Abstract
The lines along which the Japanese policy in Indonesia would develop in future years began to appear, though vaguely, after some months of the occupation. During this period it became clear to the Japanese that the Indonesians were not a static mass of people without any principles or convictions. On the contrary, they could perceive that there existed among the population deep-rooted ideas and traditions, which, often contradictory to each other, made the conduct of the administration difficult. The Japanese began by committing many serious mistakes. For the Japanese of 1942 the task in Indonesia was much more difficult than for the Dutch a century earlier. An occupation authority, technically seen, always has the tendency to carry on the administration in a most irregular manner. The occupant strives after a particular goal, and everything else is made subordinate to that — whether it succeeds or not. It is not even possible to set up a system of economic-colonial exploitation of the old pattern. Apart from the inner contradictions which invariably exist in every occupation-regime, there still remains the difficulty that, in numerous cases, the final decision has to be taken by the military who are hardly qualified for this.
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References
B. H. M. Vlekke, “Communism and Nationalism in South East Asia”, International Affairs, April 1949.
See the Plan of the Total War Research Institute of February 18, 1942, op. cit.
See Out of Exile, p. 247.
On this point Sjahrir (Out of Exile, p. 249) entirely agrees with all Dutch writers.
See infra.
Out of Exile, p. 249.
For a detailed study of Adat Law, see, inter alia, B. Ter Haar, Adat Law in Indonesia (Translated from the Dutch, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York 1948).
See, inter alia, D. H. Burger, “Structuurveranderingen in de Javaanse Samenleving” in Indonesië, March 1949-May 1950.
See H. Bouman, Enige beschouwingen over de ontwikkeling van het Indonesisch Nationalisme op Sumatra’s Westkust (Thesis Leiden, J. B. Wolters, Groningen 1949); A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., pp. 177 ff, 190, 193 ff.
Territorial Chiefs.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 58; Kan Po No. 7, p. 3, Nov. 1942.
For Atjeh, see A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., pp. 198-199, 274 ff.
Part of the materials for this section has been drawn from C. A. O. van Nieuwen-huijze, Japanese Islam Policy in Java 1942–1945 (MS).
J = Syuumbu, M = Kantor Urusan Agama.
Kiais (Malay) and Ulamas (Arabic) are the group of people who specialise in the study of Islamic religion.
The religious leaders always used to point to large sums allocated in the Dutch Indies Government budget for Christian clergy, missionary schools and hospitals, these being much larger than the sums spent on similar Muslim activities.
Kan Po No. 9, p. 6, December 1942; Doc. No. 2750, p. 78.
Hadji = only those who have made the pilgrimage to Mecca are entitled to use this title. These five Japanese “Hadjis” were: Abdul Hamid Ono, Abdul Munim Inada, Saleh Suzuki, Mohammad Taufik Sasaki and Abdul Munir Watanabe — See Doc. No. 2750, p. 78.
A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 106.
Kan Po No. 9, p. 6, December 1942.
Zyawa Nenkan, p. 145. See A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 107.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 80; Decree No. 1, March 7, 1942 of the Commander of the Japanese Army in Java.
Asia Raya, June 16, 1942. This ideal proved to be fascinating for a long time even after the occupation. Its realisation, as far as possible, has been achieved by the establishment of a Muslim University at Djokjakarta by the government of the Republic of Indonesia.
Kan Po No. 14.
MIAI, a federation of thirteen Muslim organisations, was set up in September 1937. The main stimulus which caused MIAI to come into existence was Muslim opposition against the Dutch Government, which proposed certain legal regulations concerning marriages of Muslims. It is said that this MIAI developed pro-Japanese sentiments since 1938, when an article, entitled “The Voice of Japan”, appeared in the issue for September 15, 1938 of Berita Nahdat Al-Ulama (Newsletter of Nahdat al-Ulama), in which all MIAI news was regularly published.
The periodical of MIAI.
Suara MIAI, October 1, 1943.
November 22, 1943. Kan Po No. 32, p. 26.
A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 107.
Kan Po No. 44.
It may be interesting to note that the Muslims of India also were distrusted for more than a century by the British after they established their power there in the middle of the 18th century.
See infra.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 81; Kan Po No. 39, pp. 28-31.
July 9, 1945. Kan Po No. 71, p. 15.
July 29, 1945. Kan Po No. 72. p. 17.
A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 107.
age: 15-25 years.
Doc. No. 2750, pp. 13, 55-56.
G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., pp. 23-24; G. McT. Kahin, op. cit., p. 103.
Republic of the United States of Indonesia: “History of Indonesia’s National Movement” (Washington, July 1, 1949), p. 13.
Out of Exile, p. 241.
ibid., p. 246.
ibid.. After the war a controversy arose over the charges of collaboration with the Japanese brought by the Dutch particularly against Sukarno and Hatta. The Indonesians, however, maintained that these nationalist leaders co-operated only with a view to consolidate and further Indonesian nationalism among the masses, and not for their own selfish personal ends (See Political Manifesto of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, issued at Djakarta, November 1, 1945. English text from The Voice of Free Indonesia, No. 2, Djakarta, November 1945 published in New Cycle in Asia, Selected Documents on Major International Developments in the Far East, 1943–1947, Ed. by Harold R. Isaacs, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York 1947, pp. 182–188). “It is important to note”, says a writer, “that the standards used to define quislings in the West during World War II did not automatically hold among Asian subject populations. In this case the overwhelming endorsement of Sukarno by the Indonesian people after the war, despite his prominent role under the Japanese, shows that his collaboration was accepted as arising from national rather than servile or personal motives”(Lawrence K. Rosinger & Associates, The State of Asia, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York 1953, p. 412). “Actually, an accurate appraisal of the collaborationist charges which have been directed against the Republic’s leaders”, observes another author, “depends primarily on an initial adjustment in viewpoint. In analyzing collaboration with the Japanese in Indonesia a basically different approach must be adopted from that applied to the same issue in the occupied countries of Europe” (Charles Wolf, Jr., The Indonesian Story, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York 1948, p. 11). Even Dr. Van Mook, one of the Dutch authorities who brought charges of collaboration in 1945, seems to have revised his opinion after three years. Writing at the beginning of 1949 he stated: “Uit later gevonden documenten is wel gebleken, dat ook bij al zijn afkeurenswaardige handelingen het streven naar een onafhankelijk Indonesië hem steeds heeft bestuurd” (H. J. van Mook, Indonesië, Nederland en de Wereld, Amsterdam 1949, p. 103). In this connection it may be of further interest to note that substantially the same charges were made by Soviet spokesmen in early 1949 against both Sukarno and Hatta but Moscow seemed to have gradually dropped the charge when an approach was made by Indonesia in the summer of 1950 for formal exchange of recognition. In the beginning of 1951 the press and radio of Communist China also spoke in the same critical tune as that initiated by Moscow in early 1949 (George McT. Kahin, op. cit., pp. 104-105).
As Sjarifuddin tried to do in vain. See C. Smit, De Indonesische Quaestie (E. J. Brill, Leiden 1952), pp. 34–35.
Evidently, the Japanese immediately engaged many Indonesian informers who had also worked for the Dutch Indies police (Out of Exile, p. 238). The police school at Sukabumi was at once reformed by the occupiers and reopened. In every Syuu headquarters a similar police school was also opened (Doc. No. 2750, p. 39).
Doc. No. 2750, p. 57; G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., p. 26; W. H. Elsbree, op. cit., pp. 79-80. The other three nationalists were Moh. Hatta, K. H. Dewantara and Kiai H. M. Mansur.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 58.
Out of Exile, p. 246.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 58; G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., p. 25; George McT. Kahin, op. cit., p. 106.
“Centre of People’s Power.” Putera means: Knight’s son.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 59.
ibid., pp. 60-61. In the area occupied by the Navy there was no Putera. There was, however, the Japanese youth organisation, Seinen Undo. Maeda Interrogationreport, R.V.O., 006933.
Commander, 7th Area Army.
Lieutenant-General Harada had succeeded General Imamura as Commander of the 16th Army. After him came General Nagano. Interrogation-report Saito (representative and liaison officer of Major-General Yamamoto), R.V.O., 005839-005840.
ibid., 005840.
Report HQ 16th Army, R.V.O., 005869; Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1345; Timetable No. 147.
Report HQ 16th Army, R.V.O., 005869; Kan Po No. 24, pp. 10-14, August 1, 1943.
Announcement of Gunseitokyoku. See the collection of decrees and proclamations published by Abdul Karim, Djokjakarta.
G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., p. 32. For Sumatra a “Central Advisory Council” was set up only in June 1945.
Interrogation-report Saito, R.V.O., 005840 and Report HQ 16th Army, R.V.O., 005869.
Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1346; Timetable No. 149.
The “Joint Declaration” of the Conference, described as the “East Asia Charter”, was meant as a counterpart of the Atlantic Charter. It was also intended to counteract the effects of the Moscow Conference of Russia, Great Britain and the United States, held in October 1943-Christian Science Monitor, November 13, 1943. For the text of the “Joint Declaration”, see Doc. No. 2750, pp. 118-119.
