Abstract
If an agent’s preferences are not representable by an expected utility function — if they, for example, are cyclical, or violate the Independence Axiom — the agent may appear to be prone to dynamic inconsistency: in some decision problems he may be expected to embark upon action plans which he is not going to follow through. Dynamic inconsistency is disadvantageous for the agent. Thus, we seem to have a good pragmatic argument against a preference structure that gives rise to such disadvantageous behaviour.
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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Rabinowicz, W. (1997). Wise Choice on Dynamic Decision-Making Without Independence. In: Ejerhed, E., Lindström, S. (eds) Logic, Action and Cognition. Trends in Logic, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5524-3_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5524-3_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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