Abstract
Gianfrancesco Pico is certainly not the first western philosopher to attack Aristotle. The long history of anti-Aristotelianism has yet to be written. Pico, as we might expect, draws extensively from his predecessors’ criticisms of peripatetic philosophy. What must be considered significant about his long attack, however, is that it seems to be more comprehensive by far than any of the earlier anti-Aristotelian criticisms. Pico does not merely attack Aristotelian doctrine from a sceptic, Platonic, or Stoic point of view, nor merely from rhetorical-humanist considerations, nor only from the aspect of its incompatibility with Christian teaching, but combines all of these. The result is that Pico gives us an exhaustive compendium of anti-Aristotelian lore in the second half of his Examen Vanitatis.
Ego Aristotelem summo ingenio, doctrina, eloquentia, rerum peritia, pru-dentiaque et, ut semel dicam summum hominem, sed hominem tarnen, fuisse puto.
Rudolph Agricola, De inventione dialectica, book I, chapter 3.
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References
On Henry of Ghent see Charles B. Schmitt, “Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and Gian-francesco Pico on Illumination,” Mediaeval Studies, XXV (1963), pp. 231–58.
Here we can mention only several of the more prominent examples of later attacks on Aristotelian philosophy. Among them are Petrus Ramus’ (1515–72) Aristotelicae Animadversiones, first printed in 1543 and often reprinted thereafter; Francesco Patrizi’s (1529–97) Discussiones Peripateticae, printed, 1571–81, and Pierre Gassendi’s (1592–1655) Exercitationes Paradoxicae Adversus Aristoteleos, first printed in 1624.
The tradition in Germany has been studied by Peter Petersen, Geschichte der Aristotelischen Philosophie im protestantischen Deutschland(Leipzig, 1921);
Max Wundt, Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts(Tuebingen, 1939);
idem, Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aujklaerung(Tuebingen, 1945). See also the general observations in William F. Edwards, “The Logic of Iacopo Zabarella (1533–1589)”, (Ph. D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1960), pp. 323–53.
“Vitia vero illius quae circumferri soient, alii non admittunt, alii quoquomodo possunt extenuare conantur,” is how Pico expresses it. Ex. Van., IV, prooem.;p. 657.
“Propterea illud ego ab Aristotelis nimiis amatoribus et laudatoribus qui nunc in ecclesia nostra vivunt libenter impetrarem, ut me qui ab Aristotele multa didicisse et viginti circiter annos eius volumina comperiendae gratia veritatis versasse non diffiteor, si eius doctrinam quasi libra appensam et diutius in examine versatam, non id habere ponderis quod plerique existimarunt assevero, si frustrari fine Philosophiae, si incertam, si plerisque in locis falsam monstravero, pari ter excusent, potiusque id amori ascribant veritatis et pietatis cultui.” Ibid., pp. 657–58.
This work was printed in a separate edition at Venice in 1501 by Aldus. An earlier edition at Rome (1500) is mentioned by Hain (1304) and other bibliographers, but neither Professor Caplan nor I have found a copy still in existence. The De Imaginationeis one of the few of Pico’s works to appear in a modern edition. See Harry Gaplan, Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola On the Imagination(New Haven, 1930). This is accompanied by a valuable introduction, notes, and an English translation by Professor Gaplan. See our further remarks on this work in the next chapter.
In fact Aristotle is highly praised in several places in this work. For example, Aristotle’s brilliant speculations on the imagination are praised and he is said to be the first to distinguish clearly imagination from sense, opinion, and the intellectual powers of the soul. “... Aristoteles quique eum secuti..., exquisitissimis speculationibus decernentes differre imaginationem a sensu opinioneque, atque ab intellectualis animae potestatibus, utpote quae propriam in animali sedem propriasque functiones sortiatur.” Gaplan, op. cit., p. 26. Aristotle is also generally defended against his interpreters, Alexander and Averroes, in Pico’s Digressio de immortalitate animae, completed by 1514 and published in 1523.
What Pico is objecting to is perhaps best described by the following remarks, “... quia vel ita sese res habere videretur, ut ipse decreverat, vel quia tanta ferebatur eius authoritas, ut disquirendum eius de veritate doctrinae in sese non succurreret, neque enim philosophum sed philosophiae legem plerique omnes arbitrabantur.” Ex. Van., IV, prooem.;p. 658.