R.V.O., 001854.
ibid.. See also Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. Nos. 1344 and 1331; Timetable No. 150.
The Masjumi.
The Kakyoo Sookai. Doc. No. 2750, pp. 82-83. See also Victor Purcell, The Chinese in South East Asia (Oxford Univ. Press, London 1952), pp. 551–552.
First Session, October 15-20, 1943.
See Kan Po No. 26; Osamu Seirei No. 36, dated September 5, 1943; Osamu Kanrei No. 6, September 5, 1943; Doc. No. 2750, p. 65. Twenty-three members of the Central Advisory Council were appointed by the Commander-in-Chief. Of the remainder, the advisory council of each Residency and municipality nominated from amongst its members one representative, while two members were nominated by the Principalities of Djokjakarta and Surakarta. Total: 43 members.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 75.
Kan Po No. 30, p. 7.
January 29-February 2, 1944.
Kan Po No. 35, p. 7; Kan Po No. 36, pp. 13-27.
Kan Po No. 34, pp. 10-23.
G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., pp. 36-37; Kan Po No. 28, p 11; Kan Po No. 29, pp. 5-15; A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 113; George McT Kahin, op. cit., p. 110.
G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., p. 37.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 85; A.A. Zorab, op. cit., pp. 112-113; W. H. Elsbree, op. cit., pp. 126-127.
Kan Po No. 35, p. 13.
R.V.O., 011208.
ibid.
R.V.O., 011209.
The Hookoo Kai system was imported from China to Japan in the 8th Century. In China the neighbourhood societies and their covering organisations in fact were only used for the usual promotion and care of administrative affairs. Japan borrowed the form of organisation but at the same time made it subservient to the totalitarian régime by turning it into a propaganda-spying-hostage organisation. In this form the system was introduced in the occupied territories.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 50.
ibid., p. 51.
Tyuuoo Seinen Kunrensyo.
Kan Po No. 18, pp. 8-17.
Gatot Mangupradja. Before the war, in 1930, he, along with Sukarno and other leaders of the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), was sentenced to imprisonment by the Dutch authorities.
Kan Po No. 28, pp. 19-24; Osamu Seirei No. 44, Oct. 3, 1943; Doc. No. 2750. p. 68.
The preamble of a large number of decrees for any measure contained “the desire of the 50 million inhabitants of Java.” The curious thing is that the Military Commander used the expression “original inhabitants”, while the head of the Military Administration spoke of “the Indonesian people”, which was not officially allowed.
The Indonesian name is Sukarela Tentara Pembela Tanah Air, abbreviation is Peta.
Kan Po No. 28, pp. 19-24.
Doc. No. 2750, pp. 67-69.
Kan Po No. 41, pp. 5-10; Kan Po No. 48, July 24, 1944, p. 12.
Java had 17 Residencies (Syuu).
Japanese report about Indo-auxiliary troops, R.V.O., 006503.
Kan Po No. 28, pp. 19-24.
Japanese report about Indo-auxiliary troops, R.V.O., 006504.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 107.
Kan Po No. 67, pp. 10-14, May 19, 1945.
Japanese report about Indo-auxiliary troops, R.V.O., 006501-006506.
ibid.
Kan Po No. 18, pp. 9-23.
Japanese report, R.V.O., 006528.
Hei: soldier, Ho: 2nd class reserve.
Japanese report, R.V.O., 006527.
ibid., 006527-006528.
ibid., 006529-006530.
The figures about the strength of the different bodies rather differ in the various reports. The nearest truth probably lies in the following ones, which were the numbers at the time of capitulation: Peta: 37,000. Hei Ho: 25,000. Hizbullah: 50,000. Keiboodan: 1,280,000. Pemudas (youths): 500,000-600,000. Student Service Corps: 50,000. Barisan Berani Mati (suicide corps): 50,000. Pelopor (shock troops): 80,000. See Report HQ 16th Army, R.V.O., 005124 and Japanese report about Indo-auxiliary troops, R.V.O., 006501-006506, 006527.
Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1348; Timetable No. 151.
Prosecution Doc. No. 454, Court Exh. No. 277; Timetable No. 153.
About the promise of independence see Kan Po No. 51, p. 11 and pp. 15-22; Kan Po No. 52, pp. 24-28.
Badan Penjelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan (M). See Report HQ 16th Army, R.V.O., 005871. Kahin’s statement (Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 102) that the Japanese, on their arrival, “immediately” allowed the display of the red-white Indonesian national flag and the singing of Indonesia Raja, the national anthem, is thus absolutely wrong.
Report submitted by HQ 16th Army was entitled “Gist of Measures for Guiding Independence.” See Doc. No. 2750, p. 103.
