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The Procedural Status of the Individual before International and Supranational Tribunals pp 45–69Cite as

The Efforts of the United Nations

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Abstract

Following the conclusion of the Second Great War, the victorious powers again attempted to protect human rights at the international level, and the United Nations employed essentially the same strategy as the defunct League of Nations. Although the U.N. was to achieve much more success than its predecessor, the inescapable fact remains; the global approach was again doomed to failure.1 This is to say, effective protection of the individual by the U.N. was impossible because of the divergent forces within the World Body.2

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References

  1. Ch. I, supra, note 3. Munk, Atlantic Dilemma: Partnership or Community? (1964).

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  2. Ibid. See also Ch. VII infra.

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  5. Ch. I, supra, pp. 13-15, notes 37-39.

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  6. See supra, p. 45, notes 1-3. In spite of the fact that the United Nations has not achieved the degree of success envisaged in 1945, it is valid to conclude that the mere existence of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has influenced the developing “rule of law.” When the General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration there was considerable doubt about its value. It was pointed out that, since it was no more than a declaration, it had no legal binding force. It was suggested that the Universal Declaration would consequently be of little practical use. The short history of the Universal Declaration has proved these views to be mistaken. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, even though it is not binding in the law on member states of the United Nations, has had a very considerable influence indeed. The declaration has served both as an example and as a goal. In addition, it has been incorporated in whole or in part in a number of international agreements, and references to its provisions appear in the constitutions and legislation of various states. The Universal Declaration, moreover, has served as a model for national legislation. It has even been cited in court decisions. In sum, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been a very powerful influence in advancing human rights in many countries. Lord, “The Declaration of Human Rights,” 13 Va. L. Weekly Dicta Comp. 6 (1962). Further he states: Since 1948 … there has resulted a new awareness on the part of the international community of the worth and dignity of man, and a realization that man has certain inalienable rights. In a civilization which stresses state power and control over its citizens the basic right of a man to be free must be articulated and defended. Id., at 9. Lauterpacht takes an even more optimistic view because “the fact that the Charter of the United Nations has gone a long way towards recognizing the status of the individual as a subject of international law cannot be altogether without influence on his procedural capacity.” Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights 374 (1950) and his discussion of the moral force of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, id. at 417. For an excellent discussion of Lauterpacht’s impact on international human rights see Fitzmaurice, “Hersch Lauterpacht-The Scholar as Judge,” 37 Brit. Yb. Int’l L. 1 (1961) and Jenks, “Hersch Lauterpacht — The Scholar as Prophet,” 36 Brit. Yb. Int’l. 1 (1960).

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  7. Cf., Ch. I, supra, pp. 12-13, notes 34-35.

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  8. See supra, pp. 45-46, notes 3 & 4. For an authoritative statement concerning the activities of the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and the regional groups, see “Draft International Covenants on Human Rights — Explanatory Paper on Measures of Implementation Prepared by the Secretary General,” U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec, 18th Sess. (A/5411) (1963). Note the regional efforts. For the earlier document dealing with the Covenants of Human Rights see U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec, 10th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 28 (pt. II) (A/2929); Bishop, International Law 270-83 (2d ed. 1962). The U.N. Covenants will again be considered by the World Organization very shortly. Many of the problems being discussed in this present book will be reexamined. The U.N. Economic and Social Council will continue to seek positive results.

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  9. Ransom, “International Legislation and the American System,” 22 Tul. L. Rev. 547 (1948). See Ch. I supra, p. 3, note 17 and his text cited therein.

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  10. Australian Draft Proposals for an International Court of Human Rights, U.N. EcoSoc Council Off. Rec. (E/CN. 4/AC.1/27) (10 May 1948).

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  11. Id., at 2.

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  12. Id., at 5. Significantly, the Australian Plan provided for the enforcement of decisions.

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  13. Supra, p. 47, note 8, and the text therein. See the discussion of the abandonment by the UN of its efforts to effectively protect human rights. Ch. I, supra, pp. 7-8, notes 26-28.

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  14. See Ch. 1 supra, p. 7, note 26 and the sources collected therein.

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  15. See Ch. 1 supra, p. 8, note 27 and the citations contained therein.

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  16. See Ch. 1 supra, p. 8, note 28 and the sources collected therein. Note particularly the discussion at p. 6ff.

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  17. Munk, Atlantic Dilemma: Partnership or Community? (1964).

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  18. See the private plans set forth in Chapter VII.

