Abstract
Before the advent of Śaṅkara (8th century A.D.), there was a long tradition of efficient philosophical deliberations in India. Śaṅkara’s interpretation of the Self will not be properly understood without a reference to this context. Hence in this paper, I should like to mention briefly some of the main philosophical trends which Śaṅkara became heir to, and against which, or in the background of which, Śaṅkara developed his own philosophy.
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Ed. by Radhakrishnan and Moore, A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1957, pp. 16–27.
Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, George Allen and Unwin, 4th Imp., 1958, Ch 1. Specially pp. 33–35;
and Sharma, C, Indian Philosophy (A Critical Survey), Barnes and Noble, 1962, Ch. 1.
Sw. Nikhilänanda, translated and annotated by, The Māṇḍūkya Upanişad with Gauda-pāda’s Kārīkā and Śaṅkara’s Commentary, Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1955, and
Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad by Sw. Sarvananda, Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1956, pp. 1–17.
For details of the Principal Upaniṣads, vide the writer’s paper, The Place of Yoga in the Principal Upaniṣads in Research Journal of Philosophy and Social Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 2., 1964, Kedar Nath Ram Nath, Meerat City, India.
Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp. 57–58.
Radhakrishnan and Moore, A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, p. 233 and Ch. VII.
According to Hiriyanna, the Buddha continued the Upanisadic tradition in its real spirit and was completely detached from any metaphysical mode of reflections. Observe the following quotations: “If the Buddha did not know the truth, he would not have considered himself a Buddha or the enlightened.” (Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 138) also, “.. . We are not to look for any metaphysics as such in the teachings of Buddha.” Ibid. For the Buddha’s belief in the denial of the Self, Vide, Ibid, pp. 138–147.
E. A. Burtt in his The Compassionate Buddha, A Mentor Religious Classic, 1955, gives the reason why the Buddha considered the metaphysical arguments as irrelevant.
According to Murti, The Upanisads and Buddhism belong to the same spiritual genus, but they differ as species, and the differentiale are the acceptance and rejection of the Ätman, vide, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, George Allen and Unwin, 1955, p. 20. The present writer, however, differs from Murti’s method of interpretation of the Buddha’s position and of the four Buddhist schools. For the writer’s view about the Buddhist schools, vide, Changing Phases of Buddhist Thought in The Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1954.
Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, Royal Asiatic Society, 1923, pp. 25–53.
Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha (translated from the Pali of the Digha Nikāya) Sacred Book of the Buddhists, Vols. III and IV, 1899–1921.
Neither X, nor non-x, nor both.
Writer’s paper, Nāgārjuna: On Causation and Nirvāṇa in Dr. Radhakrishnan Souvenir Volume, The Darshana International, Moradabad, India.
Vide writer’s paper on Aśvaghoṣa’s Tathatā (Suchness) in Philosophical Quarterly, Amalner, India, October, 1962, for details.
Referring to Dharmakīrti, a famous disciple of Digṅāga, Rahul Sankrityayana, in his Preface to Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārtikaṁ, Kitab Mahal, India, 1943, says that Dharmakīrti “was the central figure around whom all the creative minds of India revolved.” For details about Dignāga’s doctrine of perception, vide Stcherbatsky: Buddhist Logic, Vol. I. Leningrad, 1932.
Hiriyaima, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp. 379–81.
Text with English Translation and Notes by Swami Nikhilānanda, Sri Ramakrishna Asrama, 1955. The other name by which this treatise is known is Vākyaśudhā.
Vide for details: A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, Ed. by Radhakrishnan and Moore, Ch. XV.
The psycho-physical individual.
For details, vide, Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp. 342–61.
Vedantāsāra of Sadānanda, With Introduction, Text, Translation and Comments, by Swami Nikhilānanda, Advaita Ashrama, Himalayas, 1941.
Viz: those of Sattva, rajas, and tamas.
Creative Evolution, Macmillan & Co., 1920.
Alexander: Space, Time and Deity, 2 Vols., Macmillan & Co., 1927.
Emergent Evolution, William and Norgate, 1927.
A Realistic Universe, Macmillan & Co., 1916.
Adventures of Ideas, A Mentor Book, Sixth Impression, 1964.
Venkataramiah, D., Translated into English by: The Paṅcapādikā of Padmapāda, Oriental Institute, Baroda, India, 1948.
The Bhāmatī of Vācaspati on Śaṅkara’s Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (Catuṣūtrī) Ed. by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri and C. Kunhan Raja, The Theosophical Publishing House, India, 1933, with a foreword by Radhakrishnan ;
also Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp. 340–341. 1933
Mahadevan, The Philosophy of Advaita, Luzac and Co., 1938, Chs. I and II.
Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1930.
Idealistic Thought of India, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1953, vide Preface and Chs. III–VIII.
Indian Idealism, Cambridge University Press, paperback, reprinted 1962, also vide: Otto, Mysticism East and West, Meridian Books, 1957, for a comparison between Sankara and Eckhart, a German mystic of the 13th century.
Sharma, Indian Philosophy (A Critical Survey), Ch. XX.
Raju, Idealistic Thought of India, pp. 375–394, and Spiegelberg, Living Religions of the World, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956, Ch. 16 (Islam and Sufism).
Sharma, Indian Philosophy (A Critical Survey), p. 332, and Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp. 388–390; Hiriyanna goes into the details of Rāmānuja’s notion of dharma-bhūta-jñāna; he interprets it as subsidiary or attributive jñāna, an accompanying character associated with the subject but proceeding towards an object to reveal it. Hence it is not the subject itself, but it is its accompanying character functioning to reveal its parts, which are within it. He interprets such basic knowledge in the case of the supreme self and also the finite self. In the case of the supreme self, the basic knowledge remains with it continuously and functions as revealing its parts; in the case of the finite selves, it endures even in the deep-sleep, but it does not function then or does not show itself, as knowledge is known always along with an object. In an aspect, the dharma-bhūta-jñāna of Rāmānuja, corresponds to the antaḥharaṇa of Śaṅkara, which also is supposed to go out towards objects and assume their form before giving rise to knowledge. But while the antaḥkaraṇa in Śaṅkara’s view is physical (jaḍa), requiring the aid of sākṣi for enlightenment, i.e., to be converted to knowledge, the dharma-bhūta-jñāna of Rāmānuja is a basic ever-present phenomenon and function, revealing the parts or objects. In the case of the finite selves it requires the mind or the senses as aids for determining its appearance in particular ways, as color or as an inner state or feeling. In the case of the supreme self it is operative spontaneously and without any medium.
Srinivasa Chari, Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita, Asia Publishing House, N.Y., 1961, and Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 385 ; according to Hiriyanna, Vedänta Desika was also known as Venkaṭanātha.
A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, ed. by Radhakrishnan and Moore, p. 508.
Sharma, Indian Philosophy (A Critical Survey), pp. 363–368.
Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, pp. 724–755, speaking of Śāktaism, Radhakrishnan often refers to Sir John Woodroffe’s works. Woodroffe (also known as Avalon) is a specialist in the field of Śāktaism and Tantraism.
Comparative Studies in Vedāntism, Oxford University Press, 1927, also Sharma, Indian Philosophy (A Critical Survey), pp. 368–369, and Raju, Idealistic Thought of India, pp. 170–173.
A philosophy based on the Tantras
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., Fourth Impression, 1951, especially Chs. IV–VIII.
Radhakrishnaii, The Spirit in Man in Contemporary Indian Philosophy, George Qllen and Unwin Ltd., Revised Second Edition, 1952, for his view of God (religious experience) and Absolute. According to Radhakrishnan, “Even as the world is a definite manifestation of one specific possibility of the Absolute, God with whom the worshipper stands in personal relation is the very Absolute in the world context and is not a mere appearance of the Absolute.” (p. 498). For critical comments and appreciation of Radhakrishnan, vide, Raju, Idealistic Thought of India, pp. 331–350.
An Idealist View of Life, p. 331, Radhakrishnan is critical of Whitehead in the following way: “... God, in Whitehead’s scheme, is affected by the process of reality. His nature finds completion only in terms of the world process. In any state he has a past which is irrevocable and a future which is not yet. What happens to God when the plan is achieved, when the primordial nature becomes the consequent, when there is an identity between natura naturans and natura naturata, to use Spinoza’s expression, is not clearly brought out.” For details about God and the Absolute, vide, pp. 331–345.
C. Hartshorne, Radhakrishnan on Mind, Matter and God in The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Tudor Publishing Company, N.Y., 1952, pp. 315–322, and Reply to Critics, by Radhakrishnan, pp. 796–798.
Radhakrishnan: Comparative Studies in Philosophy, Editorial Board, Rev. Inge and others, Harper & Brothers, 1950, Introduction.
Ibid
Ibid
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© 1968 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Sarkar, A.K. (1968). Śankara’s Interpretation of the Self and its Influence on Later Indian Thought. In: Raju, P.T., Castell, A. (eds) East-West Studies on the Problem of the Self. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0615-1_11
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