Ken Koku Gakuin (J).
Report HQ 16th Army, R.V.O., 005871.
the nations of the world belonging to one family.
Osamu San Jo Ko No. 142, September 7, 1944. Prosecution Doc. No. 2756. See also Doc. No. 2750, pp. 94-98.
September 8, 1944. Kan Po No. 51, p. 21.
Kan Po No. 51, pp. 23-25.
ibid.
Kan Po No. 55, pp. 8-20; R.V.O., 008209-008210; Doc. iVo. 2750, pp. 104-105.
November 23, 1944. Kan Po No. 55, p. 6.
Report HQ 16th Army, R.V.O., 005871.
Kan Po No. 61, p. 8.
Kan Po No. 62, pp. 26-27.
Henceforth to be called: Investigating Committee.
Dr. Radjiman Wediodiningrat was the Chairman of the Investigating Committee; the Committee’s sixty-two members included also Sukarno and Hatta, 4 Chinese, one Arab, one Indo-European and eight Japanese “experts”, besides the other Indonesian representatives-Report Ichibangase Yoshio, Japanese Vice-Chairman of the Committee, R.V.O., 005850. See also G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., p. 33.
R.V.O., 005899-005900.
Report HQ 16th Army, R.V.O., 005872; Kan Po No. 63, p. 4; Kan Po No. 64: Osamu Seirei No. 18, April 1, 1945 and Osamu Kanrei No. 5, April 3, 1945; Kan Po No. 66, p. 39.
including Java and Sumatra.
Head of General Affairs Department and as such a leading figure of the Military-Administration.
Report HQ 16th Army, R.V.O., 005872; Doc. No. 2750, pp. 108-109.
Report HQ 16th Army, R.V.O., 005872; Doc. No. 2750, p. 109.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 109.
The decision for the establishment of this Committee was announced on March 1, 1945, see Kan Po No. 62, pp. 26-32; the official proclamation of the decision and the establishment of the Committee took place on April 29, 1945, see Kan Po No. 66, pp. 9-10; the installation of the Committee happened on May 29, 1945.
G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., p. 34; Kan Po No. 68, p. 12.
to the Commander of the 16th Army.
Kan Po No. 62, pp. 31-32. During the period of occupation the Japanese attempted in vain to increase the production of cotton in Java on a large scale. Before the war the experiments of the Dutch in this field likewise produced a negative result.
Kan Po No. 62, p. 32.
Panitia Memperbaiki zat Makanan pada masa Perang.
Kan Po No. 62, pp. 38-39; Doc. No. 2750, p. 75. Badan Penolong Prajurit Peherja (Body in Aid of Economic Warriors).
Kan Po No. 55, p. 15.
Kan Po No. 62, p. 40.
Shin Kokumin Undoo (J), Gerakan Hidup Baru (M).
selaloelah siap sedia. Kan Po No. 62, pp. 41-42.
Kan Po No. 62, pp. 44-45.
The correct figures of the Romushas who were transported outside Java are not known; the official estimates of the Japanese after the capitulation mention the figure of 270,000 men, of whom not more than 70,000 could be recovered after the war — Doc. No. 2750, p. 74.
Kan Po No. 62, p. 45.
Kan Po No. 68, p. 16.
The eighth session was held from June 18-21, 1945. See Kan Po No. 69, pp. 20-35.
Kan Po No. 69, pp. 30-32.
G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
Report HQ 16th Army, R.V.O., 005873.
Doc. No. 2750, pp. 110-112.
ibid., p. 113.
November 20, 1941. Prosecution Doc. No. 1448.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 114.
ibid., p. 115.
ibid., p. 116.
ibid., p. 117; Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1344; Timetable No. 147.
August and October 1943 respectively.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 119.
Prosecution Doc. No. 2755; Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. Nos. 1348 and 1349; Timetable Nos. 151 and 152.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 121; Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 277; Timetable No. 153.
Prosecution Doc. No. 2758.
Doc. No. 2750, pp. 122-123.
Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. Nos. 1344, 1340, 1350 and 1351; Timetable No. 155; Prosecution Doc. No. 2759.
Hereafter to be called: Preparatory Committee.
HQ Saigon.
Report HQ 16th Army, R.V.O., 005873.
ibid.
Heads of General Affairs Departments of the Gunseikanbu.
Report HQ 16th Army, R.V.O., 005873.
Interrogation-report Major-General O. Nishimura, Head of the General Affairs Dept. of the Military Administration in Java, R.V.O., 005815-005818.
