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Phenomenalism, Idealism and Gurwitsch’s Account of the Sensory Noema

  • Robert Welsh Jordan
Chapter
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Part of the Contributions to Phenomenology book series (CTPH, volume 25)

Abstract

The relation between phenomenology and idealism was something a number of those around this table puzzled over here back in the 60’s. Professor Gurwitsch used to argue persuasively and, I think, correctly that neither perceived objects nor perceptual noemata can be correctly thought of as eide in Husserl’s sense of that esoteric word. Yet one thing which makes his meaning of the word so very abstruse is the fact that Husserl entirely agrees with this conviction yet speaks all the while of the noematic objects of perceptual experiences as ideals [i.e., Ideen im Kantischen Sinn].1 From the late 1920’s throughout his distinguished career, Gurwitsch argued, if I read him correctly, that the description of the perceptually meant object need not refer to an idea of the object which would be distinct from the sense or meaning of the object; the perceptual noema has, he insisted, no such constituent.

Keywords

Perceptual Experience Globe Theatre Polar Unity Phenomenological Philosophy Mere Appearance 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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    A. Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964, p. 184).Google Scholar
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    A. Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964, p. 232).Google Scholar
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    A perceptual appearance which is itself given, he writes, “predelineates… the total… configuration along more or less indeterminate but specifically generic and typical lines” [A. Gurwitsch, Phenomenology and the Theory of Science, Lester Embree (Ed.) (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974, p. 253)].Google Scholar
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    A. Gurwitsch, Phenomenology and the Theory of Science, Lester Embree (Ed.) (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974, p. 250. Gurwitsch reads Husserl on this point as if the latter had believed that a being is a constituent of itself!Google Scholar
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    A. Gurwitsch, Phenomenology and the Theory of Science, Lester Embree (Ed.) (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974, p. 252.Google Scholar
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    A. Gurwitsch, Phenomenology and the Theory of Science, Lester Embree (Ed.) (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974, p. 253.Google Scholar
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    A. Gurwitsch, Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966, p. 265).Google Scholar
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    A. Gurwitsch, Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966, p. 266.Google Scholar
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    A. Gurwitsch, Phenomenology and the Theory of Science, Lester Embree (Ed.) (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974, p. 247.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert Welsh Jordan
    • 1
  1. 1.Colorado State UniversityUSA

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