Skip to main content

Abstract

Conrad prefaces his commentary on St. Thomas Aquinas’ De Ente et Essentia with a prooemium in which he does three things. First, he discusses the nature of philosophy, explaining that man’s need for it is rooted in the emptiness and potentiality of a possible intellect created for eternal glory, showing why it ought to be sought, and how it has been defined and divided. Secondly, he explains how the investigations of the De Ente et Essentia are related to those parts of philosophy which have as their task a description and explanation of some special part of the world of existing things. Thirdly, he identifies each of the four causes of the De Ente et Essentia: its one efficient cause, its twofold material cause, its twofold final cause, and its twofold formal cause.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Like most (perhaps all) medievals, Conrad equates in a way these four: 1) the sciences,

    Google Scholar 

  2. philosophy, 3) knowledge, and 4) wisdom, as the fruit of intellectual activity, as opposed to the virtues (moral), the fruit of volitional activity. This seems to include both speculative and practical knowledge, as is suggested by what Conrad presents in what follows immediately in his introduction, i.e., various reasons (ot others) for studying philosophy, various definitions (of others) of philosophy, some of philosophy’s divisions.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Conrad wrongly attributes the Fons Vitae of Avicebron to St. Anselm.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Conrad, like most (perhaps all) medievals, makes no distinction between science, on the one hand, and philosophy or human knowledge or wisdom, on the other hand. Science, in the singular, is the equivalent of philosophy or knowledge or wisdom. The sciences, in the plural, are simply the divisions, in the plural, of philosophy, i.e., of the whole of human knowledge or human wisdom, both speculative and practical — apart, of course, from Revelation and the Theology based on that. Of course, Conrad does not even mention Theology here. It would be interesting, indeed, to learn what his views are (if he has any) on the difference, and on the relation, between philosophy and Theology. But this is impossible, at least for the time being; for, as far as is known, there are only two works of Conrad in existence, 1) the present one, and 2) a shorter commentary on Dominicus Gundissalinus’ Liber De Unitate et Uno, and this latter work is still in process of paleographical deciphering.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Why I say “seems to be” will become clear in the immediately following, i.e., pp. 94–97-

    Google Scholar 

  6. In fact, Isaac offers only three ways, and explicitly only three: “... et descripserunt earn [philosophi] descripcionibus tribus” (p. 302). “Cum iam pervenimus ad descripciones philo-sophiae tres, tunc sequamur illud loquendo de quiditate sapienciae.” (p. 306). All references to Isaac’s Liber De Deficionibus are to J. T. Muckle (ed.), “Isaac Israeli’s Liber De Defini-cionibus,” Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age, Vol. 11 (1937–38), pp. 300–340.

    Google Scholar 

  7. According to Isaac, Philosophy is to be described, and not defined. As he explains it, there came a time when philosophers saw that definitions should be composed of a genus and of a specific difference, and a time when they saw that they could find no genus for philosophy.

    Google Scholar 

  8. It was then that they saw that philosophy could be at most described. “Postquam noverunt illud philosophi [sc. how the four questions: anitas (an est)y quiditas (quid est), qualitas (quale est) t and quaritas (quare est) are employed with respect to acquiring scientific, that is philosophical, knowledge about things], et verificatum est apud eos quod definiciones non com-ponuntur nisi ex generibus et differenciis specialibus, et non invenerunt philosophiae genus ex quo eius definicio componeretur, subtiliati sunt bonitate consideracionum et cogitacionum ipsorum et descripserunt earn descripcionibus tribus.” (Ibid., p. 302).

    Google Scholar 

  9. “Descripcio autem eius [sc. philosophiae] derivata ex nomine suo est quod philosophia est amor sapienciae et illud racionatur ex nomine philosophi; philosophus enim compositus est ex phile et sophia. Et dicitur quidem lingua graeca phile amator et sophia sapiencia. Cumque illud ita sit, tunc manifestum est quod intencio philosophi est amator sapienciae, et cum intencio philosophi sit amator sapienciae, tunc intencio philosophiae est amor sapienciae.” (Ibid., pp. 302–303).

    Google Scholar 

  10. Ibid., p. 302, p. 306.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Ibid., p. 330, p. 331.

    Google Scholar 

  12. “Huius autem tripartite partis theorice communis utilitas est cognoscere disposiciones omnium que sunt ad hoc ut describatur in animabus nostris forma tocius esse secundum ordinem suum, quemadmodum forma visibilis describitur in speculo. ... unde describi earn [sc. formam tocius esse] in anima in presenti quidem est summa nobilitas et est causa felici-tatis in futuro.” (Dominicus Gundissalinus, De Divisione Philosopkiae (critical edition of L. Baur) in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Vol. IV, 2, pp. 15–16). Note the similarity between Conrad’s : descriptio universi esse in anima, and Gundissalinus’ : ut describatur in animabus nostris forma tocius esse. Notice too the similarity between Conrad’s : cuius cognitio est in presenti summa nobilitas ..., et in futuro causa felicitatis eteme (see Prooemium Conradi de Prusya, p. 13), which he adds to the words, descriptio universi esse in anima, and Gundissalinus’: unde describi earn [sc. formam tocius esse] in anima in presenti quidem est summa nobilitas et est causa felicitatis in futuro, which he in like manner adds to his words, ut describatur in animabus nostris forma tocius esse. — It may even be the case that Conrad not only had before him the text, or a portion thereof, of Gundissalinus’ De Divisione Philosophiae, but that he wrongly attributed it to Isaac; in much the same way as he attributed the Fons Vitae of Avicebron to St. Anselm (see Prooemium Conradi de Prusya, p. 10, p. 12) or, in much the same say as he attributed Gundissalinus’ Liber De Unitate et Uno to Boethius.

    Google Scholar 

  13. “... intencio quidem sermonis mei, scilicet assimilacio operibus creatoris est percepcio veritatis rerum ...” (Op. cit., p. 303).

    Google Scholar 

  14. Ibid., p. 302, p. 303, p. 330.

    Google Scholar 

  15. I do not know where in his works Algazali records this definition. But I do know that it is recorded by Gundissalinus in his De Divisione Philosophiae (see ed. Baur, p. 7). Can this be taken to corroborate in some way the conjecture that Conrad may have had before him a copy, or part of a copy, of the De Divisione Philosophiae, as noted above in footnote 10, in connection with philosophy defined as descriptio universi esse in animal It should also be mentioned, as noted by A.-H. Chroust, that this definition of philosophy, Early Stoic in its origin, appears in M. Aurelius Cassiodorus’ De Artibus ac Disciplinis Liberalium Litterarum (Patrol. Lat., Vol. 70, col. 1167) and in Isidore of Seville’s Etymologiae (Patrol. Lat., Vol. 82, col. 141, col. 142), as well as in many other authors who wrote prior to Conrad’s time. See Chroust’s “The Definitions of Philosophy in the De Divisione Philosophiae of Dominicus Gundissalinus,” The New Scholasticism, Vol. 25 (1951), pp. 263–266.

    Google Scholar 

  16. To say, as Conrad has said, that part of the material cause or subject of the De Ente et Essentia is ens in communi (see above, p. 14) is to say, if not exactly the same thing, something very close indeed to saying that knowledge of being and essence in themselves and absolutely constitutes its interior final cause. Expressed either way, i.e, either in terms of part of subject or in terms of interior final cause, this task is not, as a simple matter of fact, a task of the De Ente et Essentia.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Bobik, Joseph. Aquinas On Being and Essence. A translation and interpretation. Notre Dame, Indiana: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1965; p. vii.

    Google Scholar 

  18. Ibid., p. viii.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1974 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Corbett, J.A., Bobik, J. (1974). Comments on Conrad’s Commentary. In: The Commentary of Conrad of Prussia on the De Ente et Essentia of St. Thomas Aquinas. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9651-2_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9651-2_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-247-1939-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-9651-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics