing”, Countermeasures, October/November, 1975.
“Airborne Counter Threat to Submarines”, Countermeasures, September, 1975. An overview of the long-range patrol aircraft whose mission is to locate and attack enemy submarines.
“Modern Shipboard EW”, Countermeasures, February, 1976. In modern warfare, a complex electromagnetic environment poses many threats to the survivability of naval vessels in a tactical theater of operation. New sophisticated electronic equipments provide threat early-warning protection for the U.S. Navy’s fleet of surface and subsurface platforms.
A. Arnot, “SM-2 Passes Naval Tests”, Countermeasures, June, 1977. Recent at-sea firings of the U.S. Navy’s new Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) demonstrate a new shipboard defense capability against airborne threats.
R. Hartman, “SAM-D is a Patriot”, Countermeasures, July, 1977. Being developed to replace both Nike Hercules and Hawk systems, the highly mobile, all-weather Patriot will be the field army’s air defense cornerstone against medium-to high-altitude targets in the sophisticated land-warfare environment predicted for the 1980s and beyond.
G. Myrdal, “Political Factors in Economic Assistance”, Scientific American, April, 1972. It is argued that the global downward trend in aid from the rich countries to the poor countries can be reversed only by stressing the moral argument.
E. Rostow, “For an Adequate Defense”, Wall Street Journal, 12 May, 1975.
M. Skolnik, Introduction to Radar Systems, Chapter 13, McGraw-Hill, 1962.
J. Schlager, “Systems Engineering: Key to Modern Development”, IRE Trans., Vol. EM-3, pp. 64–66, July, 1956.
J. N. Warfield, Systems Engineering, Ordnance Res. Lab Report, Penn. State Univ., 10 August, 1955 (Available from Office of Technical Services, Wash. D.C.) PB 111801.
C. D. Flagle et al., eds., Operations Research and Systems Engineering, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1960.
P. M. Morse and G. E. Kimball, Methods of Operations Research, Technology Press and John Wiley and Sons, 1950.
P. M. Morse, Journal of Appl. Physics 23, 165, 1952.
L. A. Brothers, Journal of Ops. Rec. Soc. Am. 2, 1, 1953.
P. J. Kahrilas, “Design of Electronic Scanning Radar Systems”, Proc. IEEE, Vol. 56, No. 11, 1968.
L. J. Cantafio, “Prediction of the Minimum Investment Cost of Phased Array Radar”, Supplement to IEEE Trans on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, Vol. AES-3, No. 6, November, 1967.
O. H. Oakley, “Trends in Marine Technology”, Astronautics and Aeronautics, April, 1966. Particular attention is directed to the brief discussion of systems design which describes the merits of integrated ship design.
R. Shuster and D. Blattner, “The Worth Concept: An Aid to System Planning”, Paper presented at the 1961 Winter Convention IRE, Los Angeles, California.
“Top 50 Defense Contractors”, Electronic Warfare, June, 1978.
“Armament Decade”, Science and the Citizen, Scientific American, November, 1973. The cost of the arms race for the world as a whole and for the vast majority of countries has continued its rise, while the problems of development and the urgency of social needs are as acute as ever.
J. Anderson, “Billions Squandered on Military Duds”, 22 September, 1974.
J. Anderson, “Military Contractors make as much as 240% Hidden Profits”, 1974.
“Aerospace Crisis”, Wall Street Journal, Four article series, 1974.
R. Levine, “U.S. Military Strategy/Weaponry Begins to Draw Fire”, Wall Street Journal, 3 June, 1975. Rarely challenged in the past, basic Pentagon planning is studied by lawmakers.
“Out of Control”, Science and the Citizen, Scientific American, April, 1976. In a period of global economic recession and simultaneous price inflation one sector of the world economy—the arms race—appears to be exempt from the general squeeze on the public purse.
“50 and 100 years ago”, Scientific American, March, 1977.
T. Jones, “The Flaws in Defense Contracting”, Wall Street Journal, 25 November, 1977. Only when defense companies are required to assume the kind of management responsibility demanded elsewhere in the private sector will our national security benefit from the advantages of the market system.
S. Melman, “Who decides Technology?”, Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1969.
“L. Nevin, “Strategic studies map influence of global armaments and militias” Associated Press news item, 27 August, 1976. Gives a profile of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. See References 13 and 14.
P. Morrison and P. Walker, “A New Strategy for Military Spending”, Scientific American, October, 1978. An analysis of U.S. military forces finds that they so far exceed actual military needs as to be unsafe for the nation and the world. A program for prudently decreasing these forces is described.
“Off the Beam”, Science and the Citizen, Scientific American, December, 1978. Efforts to revive the U.S. ABM program, which was severely limited under the terms of the 1972 SALT ABM treaty, have gained momentum in some circles over the past year or two, energized in part by recurrent public assertions that the Russians are engaged in a secret multi-billion ruble program of their own to develop a new kind of ABM system, based this time not on nuclear armed interceptor missiles but on intense beams of charged particles.
“USSR—Soviet demands for SALT II limitations on U.S. cruise missiles have been dropped”, ME/C (Military Electronics/Contermeasures) December, 1978. Russian tests with MIG-25 Foxbat fighters shoot down drones simulating U.S. weapons.
“USSR—A new Generation of ICMBs is Cause for Concern”, World News ME/C, October, 1978.
“Breakout System Tested for MX”, Technology News ME/C, October, 1978.
F. Berry, Jr., “TACTAS”, ME/C, November, 1978. The Tactical Towed Array Sonar (TACTAS) concept differs from hull-mounted passive sonars by deploying a towed array of hydrophones on a cable beneath and behind the ship.
B. Walsh, “The Multirole Cruise Missile”, ME/C, September, 1978. As a major weapon system, the new generation of cruise missiles represents a powerful and versatile addition to the U.S. military’s strategic and tactical force structure.
M. Stoiko, “Soviet Rocketry”, Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1972.
L. Martin, “Arms and Stratep”, David McKay Co., 1974.
“Carter endorses mobile missile plan” Microwaves, July, 1979.
“Can the Infants Survive” Astronautics and Aeronautics August, 1969.
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Constant, J.N. (1981). Strategic Systems and War Games. In: Fundamentals of Strategic Weapons. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0649-6_1
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