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The Introspective Method in Knowledge

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John Grote

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Abstract

Let us turn from a consideration of Phenomenalist Logic where the basis for knowledge is erroneously, according to Grote, regarded as real independent of us, to a consideration of the introspectionist method in knowledge. For without that which is introspected there can be no knowledge. That is, the field of the introspective is necessary to all knowledge, and without this field, or, more specifically, without ‘philosophy’ or consciousness there could be phenomena. Since the thought side of reality is so significant it seems appropriate to devote a special chapter to it.

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References

  1. For introspection is “observation directed upon the self or its mental states and operations. The term is the modern equivalent of ‘reflection’ and ‘inner sense’ as employed by Locke and Kant.” Runes, DOP, 149.

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  7. We will consider chiefly Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. State University of New York, Fredonia, N.Y., USA

    Lauchlin D. MacDonald

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© 1966 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

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MacDonald, L.D. (1966). The Introspective Method in Knowledge. In: John Grote. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9239-2_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9239-2_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-011-8504-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-9239-2

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