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  19. Supra, p. 47, note 8. King & Gormley, “Toward International Human Rights,” g Wayne L. Rev. 294 (1963).

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  20. (A/5411) supra, p. 47, note 8 ff.

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  21. Supra, p. 45, note 3.

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  22. Ibid.

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  23. The legal effect of this right was tested in the advisory opinion on The International Status of South West Africa, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 128. The ICJ upheld the right of individuals residing in a United Nations mandated territory to submit petitions to a national government, which in turn had the absolute duty to forward these complaints to the General Assembly. In short, these private persons could submit complaints to the United Nations even though the international body could take no further action. Bruegel, “The Right to Petition an International Authority,” 2 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 542 (5th ser. 1953), presents a good discussion of the procedure developed by the United Nations for the purpose of dealing with complaints received from individuals in trust territories. He points out that the United Nations can only receive and file these complaints but has no authority to instigate any remedial action; therefore, the recommendation is advanced that the U.N. be given the needed power. On the other hand, the General Assembly has determined that the right of petition is a distinct human right even though it has not been included in the Universal Declaration. Res. No. 217 (III) B (1948). The General Assembly considered the 1946 Polish Complaint against Franco-Spain dealing with violations against human rights. Res. No. 39 (1) (1946), modified by Res. No. 286 (r) (1950). The need for greater use of the right of petition is stressed in Consultive Council of Jewish Organizations, Implementation of an International Covenant of Human Rights (n.d.). See “Report To The Human Rights Commission.” U.N. Doc. No. E/600; Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (1950). For a discussion of the specialized agencies see Alexandrowicz, World Economic Agencies: Law and Practice (1962). See id., at 99-100 for a discussion of Indian Labour Leaders v. The Government of India. In this regard see Ch. I, supra, p. 7, note 25 and the sources collected therein.

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  24. The term “non-judicial” as it is being used here is taken from the title of Chapter II of Golsong’s Hague Academy Lectures, namely “Implementation of Human Rights By Special Measures of a Non-Judicial Nature,” “The Implementation of International Protection of Human Rights,” no (III) Recueil des Cours (1963). On this point consult Golsong, id., and the sources collected therein.

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  25. See Saba, “The Quasi-Legislative Activities of Specialized Agencies,” III (I) Recueil des Cours 604 (1964), for a discussion of the work of the Commission of Human Rights, UNESCO, FAO, WHO, etc. He deals with the enforcement powers of these organs in addition to their law making functions. Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations (1963). Higgins, id., at 118 deals with the jurisdiction of the General Assembly to deal with human rights questions.

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  26. Protocol, 1962, UNESCO, Acts and Regulations of the 12th Sess. of General Conference, Nov.-Dec. 1962. As to the Conciliation and Good Offices Commission see Articles 1-5. This Protocol has yet to receive the required number of ratifications. Golsong, op. cit., supra, p. 50, note 24.

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  27. Some limitations, not found in the practices of the Council of Europe, remain. For example see Article 17 (1) of the Protocol dealing with exhaustion of remedies.

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  28. Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4.

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  29. Saba, op. cit., supra, p. 50, note 25.

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  30. Constitution of the International Labour Organization. The original text was adopted in 1919 and has been subsequently amended. See especially the Instrument of Amendment of 1962, which entered into force on 22 May 1963. For the basic documents of the specialized agencies see Peaslee, International Governmental Organizations: Constitutional Documents (1962). Bowett, The Law of International Institutions (1963), and McNair, The International Labour Conventions, The Expansion of International Law (1962).

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  31. The most authoritative sources available are the series of books by Jenks. Jenks, Human Rights and International Labour Standards (1960); Jenks, The International Protection of Trade Union Freedom (1957); Jenks, The Proper Law of International Organizations (1962), and Jenks, The Law of Freedom and Welfare (1963). Supra, p. 52, note 30.

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  32. International Labour Standards 38-40 (1961) for a listing of available conventions. Supra, note 31.

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  33. 1930, No. 75

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  34. 1948, No. 87.

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  35. 1949, No. 98.

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  36. 1957, No. 105.

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  37. 1959; No. 111.

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  38. For an excellent discussion concerning the legal effect of unratified conventions and recommendations see Saba, op. cit., supra, p. 50, note 25, and Jenks, op. cit., supra, note 31.

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  39. E.g., Argentina eliminated discriminatory practices as to foreign workers; Bulgaria increased maternity benefits; India has eliminated certain categories of young persons who may be employed in factories; and Brazil has modified its laws governing maritime employment in order to comply with the standards set forth in the ILO conventions. Supra, p. 53, note 32. See also Alexandrowicz, “The Machinery for Assessing the Implementation of Conventions and Recommendations,” World Economic Agencies: Law and Practice 103-108 (1962).

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  40. Alexandrowicz, ibid. Biyearly reports must be submitted by governments. Each year approximately 5,000 reports are examined. For an analysis of the two stage examination see id., at 103-104.

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  41. Jenks, The International Protection of Trade Union Freedom (1957). Alexandrowicz, op. cit., supra, note 39.

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  42. Alexandrowicz, id., at 107. Jenks, op. cit., supra, note 41 at 62. Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948, No. 87.

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  43. E.g., freedom of association, forced labour, protection of women and young workers, the search for employment, safety and hygiene, hours of work, labour-management relations, social security, labour inspection, etc.

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  44. The applicable procedure is set forth in Article 26 (2) to (5) in connection with Articles 25-34. See Article 35 as to non-metropolitan territories.

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  45. Report of the Commission Appointed under Article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to Examine the Complaint Filed by the Government of Ghana concerning the Observance by the Government of Portugal of the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), XLV ILO Off. Bul., Supp. II, April 1962. [Hereinafter cited as Ghana v. Portugal.]

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  46. Report of the Commission Appointed under Article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to Examine the Complaint Filed by the Government of Portugal concerning the Observance by the Government of Liberia of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), XLVI ILO Off. Bul., Supp. II, April 1963 [Hereinafter cited as Portugal v. Liberia.]

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  47. Conventions No. 29, 1930; and No. 105, 1957, supra notes 45 and 46.

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  48. Part V of Final Reports, supra, Ghana v. Portugal at 97ff; and Portugal v. Liberia 117 ff.

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  49. Portugal v. Liberia 176-181.

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  50. Portugal v. Liberia id., at 179. See also id., at 169-176. However, the Commission noted the great credit which the Government of Liberia had brought upon itself by its wholeharted cooperation with the ILO; moreover, the continuing improvement being made was recognized with great approval. The Liberian Government had argued that the Convention, as a binding treaty, had automatically prevailed over the local law; therefore, no implementing legislation was required. Also it was argued that many of the violations — no longer present — were the result of poor economic conditions, which made it impossible for Liberia to meet the minimum ILO standards. The Commission noted the recent improvements. Id., at 179-181.

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  51. Ghana v. Portugal 234. The improvement made is set forth at id., 234-236. See also id., 241-245 for the recommendations of the Commission.

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  52. Id., Para. 779, at 247.

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  53. A complete examination of the cases would prove to be unduely lengthly. See the review by Alexandrowicz, op. cit., supra, p. 54, note 39, at 94-103.

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  54. A line of cases has been filed by the Communist dominated World Federation of Trade Unions against non-Communist countries. [Hereinafter referred to as WFTU.] The International Conference of Free Trade Unions has filed a series of complaints against Communist governments. [Hereinafter referred to as ICFTU.] E.g., ICTFU v. Government of Czechoslovakia, 8th Report of ILO, 1954, Appendix II, case No. 44; ICTFU v. Government of Hungary, id., case No. 19; and ICTFU v. Goverment of Poland, id., case No. 58. See also WFTU v. Government of Japan, 8th Report of ILO, Appendix II, case No. 60. WFTU v. Government of South Africa, id., case 63; WFTU v. Government of France, id., case No. 77. WFTU v. Government of India, 4th Report on Freedom of Association, case No. 5. See especially the collected cases in Alexandrowicz, op. cit., supra, p. 54, note 39, at 94-103. See id., 63-112.

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  55. Supra, p. 53, note 32.

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  56. Jenks, op. cit., supra, p. 53, note 31.

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  57. This special commission consists of Erik Dreyer, former Permanent Secretary to the Danish Ministry of Social Affairs, Chairman; David Cole, former Director of the United States Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and Sir Arthur Tyndall, former Judge of the New Zealand Court of Arbitration. ILO Press Release, 29 April 1964. The first meeting of this commission was held on 19 May 1964. See Press Release, 19 May 1964.

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  58. Article 29 (2) provides: Each of these governments shall within three months inform the Director-General of the International Labour Office whether or not it accepts the recommendations contained in the report of the Commission; and if not, whether it proposes to refer the complaint to the International Court of Justice.

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  59. Article 31 states: “The decision of the International Court of Justice in regard to a complaint or matter which has been referred to it in pursuance of article 29 shall be final.” Moreover, under Article 33 enforcement action may be taken. Of course, there is always the problem of competency by the ICJ. It has the power to refuse to take the case.

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  60. Ch. V infra.

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  61. Ch. VI infra.

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  62. Ch. I, Locke, op. cit., supra, p. 14, note 38.

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  63. Saba, op. cit., supra, p. 50, note 25.

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  64. See Ch’s. VI and VII infra.

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  65. See Ch. VII infra.

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  66. For example, close working relationships exist between the ILO and the Social Division of the Council of Europe. See European Cooperation in 1962 (1963), especially Ch. II, “Cooperation In the Economic Field,” id., at 33-87 and Ch. III, “Co-operation in the Social Field and in the Fields of Population and Public Health,” id., 89-149.

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  67. It is not possible to evaluate all of the ramifications of the ILO in its achievements in raising standards. See Jenks, op. cit. supra, p. 53, note 31. Still, some indication of recent improvements in the ILO system should be noted by way of example. See Amendments to the ILO Constitution as to Application of ILO conventions in self-groverning territories; suspension of members for racial discrimination; and suspension and expulsion of members suspended or expelled from the United Nations. Constitution of the International Labour Organisation Instrument of Amendment (No. 1), 1964, Approved by the Conference at its Forty-Eighth Session, Geneva, 6 July 1964; reprinted in 3 Int’l Legal Materials 844 (1964).

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  68. Ch. III, supra, p. 54, note 39.

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  69. Excellent plans have been offered under which the present International Court of Justice would be utilized in a global system. In particular, the Resolution of Rio, Dec. 15, 1962, drawn up by the Rio Conference of the International Commission of Jurists reaffirmed in paragraph 2, “the encouragement of the establishment of International Courts of Human Rights on a regional basis.” International Commission of Jurists, Newsletter No. 14, at 1, April 1963; Clark & Sohn, World Peace Through Law (2d ed. 1960). See Mouat, “A Gradualist Approach: Establishment of a Free World Court System,” 49 A.B.A.J. 735 (1963).

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  70. Murdock, “International Judicial Organization,” 69 ABA, Ann. Rep. 373 (1944). Under Murdock’s plan, the justices of the International Court of Justice would ride a circuit and sit with regional courts in all major areas of the world and help guide the legal development. He therefore holds: A court which, like the World Court operates on the basis of hearing three or four cases a year or at its highest peak of activity, hands down a total of eleven judgments, orders, and advisory opinions a year, is not organized in such a manner as to provide a continuous administration of justice for the thousands of cases which arise annually involving alleged violations of international law and treaties. Id., at 378. See the similar-type plan of Cowles, “Review of the United Nations Charter and the Adjudication of International Claims,” 48 Am. J. Int’l L. 460 (1954), under which the International Court of Justice would serve as an appellate body and be able to review decisions of lower arbitral and judicial tribunals.

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  71. For an excellent discussion of some of the difficulties involved in permitting private citizens to appear before the World Court, plus an excellent exposition of the activities of the Court, see Senate Subcomm. on the U.N. Charter of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Review of the United Nations Charter, S. Doc. No. 164, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 217-56 (1954). Note in particular the comments of the late Senator George on the importance of the World Court. See Gormley, “An Analysis of the Future Procedural Status of the Individual before International Tribunals,” 39 U. Det. L.J. 38 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Procedural Status]; Sohn, Proposals for the Establishment of a System of International Tribunals, reprinted in Brownell, “Law in the Settlement of Disputes Between Nations,” 31 Conn. B.J. 346 (1957). Sohn advocates the creation of a tribunal before which individuals would have direct access. He specifically deals with the claims of individuals. See the collected proposals and sources therein. Further in his conclusions, Sohn favors amending the Statute of the International Court of Justice to allow appeals by individuals, with the consent of States, and he also favors appeals to the ICJ.

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  72. “The Subjects of the Law of Nations,” 63 L.Q. Rev. 438 (1947).

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  73. Id., at 457.

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  74. See especially his excellent discussion in Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (1950). See Ch. II, supra, p. 29, note 34.

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  75. Louis B. Sohn, Chairman, American Branch, International Law Association, proposed the following resolution, which was adopted, at the Dubrovnik meeting. I. The desirability of the following amendments to the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice should be considered by the United Nations: (a) Article 34 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice should be amended to give the United Nations and its specialized agencies direct access to the Court in contentious cases; (b) Article 96 of the Charter should be amended to empower the General Assembly to authorize other public international organizations, whether general or regional, to request advisory opinions of the Court; (c) Article 35 of the Statute should be amended to empower the General Assembly to establish the conditions under which the Court would be open to public international organizations other than the specialized agencies; Article 36 of the Statue should be amended to empower the General Assembly to establish the conditions under which the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other public international organizations might make declarations accepting the jurisdiction of the Court under paragraph 2 of that Article. II. Article 96 of the Charter should be amended so as to impose upon the organs of the United Nations the obligation to request from the International Court of Justice an advisory opinion concerning any situation in which the claim is made by a Member that the organ had exceeded its jurisdiction under the Charter. Note, 51 Am. J. Int’l L. 89 (1957). An opposing view is presented by Korowicz, who maintains that the International Court of Justice should remain a forum open only to sovereigns and a few international institutions. [T]he International Court of Justice, as a World Court (as it is frequently called), should not be engaged in the settlement of disputes between individuals and States. It seems also that Article 34 of the Statute of the ICJ should be changed only in favor of the admission of international organizations as parties before the Court in their disputes with States or with other international organizations. With the consolidation and development of the international community, the number of cases between individuals and foreign States or international organizations will certainly grow, and the establishment of special regional, continental or universal tribunals to settle these cases would be an adequate solution of the problem of the judicial forum for this kind of disputes. The existence and scope of the international personality of individuals entirely depend on the will and agreement of States, and are always revocable by them. The major Powers of the World, the United States and the Soviet Union, are not in favor of the recognition of individuals as subjects of international law. … National feelings of the newly independent states of Asia and Africa will certainly not operate in favor of the concept of an international personality of individuals; they would consider it as a limitation of their newly acquired and so much cherished sovereignty. However, in spite of all the setbacks suffered during the implementation of that concept in the practice of international law, it seems that this idea holds within itself favorable prospects for the future. … [T]he recognition of international procedural rights of the individual in an action against his tormentor, which is his own State, would not serve the purpose of protecting the individual. On the contrary, it would, in the end, bring harm to the individual, since his State could always find proper means and methods through which to “punish” him for his offense against the State’s sovereignty and honor. However, individuals may be protected against foreign States by their own States, and may more readily be granted active international personality against foreign states, on the basis of an international treaty. … [I]t is the author’s firm belief that respect for and observance of human rights under municipal law and under international law will become a universal goal for all peoples and individual human beings. Korowicz, Introduction to International Law 388-89 (1959).

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  76. Jenks, “The Status of International Organizations in Relation to the International Court of Justice,” 32 Transact. Grot. Soc. 1 (1946). Considerable authority exists concerning tne procedural status of the specialized U.N. agencies in making requests for advisory opinions under Articles 65(1) and (2), 66(2) and (4) of the Statute of the Court, pursuant to Article 96(1) and (2) of the Charter. See also Article VI(2) of the FAO Constitution, Article XL(4) of UNESCO Constitution, and Article VII(21) of the ECITO Agreement. See McNair, “The Council’s Request for an Advisory Opinion from the Permanent Court of International Justice,” 7 Brit. Yb. Int’l. L. 1 (1926). Under Article 26 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice the ILO could furnish information to the Court. “But the generalization of this principle to cover all public international organizations, and the new importance given it by its inclusion in Article 34 of the Statute, combine to place the status of international organizations before the Court in a new perspective.” Jenks, id., at 3. Further, he concludes: “The unsatisfactory status which public international organizations have enjoyed hitherto in relation to international tribunals has been … to regard them as being essentially excrescences upon rather than an integral part of the international system.” Id., at 40.

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  77. Hambro is of the opinion that advisory opinions of the ICJ are authoritative even though not binding. Hambro, “The Authority of the Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice,” 3 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 2 (1954). In spite of the fact that Article 34 does not permit nongovernmental entities to plead before the ICJ, it “does not mean that individuals cannot in certain circumstances be subjects of international law, neither does it mean that individuals cannot bring claims in other circumstances and before other international tribunals.” Hambro, “The Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.” 76(1) Recueil des Cours 123, 164 (1950). Hambro goes on to explain: It is certainly conceivable that individuals may have rights and duties under international law. Article 34 of the Statute signifies only that individuals as such have no access to the Court. … It should be added, for the sake of completeness, that the Court is at liberty to permit individuals to lay before the Court facts and opinions in advisory proceedings. Ibid. Jenks takes the position that Article 34(2) and (3) actually modify the provisions of 34(1) in the area of advisory opinions. Even though public international organizations still lack standing in contentious cases, a major inroad has been made into the traditional standard. Jenks, “The Status of International Organizations in Relation to the International Court of Justice,” 32 Transact. Grot. Soc. 1 (1946). Jenks concludes: [T]he time will corne when it will be desirable to take stock of the present Statute, which is in the main a consolidation of past gains rather than a fresh advance in international judicial organization, with a view to considering how far it is practical to improve it. … [Consideration must be given] to the possibility of giving public international organizations a locus standi in judicio before the Court. Such stocktaking would be facilitated by the fact that the 1945 Statute, in contrast to the 1920 Statute, prescribes a procedure for amendment. Id., at 36.

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  78. Brownlie, “The Individual Before International Tribunals Exercising International Jurisdiction,” 11 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 701 (1962), He takes the position that an individual does not have to be a full subject of the law to possess procedural rights. Nørgaard, “International Civil Servants,” The Individual in International Law 298-303 (1962).

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  79. [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 174, 16 Int’l L. Rep. 318, 43 Am. J. Int’l L. 589 (1949). See also Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization upon Complaints Made against UNESCO, [1956] I.C.J. Rep. 77, 23 Int’l L. Rep. 517, 51 Am. J. Int’l L. 4 (1957). The only “relief” available to the United Nations is to seek an advisory opinion under the provisions of Article 34(2). See Oppenheim, International Law 55 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955). In the area of advisory opinions, the World Court’s Statute specifically provides two exceptions to Article 34 in that 1) “the Court … may request of public international organizations information relevant to the cases before it. …” Such organizations may present information to the Court on their own initiative; 2) though the United Nations, not being a State, cannot appear as a party before the Court, it may through the General Assembly or the Security Council request the Court to give an advisory opinion on any legal question. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Arts. 34-38.

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  80. 16 Int’l L. Rep. at 323.

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  81. 23 Int’l L. Rep. at 524, 51 Am. J. Int’l L. at 8.

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  82. Ibid., 51 Am. J. Int’l L. at 9.

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  83. [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 128.

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  84. Verzijl, “South West Africa and Northern Cameroons Cases,” 11 Netherlands International Law Review 1 (1964).

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  85. Supra, note 83.

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  86. Article 22 of the League Covenant provided in part: [T]here should be applied the principle that the well being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant. … [T]his tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

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  87. [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 319, 57 Am. J. Int’l L. 640 (1962). The discussion on the Preliminary Objections contains the best discussion of individual rights, which continue to exist from the old League practice. See also the subsequent litigation, the Merits, which took place in 1965. See also the later pronouncement of the Court on 2 December 1963 in the Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom) Preliminary Objections, [1963] I.C.J. Rep. 15 for an evaluation of obligations remaining from the Mandate system, even though the Court held that in this case it could not adjudicate upon the merits, since it could not render a judgment capable of effective application.

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  88. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1899). 2 Treaties (Malloy, 1910). 5 Hackworth, 436, 450 (1943). Scott, Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (3d ed., 1918). Scott, Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences (1920).

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  89. See Procedural Subjects 68-73. Sohn, “The Function of International Arbitration Today,” 108 (1) Recueil des Cours 1 (1963).

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  90. For an exhaustive discussion of the concept of sovereignty, which is still the major obstacle to conferring the required procedural status on individuals see Korowicz, “Some Present Aspects of Sovereignty in International Law,” 102(1) Recueil des Cours 1 (1961). He points out that the concept of sovereignty constitutes the basis of the traditional legal norm that only the State can be a full subject of the law. See also Korowicz, Introduction to International Law (1959). In the “Conclusion” of this book, a cautious statement is made concerning the “new” subjects of world law. The study of the present conceptions of international law as expressed in the writings of publicists, in governmental statements, and in international treaties, declarations, awards and judgements, leads me to submit the following definition: International law is the body of legal rules which govern mutual relations of sovereign States, and also the situations of other legal persons and of individuals which are not subject to the internal law of any particular State. Id., at 390.

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    W. Paul Gormley

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© 1966 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

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Gormley, W.P. (1966). The Efforts of the United Nations. In: The Procedural Status of the Individual before International and Supranational Tribunals. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9530-0_4

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