Abstract
The success or failure of a foreign policy is normally measured by the degree to which it is capable of achieving its goal. Since the supreme, avowed goal of the Federal Republic’s foreign policy toward Soviet Union during the period from 1949 to 1957 has been the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom, it appears that the policy pursued by West Germany has been a complete failure. Yet the concept of a complete failure implies that the goal sought, but not reached, must have been pursued above all other objectives. If, however, it was one of two or several alternate goals, and if one of the alternate goals has been accomplished, then one cannot pronounce a policy a complete failure. The determination whether a policy is a success or failure depends, therefore, on a complete understanding of the nature of that policy. An avowed, supreme goal may not necessarily represent to the policy maker the highest political value. Other objectives may have greater importance; though their prominence may be concealed, their real political value may outrank that of the avowed supreme goal.
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References
See pp. 23-5, supra.
For details see Section II of Chapter 1.
For details, see Chapter 3.
cf. pp. 67-92, supra.
See also pp. 72, 91-2, supra.
When the files and dossiers of the post-war years, now stored in the chancelleries and foreign offices of the Western Powers, are available for inspection, documentary evidence may obviate the conclusions of this study. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that according to recent statements of the Federal government and Chancellor Adenauer, reunification may no longer be the avowed, supreme goal. The Federal government, in a statement to the Bundestag on November 29, 1961, characterized reunification in peace and freedom as the “invariable” aim of German policy (Bulletin, December 5, 1961). Chancellor Adenauer called reunification the “ultimate goal” during his visit to Washington in November 1961, but in April of that year, also in Washington, it was merely an “important objective,” whereas he accorded highest priority to “the strengthening of Western defenses” and “closer economic cooperation in the Atlantic Community” (New york Times, November 23, 1961, p. 4, and April 14, 1961, p. 1). If an objective other than reunification were now the avowed supreme goal of West German policy, the basic hypothesis of the study may be considered as further confirmed.
For a recent study of present-day attitudes in this respect, see Hans Kohn, “Out of Catastrophy: Germany 1945–1960,” Review of Politics (April, 1960), pp. 163-174.
See also, W. W. Schuetz, “German Foreign Policy, Foundations in the West-Aims in the East,” International Affairs (July, 1959), pp. 310–5. Somewhat more pessimistic in this respect is Flora Lewis, op. cit., who believes that there are a great many signs that German nationalism is reviving.
For the support of this assumption, see pp. 137, 138, 139, supra. Of significance in this respect was also the reaction of the Federal government to a proposal of the State Department in early 1959 with regard to representation on a mixed German body to deal with reunification negotiations. The proposal was intended as a compromise between Communist insistence on equal representation and Adenauer’s insistence that representation be based on the population of the two Germanies. The ratio suggested by the State Department was based on the pre-war German states and would have given Bonn a 10: 6 advantage instead of the 3: 1 advantage which the Federal government demanded. The American compromise was not accepted and the Western proposals for a mixed German commission at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers in the summer of 1959 reflected an ascendency of the German viewpoint inasmuch as the ratio of stipulated members was 10: 4 in favor of the Federal Republic. (See New Tork Times, April 29, 1959, p. 3 and U.S. Department of State, Foreign Ministers Meeting, May–August 1959, Geneva [Washington D.C., 1959] p.56.) Furthermore, in the spring of 1962, Chancellor Adenauer’s viewpoint won out in a controversy over proposals of Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, which were intended to resolve the dangerous Berlin situation and which included the establishment of an international authority to guarantee free access to Berlin and membership of both West and East Germany on this authority. These proposals were virtually abandoned when the Adenauer government denounced them as unduly enhancing East Germany’s international status. (For details see New york Times’, April 21, 1962, pp. 1,3; April 30, 1962, pp. 1,5; May 8, 1962, pp. 1, 4, 5; May 9, 1962, pp. 1, 4; May 22, 1962, pp. 1, 18.)
For details on this proposition, see Sethe, op. cit., pp. 157-65.
Brecht, op. cit., expresses similar thoughts. As to negotiations with the D. D. R., he states that it makes little sense to establish a principle of not sitting at the same table with a little devil, but to enter into friendly negotiations with Satan himself, meaning the Soviet Union. Direct negotiations between West and East Germans were also favored by Senator Michael J. (Mike) Mansfield, at present the Democratic majority leader in the United States Senate. In a speech on the floor of the Senate on February 12, 1959, Senator Mansfield declared that a peaceful solution of the problem of reunification required “a great deal of talk — between the Germans who are in authority in the Federal Republic and Germans who purport to be in authority in the Eastern Zone.” He considered it essential that such talks “cover the whole range of problems of unification” of the two Germanies including the problems of “harmonizing [their] political, economic and military systems.” (Congressional Record-Senate, 1959, p. 2247.) See also Mike Mansfield’s article “Die kommende Krise in Deutschland,” Aussenpolitik, May, 1958, pp. 285-91 and his speech on the floor of the Senate on May 19, 1958, (Congressional Record-Senate, 1958, pp. 8962-4) in both of which he expressed similar opinions. On the other hand, Strausz-Hupe, op. cit., p. 108 states that recognition of the East German regime, possibly implied in negotions with it, would not only block the reunification by democratic means, but also dampen the rebellious spirit of the satellite people.
Schuster, “Schein-Konföderation,” op. cit., pp. 356-358 who cites historical examples for his arguments.
See in this connection also A. V. Dicey’s classic statement that the formation of a federation requires “a body of countries.… so closely connected by locality, by history, by race, or the like, as to be capable of bearing, in the eyes of their inhabitants, an impress of common nationality.” (Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, [8th ed.; London, 1915], p. 137.) Although John Foster Dulles, when Secretary of State, rejected during a press conference in January 1959 the Moscow suggestions for a confederation as “proposals for permanent partition,” he intimated that some other form of confederation might lead to greater progress in the accomplishment of German unity. Dulles stated: “Confederation can mean almost anything …. You can have a confederation of one kind or a confederation of another kind …. [The] word “confederation” covers a wide variety of political relationships. It can be a relationship between two utterly dissimilar and unrelated areas which tends to perpetuate their division, perhaps only having a surface unity with respect to certain particular matters. Or you can have a confederation which is, in fact, of very considerable progress toward reunification …. But the matter of finding ways which, in fact, will promote reunification is a matter which, I think, can be and should be studied as resourcefully as possible.” (New York Times, January 28, 1959, pp. 1, 6.) Walter Lippmann in The Coming Tests with Russia (Boston, 1961) p. 26 seems to favor the confederation concept as a line of departure for German reunification. Similar thoughts are expressed by Gerald Freund, Germany Between Two Worlds (New York, 1961) pp. 228-229.
See p. 124 supra. Senator Mansfield left the question open whether such talks between East and West German leadersjimplied legal recognition of the regime of the D.D.R. which in his opinion was a reality and possessed political authority that could not be “wished away.” (Congressional Record-Senate, 1959, pp. 2243 ff.)
See also Jacobi, op. cit., who believes that the Federal government ought to consider the establishment of diplomatic relations with the European satellites, since contact with the Eastern countries might have more advantages than dangers. Cf. also p. 114, footnote 3, supra, and Kurt Borris, “Die Grenzen von 1937,” Aussenpolitik (March, 1957), pp. 155-8; and Kurt Sieveking, “Die europäische Aufgabe der deutschen Aussenpolitik,” Aussenpolitik (March 1957), pp. 147-54, particularly pp. 152-4.
Strausz-Hupe, op. cit., p. 97, believes that the establishment of an independent Austria was intended to spur the hopes of those Germans who believed that only some form of all-German neutrality could induce the Russians to consent to German unification. Warburg believes that “Mr. Kruschchev is keenly aware of what the Russian self-interest is, …. and that he knows that ultimately the Soviet coercive position in Eastern Europe is untenable. If he could have a bridge built for him and receive something in exchange for it, he might very well consider this. Because unless he does it soon, those people are really going to be alienated from Russia in the long run; whereas some of them might voluntarily associate themselves with the Soviet bloc economically, if they are not pushed too far.” (Comments to Morgen-thau, op. cit., p. 132.) Of significance in this respect may be the serious deterioration of the East German economy which obliged the Soviet government in February of 1962 to grant new credits to the D.D.R. for the purchase of food, iron, and steel products from the U.S.S.R. (See New York Times, March 1, 1962, pp. 1, and 2, and March 10, 1962, p. 2.) In addition, East Germany was seeking credits up to $600,000,000 in Western Europe, including the Federal Republic, in order to buy food, coal, and machinery. (New York Times, May 24, 1962, p. 10.)
Sethe, op. cit., p. 49. On the other hand, Franz Joseph Strauss, Federal Defense Minister, seems to maintain in a recent article that the position of strength needs to be built up further before negotiations could be successful. (F. J. Strauss, “Verteidigung stärken um zu verhandeln,” Aussenpolitik [February, 1961], pp. 77-81.) In a speech in early March of 1962, Strauss, commenting on the prospects of reunification, stated that the “decisive hour” for unification negotiations must still be awaited. (New York Times, March 8, 1962, p. 12.)
For more details on this concept, see v.d. Gablentz, op. cit., pp. 127-32; and Morgen-thau, reunification op. cit., pp. 130, 131. See also Meyer, op. cit., pp. 621-623, 628, 629.
See in this respect also the pertinent remarks of Eberhard Menzel, op. cit.
See also Kissinger, op. cit., who points out, correctly, that if the Soviet Union only obtains half of its demands on Berlin, this is not a compromise, but a fundamental and perhaps fatal, weakening of the Western position (p. 560).
Cf. p. 22 supra.
Cf. footnote 2, p. 180, supra.
For a listing of supporters, see v. d. Gablentz, op. cit., p. 127, W. W. Schuetz, “Die aussenpolitische Bedeutung der Wiedervereinigungsarbeit,” Aussenpolitik (January, 1958), pp. 10-9, particularly p. 13; and Peter Dürrenmatt, “Die Zweiteilung und Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands im weltpolitischen Zusammenhang,” Kömgssteiner Kreis (December, 1958), pp. 3-14.
Lewis, op. cit., p. 588.
For examples, see W. W. Schuetz, Die Stunde Deutschlands, pp. 54–62; Meyer, op. cit., p. 626; and Gradl, op. cit., pp. 490, 491.
Cf. Lewis, op. cit., pp. 589-90; and Kohn, “Out of Catastrophy: Germany 1945–1960,” op. cit., 163-174.
See also Morgenthau, “Reunification” op. cit., p. 131; Lewis, op. cit., pp. 596, 597; and Kissinger, op. cit., p. 542.
Bulletin, December 5, 1961.
Bulletin, February 23, 1962.
Cf. footnote 1, p. 182.
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© 1963 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Feld, W. (1963). Conclusions. In: Reunification and West German-Soviet Relations. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9408-2_5
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