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The Structure and Interpretation of Rules of Private International Law

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Principles of the Conflict of Laws National and International

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Abstract

Ideally, every individual rule of Private Law should be served by its own rules of Private International Law or it should disclose its territorial or personal limitations.1 The immense variety of rules of substantive law makes this a practical impossibility and the parallel existence of such unilateral rules of Private International Law spread among a multitude of countries would create intractable problems of overlaps and lacunae which only an overriding international system of choice of law could solve. Instead two techniques are employed, one general, one particular. The former is represented by the ordinary rules of Private International Law which may be unilateral by indicating directly only when the lex fori applies, or bilateral by using criteria which lead at times to the application of the lex fori and at times to that of other legal systems. In effect this technique always leads in the end to a system of rules which ensure the application of the lex fori or of foreign law in clearly determined circumstances. The latter is exceptional and is represented by the so-called “spatially conditioned internal rules” 2 or “legislatively localised laws”,3 “particular choice of law rules” 4 or “functionally restricting rules”.5

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Notes to Part III

  1. Robertson, I.: Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), pp. 243–244.

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  2. Nussbaum, I.: Private International Law (1942), pp. 70–73.

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  3. Unger (1952), Modern L.R., 88; (1959), 43 Transactions of the Grotius Society, 37; (1967), 83 L.Q.R., 427; Mann, Hague Rec. 111 (1964 I), 1, at pp. 6970; Cavers, The Choice of Law Process (1965), 221. Francescakis calls some of them “règles d’application immédiate”. Théorie du renvoi (1958), 11–16, Nos. 7–11; Rev. crit. d.i.p., 1966, 1; Riv. dir. int. prie. e proc., 3 (1967) 691.

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  4. Morris (1946), 62 Law Q.L. 170.

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  5. De Nova, Dir. Int. 1959, 13, 500; Mélanges Maury, L(1960), 377; (1966), 54 Calif. L.R.,1569. See Lipstein (1949), 26 B.Y.I.L. 553–555 and the extensive lit. cited [1972 B], 31 Cambridge L.J., p. 72, n. 37; and (1977), 26 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 885 nn. 10–18; see also von Mehren, (1974), 88 Harv. L.R., 347; Mann (1972–73), 46 British Yearbook of International Law, 117, (1975); Sedler (1976), S. Calif. L.R., 27; Lando (1976), 11 Texas Int. L.J., 505.

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  6. See Rabel, Conflict of Laws, I (1945), p. 42; (2 ed. 1958), p. 47; Falcon-bridge, Conflict of Laws (2 ed. 1954), p. 44; Makarov, Vom Deutschen zum Europäischen Recht, Festschrift für Dölle, II (1963), 149, at p. 157, n. 7. Other terms in current use are Rahmen-or System-or Sammel-or Verweisungsbegriffe—see Neuhaus, Grundbegriffe des Internationalen Privatrechts (1962), p. 52; catégories de rattachement synthétiques: Rigaux, Théorie des qualifications en d.i.p. (1956), No. 157, p. 244; cp. Evrigenis, Hague Rec. 118 (1966 II), 309, at p. 318.

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  7. See Mann, Juristenzeitung 1956, 466; Neuhaus, Grundbegriffe, p. 151.

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  8. See Lipstein [1965], Cambridge Law Journal, 224, at pp. 225–226 with exemples; Neuhaus, toc. cit.,p. 155; Nadelmann (1969), 47 Texas L.R., 765; De Winter, Hague Rec. 128 (1969 III), 346 at pp. 419–436.

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  9. Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik v. Basle Chemical Works Bindschedler [1898], A.C. 200, 207; Hanson v. Dixon (1906), 23 T.L.R. 56; Benaim v. Debono [1924], A.C. 514, 520; see also Cowan v. O’Connor (1888), 20 Q.B.D. 640; Clarke v. Harper [1938], N.I. 162, 171; but contracts by telex or telephone are treated as made inter praesentes at the place where the answer is received: Entores Ltd v. Miles Far East Corporation [1955], 2 Q.B. 327; N.V. Handel MU. J. Smits v. English Exporters Ltd [1955], 2 LI.R. 69, 71; 317, 323, 324 (C.A.); and the place where it has been concluded according to these principles determines whether it has been validly concluded: Albeko Schuhmaschinen A.G. v. The Kamborian Shoe Machine Co. (1961), 111 L.J. 519; Clunet 1965, p. 459.