This Japanese parallel-Committee was composed of high army and naval authorities. The Chairman was General Itagaki, the Commander of the 7th Area Army at Singapore and the Vice-Chairman, Lieutenant General Nagano, the Commander of the 16th Army in Java. The Navy was represented by the well-known Vice-Admiral Maeda, the head of the Navy Liaison Office at Batavia.
See G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., p. 42.
Interrogation-report Major-General O. Nishimura, R.V.O., 005815-005818.
Report HQ 16th Army, R.V.O., 005873. Dokuritsu Junbi Iin (J), Panitia Persiapan Kermedekaan Indonesia (M).
Asia Raya, August 7, 1945, No. 189.
ibid.
ibid.
G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., p. 38.
Interrogation-report Numata Takazo, Chief of Staff of F. M. Terauchi, R.V.O., 006785-006791.
ibid.
ibid.
Nishimura Interrogation-report, R.V.O., 006808.
Report HQ 16th Army, R.V.O., 005874. The Preparatory Committee was composed of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and 19 members, of which 11 representatives came from Java, 3 from Sumatra, 2 from Celebes and one each from Borneo, the Lesser Sunda Islands, and the Moluccas. See G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., p. 42; George McT. Kahin, op. cit., p. 127.
Report HQ 16th Army, R.V.O., 005874.
On August 8, 1945 Russia had declared war against Japan.
August 14-17, 1945.
Liaison office between Army and Navy at Batavia.
Interrogation-report T. Maeda, R.V.O., Nefis AJ/33126.
October 19, 1945.
Interrogation-report T. Maeda, R.V.O., Nefis AJ/33126. According to Hatta (Verspreide Geschriften van Mohammad Hatta, C. P. J. van der Peet, Amsterdam 1952: “Legende en Realiteit Rondom de Proclamatie van 17 Augustus”, pp. 330-340), the kidnapping of Sukarno and Hatta to the Peta garrison at Rengasdengklok took place because of the difference of opinion between the Sukarni-Students-Sjahrir group and the Sukarno-Hatta group as to how the declaration of Indonesia’s independence should be made, not about the proclamation of independence as such. The former group (see also Out of Exile, pp. 253-254) demanded an immediate declaration of independence in, what they considered to be, a “revolutionary” method, i.e. detached from everything that was in any way suggestive of Japanese sponsorship. An Indonesia of Japanese fabrication, it was argued, was bound to be crushed by the Allies. The latter group, however, was of the opinion that the proclamation of independence should be made by the “Committee for the Preparation of Independence”, the members of which, though appointed by the Japanese, were supposed to represent the will and the ideal of Indonesia. The Committee, it was further stated, was thus the symbol of the inner consciousness of Indonesian unity, which was of greater importance than the external judicial consideration. Once the kidnappers realised that they would fail, they did not oppose the return of Sukarno and Hatta to Djakarta. Muhammad Dimyati’s argument (in his book: Sedjarah Perdjuangan Indonesia) that Sukarno and Hatta were carried off by force “because it was feared that the Japanese might use them as their puppets if they would remain in their houses” and that they were again taken back to Djakarta to resume, at the residence of Maeda, the discussion about the immediate proclamation of Indonesia’s independence which had not yet terminated at Rengasdengklok, is clearly inconsistent, as corroborated by Hatta.
Interrogation-report T. Maeda, R.V.O., Nefis AJ/33126.
June 16, 1946.
Interrogation-report T. Maeda, R.V.O., Nefis AJ/33126.
Interrogation-report Major-General Nishimura, R.V.O., 006792-006807.
ibid.
Doc. No. 2750, pp. 128-129.
The meeting was held at the residence of Maeda, because, according to Hatta, the Hotel des Indes, the place where the meeting was originally to have taken place was already closed.
The text of the Proclamation was: “We the people of Indonesia hereby proclaim the independence of Indonesia. The transfer of authority, everything related to it, and other matters will be implemented properly and in the shortest possible time.” — On behalf of the People of Indonesia, Sukarno-Hatta, August 17, 1945.
Interrogation-report Nishimura, R.V.O., 006792-006807.
Shimizu declared to have discussed, among others, the question of independence with Prince Higashikuni (an uncle of the Emperor of Japan), who formed the first cabinet after Japan’s surrender.
Interrogation-report Hitoshi Shimizu, R.V.O., AI/2-21242.
between Sawada Takayoshi, Nakagawara Yasujiro and Yasuoka.
Interrogation-report Hitoshi Shimizu, R.V.O., AI/2-21242.
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Aziz, M.A. (1955). Conquest and Occupation Policy II: Policy Towards the Indonesian People. In: Japan’s Colonialism and Indonesia. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9233-0_10
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