Abstract
In this second part of this book, I shall not attempt to develop a complete moral theory. I shall be working primarily with only a limited set of moral concepts such as those of “responsibility,” “praise,” “blame,” “dispraise,” “guilt,” and “obligation.” Further, I shall be concentrating on these concepts primarily as they have some connection with the concept of “freedom” which was developed in part one. But I shall be doing both descriptive and normative ethics as well as both descriptive and normative meta-ethics, since I do not share the conviction that the “normative” lies entirely beyond the province of what the philosopher “in his role of philosopher” ought to be doing. Since I shall offer a normative moral theory, perhaps I should first discuss the criteria which in my opinion ought to guide us in the development of and adoption of a moral ideal. Since some of these criteria often take precedence over others for a variety of reasons, I shall list them in order of ascending importance.
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References
I fully agree with Paul W. Taylor that the ultimate step in the justification of a normative ideal or way of life is simply the choice of that ideal when made under conditions of freedom and enlightenment. See: Paul W. Taylor, Normative Discourse (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1961), Chapter 6. For certain reservations which I have about including the element of impartiality within the concept of rational choice, see my article titled “On Being ‘Rational’ about Norms,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Fall, 1967.
For an exception, see: Philipp Frank, Philosophy of Science (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1957), p. 261.
See also P. Nowell-Smith’s review of Causation in the Law by H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honore in Mind, Vol. LXX, October 1961, pp. 553–581.
For example: Campbell wrote that “To be morally responsible means, I suppose we can all agree, to be the legitimate object of moral praise and blame.” See: Campbell, Skepticism and Construction, p. 121, n. 1. Rashdall wrote that “Etymologically the word signifies of course the liability to be called upon to answer for an act, with the implication that, if the agent cannot make a satisfactory defense of it, he may justly be punished. A man is said to be responsible for an act for which he might justly be punished.” See: Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, II, p. 333. Responsibility has been defined so narrowly as not to include liability to praise and reward at all, only to blame and punishment. See: Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York, Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1949), p. 69. F. H. Bradley recognized that the notions of “responsibility” and “accountability” in popular usage could not be strictly identified, but he thought that the difference between them was insignificant; and no doubt many of the present-day attempts to define “responsibility” as “susceptibility to praise or blame” reflect Bradley’s influence.
See: F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1959), p. 4.
C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1953), pp. 201–202. Ross, Foundations of Ethics, pp. 247-248.
This example is to be found in: Charles Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1960), p. 307. Stevenson uses it to support quite a different point, however.
P. Nowell-Smith, “Freewill and Moral Responsibility,” Mind, Vol. 17 (1948), p. 47.
H. D. Lewis, Morals and Revelation (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1951), p. 47.
J. J. C. Smart, “Free-Will, Praise and Blame,” Mind, LXX, (1961), p. 303.
C. A. Campbell, “Prolegomena to a Theory of the Moral Criterion,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XXXVII (1936–37), p. 184.
Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1948), vol. II, pp. 198–199.
Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1953), p. 93.
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© 1969 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Edwards, R.B. (1969). Freedom and Responsibility. In: Freedom, Responsibility and Obligation. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0643-4_4
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