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  10. When ascertainment of the conditions underlying a connecting factor involves a question of capacity to act, it is debatable whether the matter is one for the domestic law of the lex fori (e.g. the United Kingdom Domicile & Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, s. 3 (a)) or of its rules of the conflict of laws, see Graveson (1950), 3 International Law Quarterly, 149.

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  11. See the Hague Conventions on the Form of Wills, 1961, Art. 1 (d); on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition of Decrees relating to Adoption of 1965, Arts. 2, 3, 7; and on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations, 1970, Art. 2.

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  12. See also Nadelmann (1969), 47 Texas L.R., 766.

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  13. See Makarov, Mélanges Maury, I (1960), 207 ff., at pp. 217, 223, and in Vom Deutschen zum Europäischen Recht, Festschrift für Dölle,II (1963), 149, at p. 167. The Hague Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations of 1970, Art. 3, has introduced a concession to common law countries by allowing the country where the matrimonial cause is tried to substitute the notion of domicile for that of habitual residence in determining its jurisdiction under the Convention; at the same time all other countries cannot refuse recognition on this ground (Art. 6, last para.).

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  14. Re Annesley [1926], Ch. 692, but see Re O’Keefe [1940], Ch. 124; Falcon-bridge, Conflict of Laws (2 ed. 1954), p. 208, note m; (1941), 19 Canadian Bar Rev.,320, 323; de Nova, 11 Ricchiamo di ordinamenti Plurilegislativi (1940), pp. 108 ff.

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  15. For a strict differentiation between the interpretation of connecting factors and characterization of operative facts see Makarov, loc. cit. (above n. 21), p. 151, n. 7.

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  16. It is generally said that common law courts apply foreign law only if pleaded and proved by the parties while civil law courts apply foreign law of their own motion. Thus formulated the difference of the practice is too clear-cut.

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  17. See Zajtay, Riv. dir. int. e proc., 4 (1968), 233–301, esp. pp. 246–251, para. 14.

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  18. See also Makarov, loc. cit. (above p. 94, n. 21), at p. 154; but see Wengler, Rev. crit. d.i.p., 1954, 661, at pp. 670, 673, 682, rejecting for such countries the approach advocated here-see loc. cit., pp. 666–667, 671, 674; and in Festschrift für Martin Wolff (1952), 337, at pp. 340, 356.

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  19. Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws (2 ed. 1954), pp. 53 ff.; (1952), 30 Can. Bar Rev., 103, at pp. 114, 116 and note 49, 117; Ledermann (1951), 29 Can. Bar Rev., 3, 24.

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  20. Cf. Robertson, p. 127; Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws (1947), p. 101; (2nd ed., 1954), p. 59, believes that the court provisionally consults foreign law before finally characterising the question for the purpose of selecting the proper law. See the valid critique in Dicey, Conflict of Laws (8th ed., 1967), p. 27. The present account avoids this pitfall by analysing the concrete situation.

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  21. In order not to complicate or to confuse this analysis no mention is made at each stage that the same process applies, if the defendant relies for his defence on the lex fori. Here again the court must apply its own rules of Private International Law (which are not always expressed in terms of the domestic law of the forum) in order to determine whether the lex fori applies; for the English practice see Lipstein [1972 B], 31 Cambridge Law Journal, 67, at p. 78, n. 76.

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  22. Where English courts have followed this technique the result has been unfortunate. See Ogden v. Ogden [1907], P. 46 (C.A.), and the comments in Dicey and Morris, pp. 237–239; Westlake, P.I.L. (2nd ed., 1925), p. 61; Phrantzes v. Argenti [1960], 2 Q.B. 19.

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  23. See Lipstein, note to Re Maldonado [1954], P. 223; [1954], Cambridge Law Journal,123; and compare In re Utassi’s Will, 15 N.Y. 2d 436, 209 N.Y. 2d 65 (1965), discussed by Ehrenzweig, Hague Rec. 124 (1968 II), 169, at p. 234, see also Ehrenzweig in XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts of Law (1961), 395, at pp. 402, 403, n. 4, citing Estate of Turton, 20 Misc. 2d 569, 192 N.Y.S. 2d 254 (Surr. 1959).

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  24. Cp. Graulich, Principes de droit international privé (1961), No. 130, p. 99, whose solution comes near to that proposed here.

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  25. BGHZ, 12 January 1967, N.J.W. 1967 1171, I.P.Rspr. 1961–1967, No. 19, p. 64; see also BGHZ 29, 137, I.P.Rspr. 1958–1959, No. 116, p. 389; and see Castel (1961), 39 Can. Bar Rev., 93, 102 citing Livesley v. Horst [1924], S.C.R. 605; [1925] 1 D.L.R. 159.

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  26. Re Cohn [1945], Ch. 5, where according to Master Jacob in Smit, International Co-operation in Litigation (Europe) (1965), p. 103, n. 205, the parties agreed not to plead foreign law and to leave the question of foreign law to the court; Re Fuld [1966], 2 W.L.R. 717, at pp. 735, 736–738. Ehrenzweig, XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law (1961), 395, at p. 408, n. 2, does less than justice to the former decision.

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  27. For examples taken from English practice see British Linen Co. v. Drummond (1830), 10 B. & C. 903; Huber v. Steiner (1835), 2 Bing. N.C. 202, 210, 213; Don v. Lippman (1837), 5 Cl. & F. 1, 13, 16; Leroux v. Brown (1852), 12 C.B. 801, 823; Bristow v. Sequeville (1850), 5 Ex. 275; Re Martin, Loustalan v. Loustalan [1900], P. 211, 230, 233, 240; S.A. de Prayon v. Koppel (1933), 77 S.J. 80; Re Cutcliffe’s Will Trust [1940], Ch. 565; Re Middleton’s Settlement [1947], Ch. 329, 583 (C.A.); [1949], A.C. 418; Re Priest [1944], Ch. 58; Adams v. National Bank of Greece [1961], A.C. 255, 287; see also Dreyfus (C. and H.) Foundation Inc. v. I.R.C. [1956], A.C. 39; Rae (Inspector of Taxes) v. Lazard Investment Co. Ltd [1963], 1 W.L.R. 555; Baron Inchyra v. Jennings (Inspector of Taxes) [1966], Ch. 37; Re Wilks [1935], Ch. 645; Re Kehr [1951], 2 T.L.R. 788; [1951], 2 All E.R. 812; Re Barnett’s Trusts [1902], 1 Ch. 842; Mahadervan v. Mahadervan [1964], P. 233, 241–242.

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  28. For examples taken from English practice see Batthyany v. Walford (1887), 36 Ch.D. 269, 278; De Nicols v. Curlier [1900], A.C. 21; Re Bonacina [1912], 2 Ch.D. 394, 396 (C.A.); Phrantzes v. Argenti [1960], 2 Q.B. 19, 36 and the comments in (1960), 9 I.C.L.Q., 508; (1960), 23 M.L.R., 446.

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  29. For examples taken from English practice see Ogden v. Ogden [1908], P. 46, and see also Bliersbach v. McEwen (1959), S.C. 43; Lodge v. Lodge (1963), 107 S.J. 437, and see the comments by Anton (1959), 3 fur. Rev. (N.S.),253, 277; Carter in (1960), 36 B.Y.I.L., 417; Re Maldonado [1954], P. 223, 231, 244 et seq., but see Lipstein [1954], C.L.1., 22. See also Garde Castillo, La Institucion Desconocida en el d.i.p. (1947), pp. 46–47.

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  30. For this problem see Robertson, op. cit., pp. 118–134, 255–279; Cheshire, Private International Law (3rd ed. 1947), pp. 71–85; Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws (1st ed. 1947), pp. 98 et seq., 107, 161 et seq., 184 et seq.; but see (2nd ed. 1954), p. 68, note (g); (1939), 17 Can. Bar Rev., 369; (1941), 19 Can. Bar Rev., 311 at 334; Ago, Teoria del diritto internazionale privato (1934), 136 ff., at p. 154; Hague Rec. 58 (1936 IV), 313 ff.; Frankenstein, Internationales Privatrecht, I (1926), 276 ff.; Fedozzi, Diritto internazionale privato (2 ed. 1939), pp. 193–195.

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  31. See, e.g., Huber v. Steiner (1835), 2 Bing. N.C. 202, 210, 213, per Tindall C.J.

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  32. German Supreme Court, 6 July 1934, RGZ 145, 121, at pp. 128 ff.; but see RGZ 7, 21 of 4 January 1882; RGZ 24, 383, 393 of 18 May 1889 and see RGZ 21, 13 of 8 May 1880; RGZ of 21 November 1910, Niemeyer’s Z., 21, p. 62.

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  33. Before the enactment of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1970, s. 1.

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  34. But contrast Wolff, Private International Law (2 ed. 1957), para. 156, p. 165. For a variant of this example, solved without difficulty by the writer, see Wolff, para. 155, p. 164.

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  35. See above No. 57 and see, e.g., Bernkrant v. Fowler (1961), 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P. 2d 906; Grant v. McAuliffe (1953), 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P. 2d 944; Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co. Ltd., 220 F. 2d 152 (2 Cir. 1955).

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  36. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Hague Rec. 124 (1968 II), 169, at pp. 233 ff.; Private International Law (1967), pp. 113–219, paras. 52–55. 3 All E.R. 163; Collins in (1972), 21 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 320; and see Wengler in Rev. crit. d.i.p.,1972, pp. 637–661; French Court of Cassation, 15 December 1969, Thomas v. Cie. Erste Allgemeine, Rev. cric. d.i.p., 1971, p. 512, with lit.

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  37. For England see: Wills Act 1861, ss. 1, 2; Merchant Shipping Act 1894, s. 265; Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924, s. 1; Legitimacy Act 1926, ss. 1, 8; Inheritance (Family Provisions) Act 1938, s. 1 as amended; Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, s. 1 (1); Adoption Act 1958, s. 1 (1) (5); Legitimacy Act 1959, s. 2 (2); Marriage (Enabling) Act 1960, s. 1 (3); Matrimonial Causes Act 1965, ss. 14 (2) (a) (b), 24 (1) (2), 25 (1), 26 (1), 39 (1) (4), 40 (1) (a) (b); Contracts of Employment Act 1963, s. 9 (1) (2) and Sched. 1, para. 1 (3); Redundancy Payments Act 1965, ss. 17, 56 (4); Mann (1966), 82 L.Q.R., 316; see also (1964), 80 L.Q.R., 29.

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  38. See e.g., Swiss Federal Tribunal 31 October 1967, BGE 93 II 379, 385 (6b); ca. Mann (1972–73), 46 British Yearbook of International Law, 117, 124 ff.

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  39. See, e.g., Conforti, L’execuzione delle obbligazioni nel diritto internazionale privato (1962), passim; for the practice in England see, e.g., Re Bettinson’s Question [1956], Ch. 67; Regazzoni v. Sethia [1958], A.C. 301, and Ralli Bros. v. Cia Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920], 2 K.B. 287, as interpreted by Mann (1937), 18 B.Y.I.L., 97; The Halley (1868), L.R. 2 P.C. 193, 202, and the cases cited by Lipstein in Jus Privatum Gentium, I (1969), 411, at pp. 420–422.

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  40. See Lipstein [1972 B], 31 Cambridge Law Journal, 67, at pp. 73–74.

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  41. See also Unger (1967), 83 L.Q.R., 427, 444; Kelly (1969), 18 Int. & Comp. L.Q., 249, at pp. 254 ff.

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  42. See the decisions of the German Federal Supreme Court of 12 January 1967, NJW 1967, 1177; IPRspr. 1966–1967, No. 19, p. 64, and of 19 December 1958, BGHZ 29, 137, IPRspr. 1958–1959, No. 112; Kropholler, NJW 1968, 1561 with further references; Wengler, Rev. crit. d.i.p., 1954, 661, at 683, n. 2; Ago, Hague Rec. 58 (1936 IV), 245, at pp. 326 ff.; Frankenstein, Internationales Privatrecht, I (1926), p. 285.

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  43. S. 5; the Wills Act 1963, s. 3, enacted by the United Kingdom; the Netherlands did not ratify this Convention.

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  44. See Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), pp. 235–237; Beckett (1934), 15 B.Y.1.L., 46, at 73, n. 1; Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed., 1954), pp. 90–94; Lorenzen, Selected Articles, pp. 129–130; (1941), 50 Yale L.J., 743, at 755, 756; and the former practice of the German Supreme Court, RG., JW 1913, 333.

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  45. These categories were first discussed by Lewald, Hague Rec. 69 (1939 III), 1, at 129. For lit. see Kegel, Internationales Privatrecht (3 ed. 1971), p. 125.

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  46. According to Neuhaus, Grundbegriffe des Internationalen Privatrechts (1962), 251, n. 604, the category described as transposition merges into the other two. There is some substance in this contention, at least as far as any overlap between transposition and substitution is concerned.

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  47. Where domestic and foreign public law are concerned, the recognition of the operation of foreign law takes the place of the so-called preliminary question; see below p. 220 and see Mann (1963), 79 Law Quarterly Review, 525; Hague Rec. 132 (1971 I), 109, at pp. 134–144.

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  48. See Reese (1973), 73 Col.L.R., 48; Lagarde, Riv. dir. int. priv. e proc., 11 (1975), 649.

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  49. Studd v. Cook (1883), 8 App. Cas. 577 at pp. 591, 600, 604; Re Piercy [1895], 1 Ch. 83, 89; Piercy v. E.t.f.a.s., decided on 15 March 1956 by the Tribunale Oristano, Foro it. 1956, I, 1019; Riv. dir. internaz., 1959, 687; Re Ernst Meyer, Gutachten zum internationalen und ausländischen Privatrecht, 1967 and 1968 (1970), No. 67, p. 707.

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  50. See Re Marshall [1957], Ch. 507 (C.A. and, generally, Ancel, L’adoption dans les législations modernes (2nd ed. 1958), and the supplement in Rev. internat. de dr. comp., 13 (1961), 561.

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  51. See, e.g., Tursi v. Torsi [1958], P. 4; and the problems raised in the cases cited by Mann, Hague Rec. 132 (1971 I), at pp. 135 ff.: whether a woman validly married in a polygamous union in Pakistan according to the personal law of the parties is a wife for the purpose of receiving public assistance in England under the National Assistance Act 1948, Imam Din v. National Assistance Board [1967], 2 Q.B. 213, at p. 218; a French société en nom collectif a corporate body or partnership for the purpose of English tax legislation: Dreyfuss v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1929), 14 T.C. 560, at pp. 576, 577; life interest in the income of a New York trust fund; whether income from stocks, shares or rents, or from other possessions outside the United Kingdom for the purposes of English tax legislation: Archer-We v. Garland [1931], A.C. 212, with a valid criticism by Mann, loc. cit., at p. 136; a distribution of shares in a subsidiary in Maryland to the shareholders of the parent company, treated as capital in Maryland; whether a distribution of income for the purposes of English tax legislation: Rae v. Lazard Investment Co. [1963], 1 W.L.R. 555, see also Courtaulds Investment Ltd. v. Fleming [1969], 1 W.L.R. 1683. For what would appear to be the correct answer in keeping with the attitude taken above in the text see Baron Inchyra v. Jennings (Inspector of Taxes) [1966],. Ch. 37.

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  52. Cp. Lewald, Hague Rec. 69 (1939.III), 1, at pp. 139–148; Kegel, Internationales Privatrecht (3 ed. 1971), pp. 127 ff.; Raâpe, Hague Rec. 50 (1934 IV), 401, at pp. 496–517.

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  53. Baudoin v. Trudel [1937], 1 D.L.R. 216; [1937], O.R. 1, but see Kegel, International es Privatrecht (3 ed. 1971), p. 129.

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  54. See the Californian Probate Code s. 201.5 (California Statutes 1957, c. 490); see also s. 201,7,6; 140.5 (1961) and see Kegel, op. cit., pp. 131–133, with lit.; Cavers, Hague Rec. 131 (1970 III), 75, at p. 215, n. 57, 58; Abel, Berry, Halsted and Marsh, 47 Calif. L.R., 211 (1959).

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  55. Leflar, (1960), 99 Trusts & Estates, 882; Schreter (1962), 50 Calif.L.R., 206; Gardner (1966), 54 Calif.L.R., 252; Steindorff, Sachnormen (1958), 81 ff.; and compare Re Thornton’s Estate, 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P. 2 d 1 (1934).

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  56. See in this collection of courses Lewald, Hague Rec. 29 (1929 IV), 515–616; 69 (1939 III), 1 at 47–66; de Nova, Hague Rec. 118 (1966 II), 437, at pp. 485–531, and the lit. cited by Kegel, op. cit., p. 139; Ehrenzweig, Private International Law (1967), p. 141, n. 6, with further references; Hague Rec. 124 (1968 II), 167, at pp. 238–244.

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  57. Neither the need, existing in common law countries, for the parties to prove foreign law as it would be applied in the foreign country concerned and not abstract rules of law, nor the alleged preference of English judges for having foreign judges decide foreign cases-see de Nova, Hague Rec. 118 (1966 II), at pp. 500, 502–503, esp. 506, para. 25; Ehrenzweig, Private International Law (1967), p. 146, para. 70-provide a well-founded theoretical explanation. It was precisely his previous refusal to try a case involving a succession concerning personalty including an English leasehold interest of a de cuius who had died domiciled in France: De Bonneval v. De Bonneval (1838), 1 Curt 856, which led the same Judge to “sit as a foreign court” in Collier v. Rivaz (1841), 2 Curt. 855.

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  58. See, e.g., Re United Railways of Havana v. Regla Warehouses Ltd. [1960], Ch. 52 at pp. 96–97, 115 (C.A.); Rosencrantz v. Union Contractors Ltd. (1960), 23 D.L.R. (2d.) 473; Castel (1961), 39 Can. Bar Rev., 93; (1961), 21 Rev. du Barreau de Quebec, 181, 189; Sherwood (1956), 5 Am.J.Comp.L., 120–125; Raape, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1959, 1013, 1016; but see Mason v. Rose,176 F. (2d) 486 (2 Cir. 1949); Siegelman v. Cunard,221 F. (2d) 189 (1 Cir. 1955); University of Chicago v. Dater, 227 Mich. 658, 279 N.W. 175 (1936); Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Stephenson, 217 F. 2d 295 (9 Cir. 1954); ca.: Lann v. United Steel Works Corpn., 166 Misc. 465, 1 N.Y.S. (2d) 951, 957; Duskin v. Pensylvania Central Airlines Corp., 71 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Pa. 1947), 167 F. 2d 727, 730 [6] (6 Cir. 1948), cert. denied 335 US 829 (1948); Fahs v. Martin, 224 F. 2d 387, 398 [9] (5 Cir. 1955); C. A. Frankfurt, 13 November 1956, IPRspr. 1956–1957, No. 24, affirmed by the German Supreme Court, 14 February 1958, NJW 1958, 750, AWD 1958, 57, IPRspr. 1958–1959, No. 39, p. 155, and of 9 June 1960, NJW 1960, 1720, AWD 1960, 183, IPRspr. 1960–1961, No. 23, p. 94; but see Swiss Federal Tribunal, 21 October 1955, BGE 81, II, 391.

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  59. See the survey by Graue, Aussenwirtschaftdienst des Betriebsberaters 1968, 121; Gamillscheg, 27 Rabel’s Z. (1962), 591; Maier, NJW 1962, 323, 325; Kreuzer, Das Internationale Privatrecht des Warenkaufs (1964), 284; Hartwig, Renvoi im international Privatrecht (1967), 152, 156; Vischer, Internationales Vertragsrecht (1962), 111; Batiffol, Conflits de Lois en matière de contrats (1938), No. 53; Traité de d.i.p. (4th ed. 1967), No. 311, p. 358 and note 52 bis: Kegel in Soergel’s Kommentar (10th ed., 1970), note 34 to article 27; Kelly (1969), 18 I.C.L.Q., 249, at p. 257, n. 39; de Nova, Hague Rec. 118 (1966 II), 518–519; Ehrenzweig, ibid.,124 (1968 II), 240; Private International Law (1967), 148–149, par. 73 ff.; Bayitch (1953), 7 Miami L.Q., 312.

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  60. See Hanisch, NJW 1966, 2085, with lit. and cases p. 2086, n. 15; see especially Neuhaus, Grundbegriffe des I.P.R. (1962), 190–194; JZ 1954, 704; Gündisch, Fam.R.Z. 1961, 352; Jayme, Dir. Int., 22 (1968), pp. 84, 88, notes 33, 34, with lit.; Z.f.Rv. 11 (1970), 253; Ehrenzweig, Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1962), 404; Private International Law (1967), p. 147, para. 72. For a case of concealed reference on (transmission) see the decision of the Court of Mainz of 21 October 1966, StAZ 1967, 24; IPRspr. 1966–1967, No. 159, p. 502, reported by Jayme, loc. cit., and in (1969), 21 Florida L.R.,290; Soergel-Kegel, Kommentar zum BGB, Vol. VII (10th ed., 1970), note 14 to Art. 27. Von Mehren in XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law (1961), pp. 380, 382, uses the term in a different sense.

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  61. The situation is not unlike that in Armitage v. Att.-Gen. [1906], P. 235, which is not regarded as one involving renvoi. See Dicey and Morris, Conflict of Laws,pp. 61–62.

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  62. [1906], P. 135. See also Abate v. Abate [1961], P. 29; Mather v. Mahoney [1968], 1 W.L.R. 1773; [1968], 2 All E.R. 223.

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  63. Rabels Z., 8 (1934), 148; Dir. Int., 17 (1963), I, 50; Rev. crit. d.i.p., 1966, 165. See also van Hoogstraten in Mélanges Kollewijn (1962), p. 209; Lagarde, Rev. crit. d.i.p., 1960, 459, with further lit. at n. 1. For a survey, see Voskuil (1965), 19 Dir. Int., I, 183; de Nova, Hague Rec. 118 (1966 II), at pp. 557–569.

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  64. Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 135–156; (1939), 55 L.Q.R., 565, at p. 584.

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  65. For England see Birtwhistle v. Vardill (1840), 7 Cl. & F. 940; Re Wright’s Trusts (1856), 2 K. & J. 595; Mette v. Mette (1859), 1 Sw. & Tr. 416; Brook v. Brook (1861), 9 H.L.C. 193; Shaw v. Gould (1868), L.R. 3, H.L. 55; Re Good-man’s Trusts (1881), 17 Ch.D. 266; Re Andros (1883), 24 Ch.D. 637; Re Grove (1888), 40 Ch.D. 216; Re Bozelli [1902], 1 Ch. 751; De Wilton v. Montefiore [1909], 2 Ch. 481; Skottowe v. Young (1871), L.R. 11 Eq. 474; Atkinson v. Anderson (1882), 21 Ch.D. 100; Cantiere San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding etc. Co. [1924], A.C. 226; Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd. [1943], A.C. 32; Kahler v. Midland Bank [1950], A.C. 24. In the case of suretyship Voskuil, p. 192, distinguishes between preliminary and incidental questions.

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  67. See Wolff, Private International Law (2nd ed., 1950), ss. 196, 198, pp. 206209.

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  68. Gottlieb (1955), 33 Can. Bar Rev., 523, 528.

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  69. Lipstein (1967), 2 Ottawa L.R., 49, at p. 58; see also Unger (1957), 43 Transactions of the Grotius Society, 86, at p. 94.

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  70. Cf. Wolff, Private International Law, s. 196.

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  71. Wengler, Rabels Z., 22 (1958), 535, at 544, is more pragmatic.

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  72. According to Inglis (1957), 6 I.C.L.Q.,202, at p. 214, Shaw v. Gould turned on the validity of the first marriage, and therefore on English law as that of the domicile of the children. However, in this case the presumption of legitimacy would have applied.

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  73. Legitimacy Act 1926, s. 1, now the Legitimacy Act 1976, s. 1.

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  74. See in a different context, but in a similar vein, Melchior, Grundlagen, p. 260, and notes 3 and 4; Lagarde, Rev. crit. d.i.p., 1960, 459, at p. 468, who speaks of “éloignement”. And see Wolff, Private International Law, paras. 362, 363.

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  75. R. v. Brentwood Superintendent Registrar of Marriages, ex p. Arias [1968], 2 Q.B. 956.

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  76. L. G. Weiden, 28 February 1953, NJW 1953, IPRspr. 1952–1954, No. 104; Directive of the President of the OLG Hamburg, 5 August 1955, IPRspr. 19541956, No. 84, Rev. crit. d.i.p., 1957, p. 50; BGH, 12 February 1964, BGHZ 41, 136, at p. 143 (3) with lit. at p. 144, referring to OLG Karlsruhe, 3 September 1962, IPRspr. 1962–1963, No. 70; OLG Munich 17 December 1962, IPRspr. 19621963, No. 72; LG Cologne, 10 January 1962, IPRspr. 1962–1963, No. 66; see also BGH, 14 July 1966, BGHZ 46, 87, at p. 93—but see the conclusions to the contrary and concurring with those put forward above in the text by the court below.

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  77. Lipstein (1967), 2 Ottawa L.R., 49. For the new Swiss practice see BGE 97, I, 389 of 3 June 1971; Dutoit and Mercier, Riv. dir. int. priv. e proc., 8 (1972), 5.

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  78. See Lipstein, Jus Privatum Gentium, I (1969), 411, at pp. 420–421.

