Abstract
Kant, who set himself the task of reconciling empiricism with rationalism, retained a certain dualism in his thought, that was fully overcome only by the philosophy of identity. The whole period between Kant and Fichte, the first representative of the post-Kantian speculative metaphysics, which culminated in the philosophy of identity, was dominated by the struggle against this dualism and by the attempt to replace it with a monism. The given object (thing-in-itself) and pure thought (a priori thought), matter and form, receptivity and spontaneity, a posteriori and a priori, the empirical and the intelligible, nature and man, causality and freedom — these are the characteristic features of Kantian dualism. It is true that Kant emphasized the priority of the second element in his dichotomy, i.e., form over matter, pure transcendental subjectivity over thing-in-itself, a priori over a posteriori, and so forth. Nevertheless, the first element — matter, thing-in-itself, and a posteriori — was not, so it seemed to the first interpreters of Kant, entirely discarded by the master but retained a definite and legitimate place in his system.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Str., p. 217.
Logik, p. 323.
Ibid.
“Die Vorstellung wird im Bewusstsein vom Vorgestellten und Vorstellenden unterschieden und auf beide bezogen.”
Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde, 9 Band, 3 Stück, pp. 8 f.
Ibid., p. 9.
Ibid.
Karl Leonhard Reinholds Leben und Literarisches Wirken, herausgegeben von Ernst Reinhold, Jena 1825, pp. 369 ff. George Wilhelm Bartholdy collaborated with Maimon in publishing a German translation of “Bacon’s Von Verulam Neues Organon”; the translation is by Bartholdy and the notes are by Maimon.
The correspondence between Reinhold and Maimon appeared as a section of Str., pp. 179-244 under the title, “Philosophischer Briefwechsel.”
For example, Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann.
See Reinholds Leben und Literarisches Wirken, pp. 369 ff.
Mag. z. Erfahrungsseelenkunde, 9 Band, 3 Stück, pp. 8 f.
Logik, p. 242.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 242 f.
See Mag. z. Erfahrungsseelenkunde, 10 Band, 3 Stück, pp. 123 f.
Logik, pp. 316 f.
Alfred Klemmt, Karl Leonhard Reinholds Elementar philosophie, Verlag von Felix Meiner (Hamburg, 1958), “Vorwort,” p. xi.
However, some ontologists (chief among them Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann) employed the phenomenological method to deduce the existence of transcendent entities, essences, and values.
See Klemmt, op. cit., pp. xii f.
See J. G. Fichte, “Recension des Aenesidemus…,” in Sämtliche Werke, Vol. I (Berlin, 1845).
See Fichtes Leben und Briefwechsel (2d ed., 1826), pp. 511 f.
Logik, pp. 293-438.
Ibid., pp. 337 f.
Ibid., p. 338.
Ibid.
Ibid., 340.
Schulze, op. cit., p. 117, note.
See the chapter in Aenesidemus, p. 130: “Has the Skepticism of Hume Really Been Refuted by the Critique of Pure Reason?”
Ibid., p. 133.
Ibid., p. 347.
Ibid., p. 137.
Logik, p. 347.
Ibid., p. 348.
Schulze, op. cit., pp. 263 f.
Ibid., pp. 142 ff.
Logik, p. 350.
Ibid., pp. 349 f.
Ibid., p. 350.
Ibid., p. 354.
Ibid., p. 355.
Schulze, op. cit., p. 152.
Logik, p. 353.
Schulze, op. cit., p. 154.
Ibid., p. 160. As to the meaning of the term noumena, Schulze is inclined to understand it as a thing-in-itself, which seems to be implied in Kant. See Schulze, op. cit., pp. 161 n.
Ibid., pp. 170 f.
Ibid.
Logik, p. 355.
See Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s Sämtliche Werke, Berlin, 1845, I, 313 f.
Ibid., p. 314.
Ibid., p. 490.
Ibid., p. 315.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 490.
Ibid., p. 447.
Ibid., p. 490.
Ibid., p. 447.
See Johann Gottlieb Fichtes Leben und literarischer Briefwechsel, herausgegeben von seinem Sohne Immanuel Hermann Fichte, 1862, p. 511.
Fichte, Sämtliche Werke, I, p. 227.
Ibid., pp. 482 ff.
Ibid., p. 472: “Verdrehung des Verstandes.”
Ibid.: “Unvernünftiger Begriff.”
Ibid., p. 19: “Unfug.”
Ibid., p. 472.
Ibid., p. 482.
Ibid., p. 483. The same argument is used by Maimon. See above, p. 54, n. 2.
Ibid., p. 377.
Ibid., p. 378.
Ibid., pp. 19 f.
See Fichte, Leben und literarischer Briefwechsel, II, 443 ff.
I.e., Versuch einer neuen Logik.
Dated October 16, 1794. See Fichte, Leben und literarischer Briefwechsel, p. 444.
See Maimon, Str., p. 187.
This letter is not included in the collection of Fichte’s letters published by hin son; it was published by Raoul Richter in the Kantstudien, V, 116, under the heading, “Ein ungedruckter Fichte Brief.”
“Weil ich ohne dem auch der Literaturzeitung so wichtige Rezensionen, als Maimons Logik, schuldig bin.” It seems, however, that Fichte did not write the promised review on Maimon’s Logik, as the editor, R. Richter, noted. See Kantstudien, V, 118, note 1.
See ibid., note 2.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1964 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague. Netherlands
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Atlas, S. (1964). Contemporaneous Philosophy. In: From Critical to Speculative Idealism. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9106-7_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9106-7_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-011-8400-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-9106-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive