Abstract
The statutes defining the Attorney General’s legal advisory duty do not authorize him to render opinions on his own motion, but only upon request. With respect to requests, the statutes lay down some general requirements. They mention certain officials as authorized to make requests and they indicate the kind of legal question to be submitted to the Attorney General. However, whether a particular request meets the statutory requirements is a matter for the Attorney General himself to decide. And the Attorneys General have had to render numerous opinions concerning the proper initiation of requests and the type of legal question that can be properly answered.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Reference
OAG 492 (1821). Wirt solemnly added: “And it is not impossible that this consideration might have had some small weight in settling the limits of this officer’s duties as they now stand.”
The Diary of Edward Bates, 1859–1866, Howard K. Beale ed., (Washington, 1933), p. 410. Bates, it may be noted, had the impression that the notes were receivable, a view contrary to that taken by the Treasury.
Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of America to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 9, 1914, copy in State Dept. file 811. 741/49 (NA).
OAG 291, 293 (1914). Citing In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890), Gregory argued that the President’s “powers are broad” in the protection of the nation’s “responsibilities and obligations as a sovereignty.” See also, E. S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787–1948, 3d ed. (New York, 1948 ), pp. 239–40.
Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F. 2d 676, 690 (1949). See, however, Snyder v. Buck, 75 F. Supp. 902, 908 n. 6 (1948).
Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United States (Cambridge, 1927), p. 55.
OAG 602 (1893); refusal to draw up a list of occupations within the meaning of the term “laborers” as used in the Chinese Exclusion Acts.
OAG 649 (1893); refusal to define words “actual, bonafide residence.” 21 OAG 109 (1894); refusal to give definition of certain terms of the tariff laws that would be “applicable to all cases possibly arising.”
In 9 OAG 421 (1860), Attorney General Black said that to attempt to settle questions in advance of their arising was “to anticipate trouble.” In 19 OAG 331 (1889), it was added that such a practice was “to promote trouble.
See E. S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787–1948, 3d ed., p. 93, with respect to the importance of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the power to make recess appointments. See also, Rita W. Nealon, “The Opinion Function of the Federal Attorney General,” New York University Law Review, vol. 25 (1950), pp. 825–43.
Some opinions have dealt with events after the fact, as, for example, Attorney General Speed’s opinion on the trial of Lincoln’s assassins, 11 OAG 297 (1865). Also, courts in injunction proceedings, advisory opinions and declaratory judgments do not confine themselves to passing on events after the fact.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1957 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Deener, D.R. (1957). Requests. In: The United States Attorneys General and International Law. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9570-6_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9570-6_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-011-8723-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-9570-6
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive