Abstract
This paper compares three accounts of what can be inferred from a knowledge base that contains conditionals: Lehmann and Magidor’s Rational Entailment; Pearl’s System Z, later extended and refined in collaboration with Goldszmidt; and the present author’s Nonmonotonic conditional logic for belief revision. We show that although the ideas motivating these systems are strikingly different, they are formally equivalent. An explanation of the surprising parallel is offered in terms of the interpretation of conditionals in the context of nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision. Finally, some common problems with the equivalent systems are outlined, as well as some problems in assessing these problems which indicate that a general definition of dependence between the items in a knowledge base is needed.
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Rott, H. (1997). Drawing Inferences from Conditionals. In: Ejerhed, E., Lindström, S. (eds) Logic, Action and Cognition. Trends in Logic, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5524-3_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5524-3_8
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