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Concerning Aron Gurwitsch

  • Maurice Natanson
Chapter
  • 94 Downloads
Part of the Contributions to Phenomenology book series (CTPH, volume 25)

Abstract

Were Aron Gurwitsch to be asked what kind of philosophical statement about him he would prefer to be made after his death, I am convinced that he would say that he wanted his philosophical views reported—just that; reported and discussed. I believe that by philosophical discussion he would have meant critical but informed discussion: serious, fundamental, well-grounded analysis of his views, based primarily on his writings, his teaching in and out of the classroom, his correspondence, and the most judicious and exacting reports of his philosophical conversation. What he would not want is easily stated: anecdotal, purely biographical, impressionistic accounts of his life and thought. I am not convinced that I can either meet or agree completely with Gurwitsch’s wishes or preferences on this occasion. Although I honor, let alone respect, his wishes, I have my rights too! And I consider it within my rights to go against the preferences of my subject—at least occasionally. Largely, I shall reserve a more nearly personal statement of my feeling to serve as a brief coda. But even now I face a decision whether to report what I consider to be a small story relevant to Gurwitsch’s character as well as his philosophical method.

Keywords

Keynote Speaker Phenomenological Reduction Gestalt Theory Small Story Correlation Conception 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Maurice Natanson
    • 1
  1. 1.Yale UniversityUSA

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