A recent and extensive discussion of the Retractionesis in Gustave Bardy’s introduction to the edition, Oeuvres de Saint Augustine, ist ser., vol. xii, Les Revisions(Paris, 1950), pp. 1–255. Also see John Burnaby, “The ‘Retractiones’ of St. Augustine: Self-Criticism or Apologia?,” Augustinus Magister: Congrès international augustinien(Paris 21–24 septembre 1954), pp 85–92 for a discussion of the meaning of retractatio, as Augustine used the term.
Giovanni Pico seems to have changed his position later in life, as we have tried to indicate in the preceding chapter, pp. 32–34. On these last years see Eugenio Garin, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: vita e dottrina(Florence, 1937), pp. 37–48. Gianfransceso Pico’s Vitaalso emphasizes the change.
“Nihil enim apud me potius fuit quam Veritas, quae maioris apud omnes momenti debet esse quam caetera, pro qua non modo contra Aristotelem, sed contra mea opera scribere me paraturn profiteor, si quando me deerrasse deprehenderem. An ego maior Augustino? qui retractavit et emendavit sua ipsius iam emissa scripta... An Ioanne Pico patruo maior? Ex. Van., IV, prooem.;p. 658.
Ibid.;p. 659. “... nam si laudavi allas aut defendi Aristotelem veritate duce, non tarnen aut religiosam aut penitus certam aut omnino veram doctrinam eius asserui, sed innui saepenumero et quandoque etiam subsignavi certam non esse, sed probabilem, non veram omnino, sed aliqua ex parte falsam, non religione fultam, sed superstitione labefactam, utpote hominis et quanquam inter Gentes magni et forte maximi, hominis tarnen, et verae lucis verae religionis ignari.”
See chapter II, p. 45.
Ex. Van., IV, prooem., p. 658. Also see p. 660 and p. 663 where Aristotle’s different “vanities” are explained. For example, “Prima igitur haec vanitas, quoniam et malum fuit initium, finis quoque malus, non vitae solum, sed ipsius doctrinae, quae ad bonum finem syncere non ducit; et intermedium quod docuit finis acquirendi non religio est, sed superstitio. Secundam vanitatem monstrabimus, quoniam et si certa eius literarum monumenta, quae ducentur in controversiam, in eis tarnen pollicetur certa, nec stat promissis, incerta videlicet et ambigua comminiscens, idque authoritatibus compluribus et rationibus confirmatum iri volumus.”
Ibid., p.658. Theocritos of Chios was a poet, contemporary with Aristotle. This quotation is found, for example in Diogenes Laertius, V, 11 (Loeb Edition, I, p. 454). On Theocritus in general see Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopaedie, 2nd ser., vol. V (1934), cols. 2025–27.
The notion that Plato came in contact with the Scriptures has a long tradition. Numenius (ca. 150–200), a Christian Platonist or Pythagorean, emphasized the close connection between Platonism and Christianity, calling Plato an “Attic-speaking Moses.” This is cited by several of the Fathers, including Clement of Alexandria (Stromata, I, 22, 150) and Euse-bius (Praep. Euan., XI, 10, 14). It was often repeated in the Renaissance, e.g. by Giovanni Pico (Heptaplus, prooem., in Garin ed., pp. 170–72) and Ficino (Theologia Platonica, XV; Opera(Basel, 1576), p. 394).
Ex. Van., IV, prooem., p. 659. Also see pp. 72–73 below.
“Quapropter ubi docuerimus non tantae prioribus saeculis fuisse quantae nunc est aesti-mationis Aristotelem, subinde aperiemus incertos esse ipsius libros, qui maximo habeantur in precio, hoc est, non constare adhuc, an ullum habeamus librum ab eo compositum. Quod et si concedatur, non liquere tarnen aliquid esse eis in libris quod illi possit extra controversiam attribui. Inde ad doctrinam ipsam etiamsi eius sit et habeatur legitima, non supposititia et notha, infirmandam sumus progressuri, auctoritate sectatorum, scribendi modo, bello expositorum perpetuo, Christianorum Theologorum magni nominis iudicio, errorum pernicie, sensus fallacia, eius demum ipsius testimonio.” Ex. Van., IV, 1. p. 663.
These criticisms are carried out in detail in chapters 4, 5, and 7 of Book IV; pp. 668–74, 676–78.
As examples we can cite his concern for determining which works were actually written by Aristotle and which ones by his commentators (IV, 4; pp. 668–72), his concern for precision in translation (IV, 5; p. 674), or his concern with the textual variants in different versions of the Metaphysics, i.e. of the Aldus edition and of a manuscript of the work in the Library of S. Marco in Florence (IV, 5; p. 673). See below, note 44, pp. 66–67.
This criticism is expanded in chapter 6 and 8 of Book IV; pp. 675–76, 678–80.
This is considered in chapter 3, pp. 667–68.
Ancient Christian criticism is dealt with in chapter 9 (pp. 680–83) and later Christian criticism is covered in chapter 10 (pp. 683–85).
In chapter 11 (pp. 685–87), but a much more detailed attack constitutes the greater part of Book VI of the Examen Vanitatis.
In chapter 12 (pp. 687–89). This, however, is merely a summary of the material in Book V, and to a certain extent of that in Books I, II, and III.
In chapter 13 (pp. 690–91). This criticism of course focuses on texts such as Nicomachean Ethics1094b 11–28, where Aristotle admits that certain of his teachings must be considered as only probable
“... Unde nam tanta illi facta fuerit authoritatis accessio...” Ex. Van., IV, 2; p. 664. The summary we give here is based on pp. 664–66.
This is presumably during the twelfth century when translators such as Joannes Hispa-lensis (fl. 1140); Dominicus Gundissalinus (d. 1151), and Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187) and philosophers such as Averroes (1126–98) were active in Spain. For a brief summary see C.H. Haskins, Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, Mass., 1927), pp. 3–19.
A good general summary of the introduction of Aristotelianism into the West is found in Martin Grabmann’s article “Aristoteles im 12. Jahrhundert” in Mittelalterliches Geistesleben(Munich, 1956), III, pp. 64–128. For the development of Aristotelianism, particularly at Paris, see Fernand Van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West, trans. Leonard Johnston (Louvain, 1955) and idem, The Philosophical Movement of the Thirteenth Century(Edinburgh, 1955).
See Harry A. Wolfson, Crescas’ Critique of Aristotle(Cambridge, Mass., 1929). Crescas will be discussed more fully in chapter V.
Pico has in mind Opus Oxoniense, prol., p. 3,q.2, text 136 (Ioannis Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia(Vatican City, 1950f.), I, p. 93). Here Scotus turns aside from the method of Averroes in favor of that of Avicenna in his attempt to prove the existence of God. See Etienne Gilson, “Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, II (1927), pp. 89–149.
“Joannes Picus Galeotti patris frater quod primo dixi libro utranque se conciliaturum philosophiam Piatonis Aristotelisque receperat ac, ni morte praeventus fuisset, facile (ut arbitror) eius rei desiderium posteris non reliquisset, tanta erat illius ingenii vis atque dexteritas, tanta doctrina. Ego vero, ut quae primo etiam sunt volumine indicata, repetam, non conciliare, sed infirmare universam gentium doctrinam tentavi libris superioribus, his autem qui sequentur Aristoteleam, ut maius inde Studium sacris literis possimus impartiri exemplo veterum theologorum, ut earum quoque veritas literarum, humana sapientia de summo... magis, magisque resplendeat.” Ex. Van., IV, 2; p. 666. See Chapter II, p. 48 and note 46.
This aspect of Pico’s thought is perhaps best expressed in his early work, De studio divinae et humanae philosophiae, which was completed in 1496. See above pp. 37–43 and also the De morte Christiin Opera, pp. 29–73.
“Sunt et ad hanc diem nonnulli qui aperire oculos incipiant et ad meliora pergendum arbitrentur; nec existiment Aristotelem tanti esse faciendum, quanti solebat.” Ex. Van., IV, 2; p. 667. On Gianfrancesco’s tendency to Platonism see below pp. 72–73 and Schmitt, “Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and Gianfrancesco Pico...”, p. 257. On his disagreement with Ficino and the Renaissance Platonists on magic and the interpretation of the prisca theologia, however, see D. P. Walker, Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella(London, 1958), pp. 146–47 and
Frances A. Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition(Chicago, 1964), pp. 157–58.
“Nec nunc Aristotelis librum ab Aristotele possessum et qui olim in eius bonis fuerit intelligo, nec sophistice loquor, nixus amphibologia, sed librum, qui ab exemplaribus Aristotelis propriis, ab eoque compositis editisve, deductus unquam fuerit. Dubitationi huic et incertae sententiae dedit occasionem varietas Aristotelicos libros tractandi et in ordinem redigendi.” Ibid., IV; 4, p. 669. Pico apparently was one of the first scholars of the Renaissance to question the legitimacy of Aristotle’s writings. The history of this criticism in the sixteenth century does not seem to have been studied in detail. For other examples see Otta-viano Ferrari, De sermonibus exotericis(Venice, 1575) and
Francesco Patrizi, Discussiones peripateticae(Basel, 1581).
Richard Shute, On the History of the Process by which the Aristotelian Writings Arrived at Their Present Form(Oxford, 1888), p. 176.
For more recent discussions of the question see Felix Grayeff, “The Problem of the Genesis of Aristotle’s Text,” Phronesis, I (1955–56), pp. 105–22 and
Josef Zuercher, Aristoteles’ Werk und Geist(Paderborn, 1952). Zuercher, who concludes, “Das Corpus Aristotelicum..., so wie es heute vorliegt, ist als Ganzes in dieser Form nicht von Aristoteles geschrieben, sondern von Theophrast (p. 17),” represents the extreme position on this still-debated matter.
Diogenes Laertius names over 150 works of Aristotle, V, 22–27 (Loeb edition, pp. 464–75). Conspicuously absent from the list are such well known works as the Metaphysics, Nico-machean Ethics, Politics, and De Anima.
Pico could have been led to this conjecture by Diogenes Laertius who mentions no fewer than eight Aristotles. Ibid., V, 35 (Loeb edition, pp. 480–83).
This conjecture is attributed to Ammonius(?).
This story is related in Ex. Van., IV, 4; p. 670. The problem arose because a number of the manuscripts of Themistius’ paraphrase of the Physicscontained Simplicius’ preface. See the introduction by Henricus Schenkl to Themistius, In Aristotelis physica paraphrasis, CAG, V (Berlin, 1905), p. XIX. When Ermolao Barbaro translated Themistius (1480), he included the preface of Simplicius under the name of Themistius. See, for example, Themistius, Libri paraphraseos...(Venice, 1502), fol. 18r. Pico may have been one of the first to recognize the similarity. The editor of the edition Themistius, Paraphrasis in Aristotelis posteriora... (Venice, 1542) notes, however, “Non est Themistii prohoemium hoc quamvis illi id Hermolaus ascripserit, sed Simplicii sicuti illi facile cognoscere qui callent literas graecas (p. 49).”
“Difficile enim ex phrasi discernere libros eodem editos seculo a viris doctis, qui eodem scribendi genere delectantur, difficiliusque cum discipuli magistrorum in scribendo stylum aemulari et effingere magna cura contendunt.” Ex. Van., IV, 4; p. 671.
Ibid., pp. 670–71. Most of the facts of Pico’s account comes from Diogenes Laertius, Strabo (Geography, XIII, 1, 54), and Plutarch (Sulla, XXVI). For modern accounts see note 36. On the library at Alexandria see Edward A. Parsons, The Alexandrian Library(Amsterdam,
See for example-Examen VanitatisII, 23 (p. 565) or for even a more extreme case see the story told in Gianfrancesco’s Strix(Bologna, 1523), fols. E2-Fr. The latter is repeated in summary form in Ioannis Wierii de praestigiis daemonum... (Basel, 1583), col. 359. On Pico’s Strixand his relation to Wier see Charles B. Schmitt, “Who Read Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola,”? Studies in the Renaissance, XI (1964) pp. 105–32, at p. 116, esp. note 59 for a rather startling example given by Pico.
His comments on the state of the Metaphysicsare of some interest so we shall cite them in extenso.“Accedit quod et aliis in voluminibus par, si non maior quandoque dissonantia reperitur. Metaphysicorum libri quantum ad undecimum et duodecimum pertinet, in Arabicis et Latinis tralationibus non conveniunt; et pars duodecimi, ubi Pythagoraeorum opinio, Homerico carmine de unitate principatus explosa cernitur, apud Graecos et Latinos extat, apud Averrois codicem non invenitur. Et quoad pertinet ad Graecos quintus liber aliter sese habet in aliquibus antiquis ac in his qui sunt formis stanneis excusi Venetiis. Illud quoque sit indico quod in Marciana Florentina biblioteca, extat codex vetustus satis, in quo repetuntur quae in quinto dicta sunt, secus ac in alus. Sed et Michael Ephesius in scholiis in primum de partibus Animalium librum citat modos necessitatis varios ex quarto Meta-physicorum, quos tarnen constat esse apud plerosque in quinto, non quarto libro collocatos; et mirum hoc videri non debet iis qui Graecos Aristotelis codices ab Aldo Venetiis impressos legerint, ubi numerus librorum Metaphysicorum variatur omnis. Nam qui in Averrois translatione et aliis plerisque secundus est liber, ibi primus habetur; et qui tertius secundi loco repositus atque ita deinceps multa varietas cernitur.” Ex. Van., IV, 5; p. 673. On the history of the text of the Metaphysics, see Franz Pelster, “Die griechisch-latein Metaphysikübersetzungen des Mittelalters,” Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Supplementband II (1923), pp. 89–118,
and also Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics(2nd. ed., Toronto, 1963), esp. pp. 69–106.
“At qui, si gratis nulla prorsus extorquente ratione concedamus, Graecos Aristotelis libros legitimos fuisse et legitima in eis Aristotelea sensa propriosque animi conceptus asser-vari; ad Latinum Aristotelem ubi venerimus, mirum quam ipse non erit Aristoteles. Libros eos semper excipio, quos Theodorus Gaza convertit e Graeco. Atque ut de reliquis taceam in eo contextu, quern exposuit Averrois de Arabico sermone in Latinum verso, tot pene errores, quot verba spectantur. Vide quam versus possit aut debeat Aristotelis interpres haberi, qui adeo ab imperitis celebrari solet Averrois; et quanti sit eius faciendum testimonium hoc ab eo positum in prooemio expositionis in naturalem philosophiam; non esse a mille et quin-gentis annis inventum cuiusquam momenti errorem in Aristotelicis literarum monumentis; cum nullum ipse ferre iudicium queat aut veritatis aut erroris, qui Aristotelis libros non legit ob ignorationem Graecae linguae, Arabica usus translatione plena mendaciis, in qua et sua commenta refudit; et si forte legit, Aristotelis libros non legit, sed Apelliconis Teii et Tyran-nionis Grammatici et illorum qui inde sibi Peripateticum postea nomen arrogavêre.” Ibid., IV, 5; p. 674.
“Nimc tantum ostendimus Aristotelem a sectatoribus quandoque vexatum et habitum incertum, atque etiam mancum.” Ibid., IV, 6; p. 675.
This is a fourteenth century Byzantine writer, whose commentary on the De Interpretationewas printed in Venice in 1503. He has not been studied very carefully, but is given brief mention in Karl Krumbacher, Geschichte der Byzantinischen Litteratur von Justinian bis zum Ende des Ostroemische Reiches, 2nd ed. (Munich, 1897), p. 431.
Porphyry (233/4–305), the most important follower of Plotinus, is the author of the famous Isagoge, a.work discussing the Categoriesof Aristotle which became one of the standard philosophical texts of the Early Middle Ages. John Philoponus, or Grammaticus (VI century), a prolific commentator on the Aristotelian writings, was one of the first Christians to take a serious interest in Aristotle. Simplicius (VI century), a Neoplatonist in orientation, wrote commentaries on De Cáelo, the Physics, De Anima, and Categories.Olympiodorus (VI century), another Neoplatonist, numbers among his works commentaries on the Categoriesand Meteorology.Leo Magentinus (XIV century), bishop of Mytilene, wrote commentaries on the De interpretationeand the Prior Analytics.
“Possem innumeros citare vel Platonicos philosophos vel aliis philosophorum sectis addictos; at suspectos afferrem testes, qui affirmarent rerum naturalium cognitionem (in qua maxime laudatus Aristoteles) scientiam non esse, sed opinonem sive credulitatem seu mavis opinativam rationem, sicut et cogitationem esse, mathematicam notitiam rerum, solaque intellectilia quae ratione et intellectu concipiuntur scientiam parere, naturalia quae sensu et ratione coniecturam. Sed et Peripatetici non desuní qui etiam res naturales sub scientia non claudunt.” Ex. Van., IV, 6; p. 676. Simplicius, Olympiodorus, Leo Magentinus, and Peter of Abano are mentioned as disagreeing with Aristotle on this point.
For example in the famous letters On Imitationwhich he wrote to Pietro Bembo.
Cicero praises the literary and rhetorical style of Aristotle several times in his writings. See for example De Or atoreI, 11, 49. However, Cicero’s knowledge of Aristotle was primarily though the more literary works, rather than through the numerous “esoteric” or “scientific” writings which passed into the tradition in the later centuries and which form the bulk of the Corpus Aristotelicumas we know it today. For a stylistic criticism similar to Pico’s see Ludovicus Vives, Opera(Basel, 1555), I, pp. 336–38, the work De causis corruptarum artium.
“Et sane consensu omnium fere veterum philosophorum damnatus olim fuit Aristotelis scribendi modus; utpote qui ea quae ambigua minime viderentur, multis verbis pluribusque argumentationibus prosequeretur. Quae autem multa egerent cura ut tractarentur et in quibus esset inter doctos aliqua disceptatio, ea paucis absoluerit; atque in hoc genere quaestionum eleganti quidem, sed concisa nimium verborum serie usus esset, nec Attica solum, sed plusquam Laconica atque etiam plusquam Chilonica, ut Aristagorae Milesii verbo utar: Quid enim brevius. Sed neque aenigmatibus, more Pythagoraeorum uti voluit, descivisset enim ab instituto. At verbis vel ambiguis in sese tametsi prima facie viderentur expositissima, vel artificiose adeo compositis concinnatisque disserebat, ut primori fronte ipsoque in lectionis vestibulo pervia satis apparerent; ubi admitti volebas, excludebaris recondito sensu et nimis quam abstruso, saepe quidem perplexo, semper nihilominus eleganti.” Ex. Van., IV, 7; pp. 676–77.
See J. Baudry, Atticos: Fragments(Paris, 1931).
“Atticus enim quod et supra [i.e. IV, 3] dicebamus philosophus, similem eum [i.e. Aristotelem] dicebat sepiae, cuius ea natura proditur, ut dum quaeritur a piscatoribus ut capiatur, iam iamque admoveri manus persentit, atramentum illud humoris nigerrimi, quod in sese habet congenitum spargens, inficit aquam ut ab oculis mox et a manibus piscatoribus elabatur.” Ex. Van., IV, 7; p. 677. The earlier reference to Atticus is on p. 668. The source of Atticus’ statement is to be found in Eusebius’ Praeparatio Evangelica, XV, g, 13. Atticus’ comparison seems to have caught the attention of a number of the humanists and philosophers of the Renaissance. It was already cited by Poliziano in his Miscellanea(in Opera, Lugduni, 1533; vol. II, p. 574) and in the sixteenth and succeeding centuries was repeated often by the opponents of Aristotle. I am indebted to Professor Alessandro Perosa for the reference to Atticus in Poliziano. See chapter VI, pp. 179–80 and Charles B. Schmitt, “Aristotle as a Cuttlefish: The Origin and Development of a Renaissance Image,” Studies in the Renaissance, XII (1965), pp. 60–72.
The Economicsis now considered to be work of the Peripatetic School, rather than by Aristotle himself. See Aristotelis, Quae feruntur Oeconomica, ed. F. Susemihl (Leipzig, 1887), pp. V–XXX.
This doubtlessly refers to Aristotle’s often repeated promise to take up problems peripheral to a given discussion elsewhere in his works. Apparently this was not done in some cases.
“Alienis etiam nititur opinionibus, quae postea falsae decursu temporum iudicatae sunt...” Ex. Van., IV, 7; p. 677.
“Quibus omnibus ex rebus quantum ad scribendi modum pertinet, Aristotelis doctrinam incertam esse colligi potest et sepiae spargentis atramentum more obscuram et etiam chameleontis instar versicolorem...” Ibid., IV, 7; p. 678. Aristotle speaks of the chameleon in the De partions animalium(IV, 11, 692a), but more extensively in the De animalium historia(II, 11). The cuttlefish is also mentioned in Book IV of the De partions animalium(chap. 5, 678b) and in many other places, notably De animalium historia(IV, 1).
On this school see M. Wellmann, “Empirische Schule,” in Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Ency-clopaedie, ser. I, vol. V (1905), cols. 2516–24.
“Si multitudinem consectaneorum spectes, nunc ipse pluribus abundat, olim paucioribus, et in futurum fortasse paucissimis, quando multi iam contra ipsum insurrexerunt Piatonis asseclae; et forte alii extabunt qui mecum sentient et mecum dicent, nec in eo, nec in aliis gentium philosophis solidam synceramque veritatem quemadmodum vulgus etiam literatorum existimat reperiri.” Ibid., IV, 3; p. 668.
This can be seen for example in the Epilogue of Book IV, p. 691.
Printed in the Opera(1601) pp. 248–466. On Pico’s criticisms of Pietro d’Abano see Lynn Thorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental Science(New York, 1923–58) VI, 467 and
Bruno Nardi, Saggi sull’aristotelismo padovano dal secolo XIV al XVI(Florence, 1958), pp. 23–25.
His whole attitude has a somewhat Savonarolian ring to it. He certainly was heavily influenced by the Ferrarese friar and while it would be incorrect to derive the whole inspiration for the Examen Vanitatisfrom his early contact with Savonarola, reflections of the influence are still there. See my forthcoming article cited in note 119, p. 26.
“An homini plerisque erranti assentiemur? Ita ut quemadmodum nos fefellit in illis, fallere quoque possit in aliis? Annon magis suspendemus iudicium et incertum quod relin-quitur habebimus?” Ex. Van., IV, 11; p. 685.
“Verum enimvero cum Aristotelis doctrina fundetur in sensu, ideo facile convincetur incerta, quia non incertus modo plurimum sensus sed saepenumero fallax ac pluribus modis aliis quam putaverit Aristoteles et decipere potest et decipi. Est enim sensus suapte natura verus ni sit varius, varius autem in diversis hominibus est, et quandoque in eodem, et saepenumero de suis sensionibus ambigunt plurimi, ut opere procedente patefiet; unde nec generalis regula sensilis veritatis quae et universis et singulis hominibus et semper aptari queat (ni ego quidem fallor) invenietur.” Ex. Van., IV, 12; p. 687.
“Est itaque apud Aristotelem ubique videre hoc sensus fundamentum magna cura iaci solere; atque ut ab Analyticis logicae libris posterioribus fiat exordium, quibus omnis nititur Aristotelica doctrina, quibusque reliqua reddere certa magna cura molitur, sensum unicum esse totius aedificii fundamentum comperimus, totiusque demonstrationis initium. Earn enim demonstrationem ex propositionibus universalibus communit, propositiones universales ex singularibus per inductionem colligit, singularia sensu deprehendit. Porro Physicis quoque libris id praestituit principium, innatum esse nobis viam a notioribus nobis ad ea quae naturae sunt notiora, nobis autem nota, quae sensibus haurimus.” Ibid., p. 687.
Post. An.100b 7-g.
Ibid., 72b24–25.
Ibid., 71b17–20.
Ibid., 87b28.
Ibid., 71b20–24.
The reasoning of this passage is not straightforward and consequently cannot be outlined in a few words, but the argument is found in detail at Post. An.99b15–10004. The key passage that gives the conclusion is at 100a10–14. That is, the individual sense perceptions combine to form the abilities (ἕξις) to construct first principles (ἀρχαί) The military simile that Aristotle here uses is quite apt. When retreat is called in battle, the line reforms when one man takes a position and the others do likewise until it is completely reestablished. In the same way the ability to form first principles is established by a series of sense impressions. Thus, the ‘individuals” of the unitary sense impressions unite, after many repetitions, to form a universal. And, as Aristotle continues, it is by the process of induction (ἐπαγωγή) that we come to know the first principles. Cf. 100b2–4. This process of induction whereby the universais are derived from particulars is also discussed at Post. An.I, 18 (81a38-b9). Here it is argued that if a person’s sense perception is lost for some reason, induction and hence scientific knowledge is impossible. See also Prior An., 46a17–22, where Aristotle tells why the principles must be learned by experience.
Post. An.100b5–1 7. There is a certain ambiguity which runs throughout Aristotle’s treatment of this question. Can knowledge of the first principles be derivable from experience and dependent upon intuition at the same time? See the discussion of this in Eduard Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, trans. Costelloe and Muirhead (New York, 1962), I, pp. 194–212.
This was rejected at 71a29–30.
This chapter consists of only about twenty lines in the Bekker Edition, but is one of the most important of the Aristotelian texts for determining his basic ideas on methodology.
Physics 184a16–18.
Ibid., 184a23–24- Here it must be noted that Aristotle is not using the terms ϰαθóλoυ and ϰαθ’ἕϰαστα in their technical philosophical senses of universal and particular. He is, rather, using them in a somewhat different sense to signify that our knowledge proceeds from the generality (ϰαθóλoυ) of the multitude of sense experiences to the individual (ϰαθ’ἕϰαστα) concept which results from a certain number of them. If these words are taken in their usual philosophical senses, the whole chapter is rendered unintelligible. This is particularly true when is contrasted with other passages such as Post. An.72a4–6 or Post. An.81b6–7 where the words are clearly used in a logical context which requires that they be interpreted in their technical sense.
Physics184a24–25. This is almost in complete contradiction to the passage from the Posterior Analyticscited in the footnote above if ϰαθóλoυ is taken in the same sense in both cases. It seems clear that the ὅλoν is the whole realm open to sense experience and ϰαθóλoυ the generality of this experience, rather than a general concept abstracted from particular experiences.
Physics.184b12–14.
Ibid., 184a16–18.
