Abstract
When someone makes a moral decision, he bases it on a principle which, he believes, applies not only to himself but to everyone similarly situated, and not only to that act which at the moment he contemplates doing, but to every act of that type. These fundamentals are recalled to indicate that “the opportunistic principle” may at times not be a moral principle at all. To clarify this remark, we will contrast two situations, one in which the opportunistic principle is not involved, the second in which it is.
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© 1965 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Kattsoff, L.O. (1965). Opportunistic Principles. In: Making Moral Decisions. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9288-0_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9288-0_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-011-8537-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-9288-0
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