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  79. The Halley (1868), L.R. 2 P.C. 193, at p. 203; cf. S.S. Diana, The Cliveden [1894], A.C. 625, 629; The Youri v. The Spearman (1885), 10 App. Cas. 276; The Talabot (1890), 15 P.D. 194; The Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse [1907], P. 36, 43–44; The City of Berlin [1908], P. 110.

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  80. The Augusta (1887), 57 L.T.R. 326, 327; The Darlington [1903], P. 77, 78, 80; The Prinz Hendrick [1899], P. 177, 181; The Guy Mannering (1882), 7 P.D. 132, 135; The Agnes Otto (1887), 12 P.D. 56, 57; The Andoni [1918], P. 14, 18; The Waziristan [1953], 2 All E.R. 1213; The Peerless (1860), Lush. 30; The Arum [1921], P. 12, 18, 20.

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  81. Mann (1937), 18 B.Y.I.L., 97, 107–113; Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws, 387, pp. 391–394; Morris (1953), 6 Vanderbilt L.R., 505 at 510; Rabel, II, 536; Cheshire and North, 228–229. See also Serick, Rabels Z., 18 (1953) 633, 647, with reference to the decisions of the German Supreme Court RGZ 161, 296, 300; 93, 182, 184 and the lit. cit. in n. 79.

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  82. Dicey and Morris, Rule 132, Exception, pp. 761–762.

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  83. The present attitude of English law is not clear; see Regazzoni v. Sethia [1958], A.C. 301; Morris (1953), 6 Vanderbilt L.R., 505, at p. 510, with references to earlier cases.

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  84. Mann (1963), 79 L.Q.R., 525; Hague Rec. 132 (1971 I), 109, at pp. 134–144.

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  85. See above pp. 45–46, 66.

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  86. Mann, loc. cit., above note 116.

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  87. See above p. 102, No. 61; Mann, Hague Rec. 132 (1971 I), at p. 144 (4).

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  88. For the lit. see Rigaux, Hague Rec. 117 (1966 I), pp. 433–437, especially Affolter, Batiffol, Castel, Diena, Gavalda, Grodecki, Lysyk, Makarov, Mann, Morris, Olivi, Roubier, Szâszy, Spiro, loc. cit.

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  89. Critically Wengler, Rabels Z., 23 (1958), 535, at pp. 552, 558 ff.

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  90. See my review of Roubier, Le droit transitoire (2 ed. 1960), in [1961], Cambridge Law Journal, 123.

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  91. E.g., contracts, matrimonial relations, both of a personal and of a proprietary nature and other family relationships. For the use of this distinction see Wengler, Rabels Z., 22 (1958), 535, at p. 543; for its practical, application see Parkasho v. Singh [1968], P. 233.

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  92. Unless a positive rule of Private International Law requires the contrary, as does the rule in Phillips v. Eyre (1870), L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 at p. 28, see Lipstein [1972 B], 31 Cambridge Law Journal, 67, at p. 99.

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  93. See, e.g., Rex v. International Trustee for Bondholders A.G. [1937], A.C. 500. Dicey and Morris, Conflict of Laws (8 ed. 1967), p. 47, n. 44, with cases; Grodecki, loc. cit., p. 78. Of course the position is different if foreign law is only incorporated into the contract which is, itself, governed by some other legal system.

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  94. Wengler, Rabels Z., 23 (1958), 535.

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  95. Adams v. National Bank of Greece S.A. [1961], A.C. 255, and see Lipstein [1960], Cambridge Law Journal, 169.

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  96. Lynch v. Government of Paraguay (1871), L.R. 2 P. & D. 268, esp. p. 272.

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  97. Bank voor Handel, etc. v. Slatford [1953], 1 Q.B. 248, at pp. 257 et seq.; Diplock L.J. in Adams v. National Bank of Greece and Athens [1958], 2 Q.B. 59, 76, 77, but see Lord Reid in Adams v. National Bank of Greece S.A. [1961], A.C. 255, 282.

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  98. But see Dicey and Morris, Conflict of Laws (8 ed. 1967), p. 45; Mann, loc. cit., who argues that Italian law altered the beneficial interests in the trust fund. According to the view taken here it altered the nature of proprietary interests in general capable of being held according to Italian law as the lex situs. See also Grodecki, 69.

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© 1981 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv, The Hague

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Lipstein, K. (1981). The Structure and Interpretation of Rules of Private International Law. In: Principles of the Conflict of Laws National and International. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9390-0_3

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