See note 78 above. The general which is more knowable to us becomes known by sense (ϰατὰ τὴν ἀίσθησιν). This also agrees with other passages in Aristotle, for example De Anima432a2-io. Especially important is 432a7–8. The note to this passage in R. D. Hicks, Aristotle De Anima(Cambridge, 1907) p. 546 is also instructive on this point. The same is to be found in chapter 18 of Book I of the Posterior Analytics(81a38-b9).
Post. An.I, 18. This was also discussed above.
“Ipse [i.e. Aristoteles] certefatetur aliquibus modis falli sensum posse, idque trahi cum ex secundo libro de Anima potest, tum ex alus operibus...” Ex. Van.IV, 12; p. 688. For examples taken from the Second Book of the De Anima, see the following discussion and notes. On the question of error according to Aristotle see Leo W. Keeler, The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant(Rome, 1934), pp. 22–40 and
Irving Block, “Truth and Error in Aristotle’s Theory of Sense Perception,” Philosophical Quarterly, XI (1961), pp. 1–9.
On the question of what Aristotle means by “perception” see Thomas J. Slakey, “Aristotle on Sense Perception,” Philosophical Review, LXX (1961), pp, 470–84.
For example, that man’s sense of smell is defective (de. An.421a9–13) or that some of man’s senses are inferior to those of certain animals in which these are highly developed (de An.421a20–22).
For example at De An.422a31–33.
Ibid., 427b11–13. The translation is taken from Hicks, op. cit., p. 123. Similar opinions are stated elsewhere in the same work at 418a1–14 and 428a 11–12.
De An.428a11–12, 16–18. Some attention was given in the treatise De Imaginationeto the question of error arising from the imagination. Cf. particularly chapter 7 (Caplan edition, pp. 42–48) and passim.See also our discussion in the next chapter.
The sceptics, of course, would not even grant this to Aristotle. There are many passages in the works of Sextus Empiricus that could be cited on this point. The deception of visual perception is treated, for example, in the Outlines of PyrrhonismI, 44–9 (Loeb Edition, pp. 27–30.
De An.428b19–22. Very similar is 418a14–16 and 425b3–4. On the general problem of error arising from sensation in Aristotle some interesting remarks are made in the section “L’ἄισθησις; erronea” in Paolo Coscenza, L’inizio e lo sviluppo della conoscenza sensibile in Aristotele(Napoli, 1958) pp. 89–95.
De An.428b22–25-
See also Zeller, op. cit., II, p. 68.
For the question of why there are several senses instead of one, see 425b5–9. Also valuable here is Hicks’ observation “τὰ ἀϰoλoυθoῦντα ϰαὶ ϰoινά, ‘the accompaniments of the objects of the special senses which are common to all senses.’ The ‘common sensibles’ are fitly called ἀϰoλoυθoῦντα because the ‘special sensibles’ (colour, sounds, tangible qualities) are always accompanied by one or more of them. Thus everything perceptible has number, is either at restor in motion, and things in space have magnitude (μέγεθoς) and shape.” op. cit., p. 433.
op. cit., p. 467.
“... ut hinc longe fallantur qui sensum non decipi ex Aristotelis sententia censeant.” Ex. Van., IV, 12; p. 688.
In the Ex. Van., II, 22; pp. 560–64.
Ibid.Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 14 and 40–78 (Loeb Edition, pp. 10–11 and pp. 26–47).
“Cognosci enim veritates multae per sensum queunt, sed utcognosci possint rationes illae Aristoteleae extra controversiam non probaverunt. Incerta enim plurimum sensilis cognitio multasque adesse conditiones oportet, ne labatur sensus et in iudicando, quod et Aristoteles et sectatores qui sensui mirum in modum fidunt, cum animadvertissent, excep-iones attulerunt multas, de quibus iam verba fecimus.” Ex. Van., IV, 12; p. 689.
Nicomachean EthicsI, 3, esp. 1094b 12–13.
Metaphysics, alpha, 1, 993a30–31. Modern criticism usually considers this book of the Metaphysicsto be by an early follower of Aristotle rather than by Aristotle himself.
993b7–11.
For the distinction in Aristotle between those things most knowable to us and those most knowable by nature see our discussion above, pp. 78–79 and the corresponding notes.
XII, 8; 1074a6–14.
III, 10; 759a8–61a11.
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Schmitt, C.B. (1967). The General Attack on Aristotle. In: Gianfrancesco Pico Della Mirandola (1469–1533) and His Critique of Aristotle. International Archives of the History of Ideas / Archives Internationales D’Histoire des Idees, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9679-6_4
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