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Relevance and Aesthetic Perception

  • P. Sven Arvidson
Chapter
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Part of the Contributions to Phenomenology book series (CTPH, volume 25)

Abstract

One of Aron Gurwitsch’s most important philosophical claims is that every moment of conscious life is structured in a theme, thematic field, margin pattern.1 This thesis allows no exceptions. Regardless of who you are or what you are doing, this is how your field of consciousness is organized. That which is presented as the center or focus of attention is the theme. That which is presented as relevant to the theme is the thematic field. That which is presented as irrelevant to the theme is the margin.

Keywords

Rapid Enlargement Aesthetic Experience Basketball Player Aesthetic Quality Thematic Field 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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    R. Lind, “Attention and the Aesthetic Object,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XXXIX, 1 (1980: 131–142)Google Scholar
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    R. Lind “A Microphenomenology of Aesthetic Qualities,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XLIII, 4 (1985: 393–403)Google Scholar
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    R. Lind“The Aesthetic Essence of Art,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, L, 1 (1992: 117–129).Google Scholar
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    For more on Gurwitsch’s thesis of autochthonous organization in consciousness, see P. S. Arvidson, “On the Origin of Organization in Consciousness,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 23, no. 1 (1992/Jan: 55–67).Google Scholar
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    Although a more in-depth analysis of Lind’s aesthetic theory is an interesting project, it is different than the present one. See P. S. Arvidson, “Stability and Achievement in Richard Lind’s Aesthetic Theory,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, LI, 4 (1993: 619–622).Google Scholar
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    In discussing Dickie’s views, Shultz’s asks if one can seriously consider something such as an act of kindness an aesthetic object. According to what has been said here, even the perception of an act of kindness is to be considered aesthetic if this field organization and the attendant attitude hold for that perception. See R. A. Schultz, “Does Aesthetics Have Anything to do with Art,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 36 (1978, p. 438).Google Scholar
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    The present study agrees more with T. Binkley, “Piece: Contra Aesthetics,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 35 (1976–7: p. 268), when he states that “aesthetic experience is not an experience unique to art.”Google Scholar
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    Witness the controversy over Marcel Duchamp’s “readymades.” According to the present account, Duchamp’s Fountain (a urinal placed on display) may be an art object, but it is not necessarily so. A good orientation to Duchamp’s affect on art criticism is J. Brough’s, “Who’s Afraid of M. Duchamp?” in Philosophy and Art, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, Vol. 23, D. O. Dahlstrom (Ed.) (pp. 119–142).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • P. Sven Arvidson
    • 1
  1. 1.College of Mount St. JosephUSA

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