Abstract
It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of science and technology in contemporary culture. The popular media are full of reports on new developments in the bio-medical sciences, in information and communication technologies, and on the role of science and technology in maintaining an economy that will be competitive in world markets. And these are only a few of the most prominent current areas of general interest. This widespread interest generates a need to understand science as a cultural phenomenon. What kind of activity is it? How does it work? How does it interact with other aspects of contemporary culture?
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Barnes, B. (1974), Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London).
— (1982), T. S. Kuhn and Social Science (Columbia University Press, New York).
Barnes B. and S. Shapin (eds.) (1979), Natural Order: Historical Studies of Scientific Culture (Sage, Beverly Hills, CA).
Barnes, B. and D. Edge (eds.) (1982), Science in Context (MIT Press, Cambridge).
Bloor, D. (1976), Knowledge and Social Imagery (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London).
Boyd, R. (1981), ‘Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology’, in PSA 1980, Volume 2, P. D. Asquith and R. N. Giere (eds.) (The Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing), pp. 613–652.
Bradie, M. (1986), ‘Assessing Evolutionary Epistemologies’, Biology and Philosophy 1, pp. 404–459.
Callebaut, W. and R. Pinxten (eds.) (1987), Evolutionary Epistemology (Reidel, Dordrecht).
Campbell, D. T. (1960), ‘Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes,’ Psychological Review 67, pp. 380–400.
— (1974), ‘Evolutionary Epistemology’, in The Philosophy of Karl Popper, P. A. Schilpp (ed.) (Open Court, La Salle), pp. 413–463.
Carnap, R. (1950), Logical Foundations of Probability (University of Chicago Press, Chicago [2nd ed. 1962]).
Cartwright, N. (1983), How the Laws of Physics Lie (Clarendon Press, Oxford).
Churchland, P. M. (1979), Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
— (1989), ‘On the Nature of Theories: A Neurocomputational Perspective’, in Scientific Theories, C. Wade Savage, (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 14 (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis).
Cohen, I. B. (1985), Revolution in Science (Harvard University Press, Cambridge).
Collins, H. M. (ed.) (1982), Sociology of Scientific Knowledge — A Source Book (Bath University Press, Bath).
Doppelt, G. (1978), ‘Kuhn’s Epistemological Relativism: An Interpretation and Defense’, Inquiry 21, pp. 33–86.
Frankel, H. (1982), ‘The Development, Reception, and Acceptance of the Vine-Matthews-Morley Hypothesis’, Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 13, pp. 1–39.
— (1987), ‘The Continental Drift Debate’, in Scientific Controversies, H. T. Engelhardt, Jr. and A. L. Caplan (eds.) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), pp. 203–248.
Franklin, A. (1986), The Neglect of Experiment (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
Friedman, M. (1983), Foundations of Space-Time Theories (Princeton University Press, Princeton).
— (1991), ‘The Re-evaluation of Logical Positivism’, Journal of Philosophy 88, pp. 505–519.
Galison, P. (1987), How Experiments End (University of Chicago Press, Chicago).
Giere, R. N. (1988), Explaining Science (University of Chicago Press, Chicago).
— (1989), ‘The Units of Analysis in Science Studies’, in The Cognitive Turn: Sociological and Psychological Perspectives on Science, S. Fuller, M. DeMey, T. Shinn and S. Woolgar (eds.), Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook, Volume XIII. (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1989), pp. 3–11.
— (1991), ‘Implications of the Cognitive Sciences for the Philosophy of Science’, in PSA 90, Volume 2, A. Fine, M. Forbes, and L. Wessels (eds.) (The Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, MI), pp. 419–430.
— (1992), Cognitive Models of Science, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume XV (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis).
Gilbert, G. N. and M. Mulkay (1984), Opening Pandora’s Box (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
Gould, S. J. and N. Eldredge (1977), ‘Punctuated Equilibria: The Tempo and Mode of Evolution Reconsidered’, Paleobiology 3, pp. 115–151.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
Hooker, C. A. (1987), A Realistic Theory of Science (SUNY Press, Albany).
Hull, D. (1988), Science as Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science (University of Chicago Press, Chicago).
Jeffrey, R. C. (1985), ‘Probability and the Art of Judgment’, in Observation, Experiment, and Hypothesis in Modern Physical Science, P. Achinstein and O. Hannaway (eds.) (MIT Press, Cambridge), pp. 95–126.
Kahneman, D., P. Slovic and A. Tversky (eds.) (1982), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
Kitcher, P. (1983), Abusing Science (MIT Press, Cambridge).
Knorr-Cetina, K. D. (1981), The Manufacture of Knowledge (Pergamon Press, Oxford).
Knorr-Cetina, K. D. and M. Mulkay (eds.) (1983), Science Observed (Sage, Hollywood, CA).
Kohlberg, L. (1973), Collected Papers on Moral Development and Moral Education (Harvard University Press, Cambridge).
Kripke, S. (1972), ‘Naming and Necessity’, in The Semantics of Natural Language, G. Harmon and D. Davidson (eds.) (Reidel, Dordrecht).
Kuhn, T. S. (1962), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, Chicago) (2nd ed. 1970).
— (1977), The Essential Tension (University of Chicago Press, Chicago).
Kulkarni, D. and H. Simon (1988), ‘The Process of Scientific Discovery: The Strategy of Experimentation,’ Cognitive Science 12, pp. 139–175.
Lakatos, I. (1978), Philosophical Papers, J. Worrall and G. Currie (eds.), 2 Vols. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
Langley, P., H. A. Simon, G. L. Bradshaw and J. M. Zytkow (1987), Scientific Discovery (MIT Press, Cambridge).
Latour, B. (1987), Science in Action (Harvard University Press, Cambridge).
Latour, B. and S. Woolgar (1979), Laboratory Life (Sage, Beverly Hills).
Laudan, L. (1977), Progress and Its Problems (University of California Press, Berkeley).
— (1984), Science and Values (University of California Press, Berkeley).
Levi, I. (1980), The Enterprise of Knowledge (MIT Press, Cambridge).
MacKenzie, D. A. (1981), Statistics in Britain: 1865–1930 (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh).
Merton, R. K. (1973), in The Sociology of Science, N. Storer (ed.) (Free Press, New York).
Piaget, J. (1954), The Construction of Reality in the Child (Basic Books, Free Press).
Nisbett, R. and L. Ross (1980), Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs).
Putnam, H. (1975), ‘The Meaning of Meaning’, in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 7, K. Gunderson (ed.) (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis).
Rorty, R. (1979), Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton University Press, Princeton).
Ruse, M. (1982), Darwinism Defended (Addison-Wesley, Reading Mass.).
— (1986), Taking Darwin Seriously (Reidel, Dordrecht).
Russell, B. (1914), Our Knowledge of the External World (Allen and Unwin, London).
Salmon, W. C. (1984), Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton University Press, Princeton).
Scheffler, I. (1967), Science and Subjectivity (Bobbs-Merrill, New York).
Shapere, D. (1964), ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’, Philosophical Review 73, pp. 383–394.
— (1984), Reason and the Search for Knowledge (Reidel, Dordrecht).
Shapin, S. (1975), ‘Phrenological Knowlege and the Social Structure of Early Nineteenth-Century Edinburgh’, Annals of Science 32, pp. 219–243.
— (1979), ‘The Politics of Observation: Cerebral Anatomy and Social Interests in the Edinburgh Phrenology Disputes’, in On the Margins of Science: The Social Construction of Rejected Knowledge, R. Wallis (ed.) (Sociological Review Monograph, No. 27, Keele).
— (1982), ‘History of Science and its Sociological Reconstructions’, History of Science 20, pp. 157–211.
Sober, E. (1984), The Nature of Selection (MIT Press, Cambridge).
Toulmin, S. (1961), Foresight and Understanding (Harper & Row, New York).
— (1972), Human Knowledge (Princeton University Press, Princeton).
van Fraassen, B. C. (1980), The Scientific Image (Oxford University Press, Oxford).
Whitehead, A. N. and B. Russell (1910–13), Principia Mathematica, 3 Vols. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) (2nd ed. 1925–27).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Giere, R.N. (1997). Explaining Scientific Revolutions. In: Ginev, D., Cohen, R.S. (eds) Issues and Images in the Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 192. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5788-9_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5788-9_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-6443-9
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-5788-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive