Abstract
We are now in a position to make a survey of the principle of the priority of impressions to ideas: to examine both the nature of the principle and the use which Hume makes of it as a criterion of meaning. To do the latter task completely, we must give a full account of Hume’s theory of knowledge. We have to see, for example, given the principle, how successful is Hume’s treatment of the nature of space, time, abstract ideas, etc. However, we are concerned with Hume’s principle only in so far as it has direct bearing upon his treatment of demonstrative knowledge. In this part, we shall only touch upon some of the major difficulties inherent in Hume’s principle. A full evaluation of the principle will be given in the chapter following the detailed examination of Hume’s account of knowledge properly so called.
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References
Thomas Reid, The Works of Thomas Reid, edited by William Hamilton, Third Edition, p. 144 (italics mine).
J. L. Austin, Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. XVIII, p. 97. “Are there A Priori Concepts?”
Passmore, op. cit., p. 63.
William James, Principles of Psychology, Part I, Vol. II, p. 46.
Laird, op. cit., p. 78.
Bertrand Russell, An Outline of Philosophy, London, 1949, pp. 199–200.
Idem, Human Knowledge, p. 109.
Idem, The Analysis of Mind, p. 208.
T. H. Green, op. cit., p. 195.
R. W. Church, Hume’s Theory of Understanding, London, G. Allen and Unwin, 1935, p. 59. Likewise A. H. Basson, in his recent book on Hume writes: “According to Hume’s theory, for a word to have a meaning it is not sufficient that it should have a use: it must also stand for an idea which determines the use. And this idea is a kind of image or picture of something which the word represents or means. Moreover, every idea is a copy of some possible impression. It follows that a word can have meaning only if it stands for an idea, which is in turn a copy of some possible impressions.” David Hume, Pelican Philosophy Series, 1958, p. 31 and 123.
Here, it seems that Hume supposes that ‘Thinking,’ being a transitive verb, should be supplied with accusatives such as ‘Ideas’ or ‘Meaning,’ which denote objects of thought, and these objects not only are prior to and independent of linguistic symbols which they are expressed, but also they are “the true and real subject of controversy.” In (his way ideas are the meaning of linguistic symbol, as Propositions are supposed, by some modern logicians, to stand for the meaning of sentences.
Passmore. op. cit., p. 94.
Russell. The Analysis of Mind, p. 159.
Perhaps Urmson refers to such difficulties when he says that “thus to know the meaning of a word is to know with what type of impression it is linked by ostmsive, definition. This seems to be the kernel of Hume’s doctrine on this point after the psychological husk has been stripped from it. ” J. O. Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, 1956. p. 103.
E. C. Mossner writes: “The case of Blacklock … was immediately recognized by the mid-eighteenth century as a variant of the Lockean problem. ‘I think he is the greatest Curiosity in the World,’ observed Hume, and all the world concurred.” Mossner also quotes Hume’s saying, “I once said to my friend, Mr Blacklock, that I was sure he did not treat love as he did colours; he did not speak of it without feeling it. There appeared too much reality in all his expressions to allow that to be suspected. He said: ‘The sweetness of the voice has a mighty effect upon me: the symptoms of youth too, which the touch discovers…” E. C. Mossner, Le Bon David, 1942, pp. 14–28.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford, 1953, p. 30.
Gottlob Frege, On Sense and Reference, in translations from The Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, edited by Geach and Black, 1952, p. 58.
G. Ryle, op. cit., pp. 271-72. I think Ryle is somehow belittling Hume’s theory. For aren’t “perceptual lessons” the very lessons that we ought to learn if we want to know anything about the world ! If it is true that the language of science is essentially descriptive, then it is also true that such a language has a referential character and the meaning of descriptive expressions is in some way bound up with this character. Russell in his recent work criticizes a purely syntactic approach to the problem of meaning. He takes essentially a Humian approach when he writes: “Sentences are composed of words, and, if they are to be able to assert facts, some, at least, of the words must have that kind of relation to something else which is called ‘meaning’”. My Philosophical Development, loc. cit., p. 235.
Frege, The Foundations, op. cit., p. VI.
Ibid., p. VIII.
John Wisdom, Metaphysics and Verification, appears in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, p. 72.
W. V. O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, p. 42.
Frege, The Foundations, p. X.
Quine, From a Logical Point of View, p. 39.
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© 1960 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Zabeeh, F. (1960). Evaluation of Hume’s Principle. In: Hume Precursor of Modern Empiricism. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9194-4_4
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