Abstract
There is a rough rule of thumb by which we can detect which projects are designed to help the poor and which are not designed to help. This rule of thumb is that if there is a means test — if the aid is so arranged that it cuts off at a reasonably low level — then it is designed to help the poor. If there is no such test, then it is not designed to help the poor, although it may, in fact, do so to some extent. This rule of thumb is undeniably rough, but it seems to fit the world fairly well. I have found, however, that the matter seems to be highly controversial, so I will explain in some detail why the switch from a means-tested program to a general aid program would, in all probability, hurt the poor.
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References
The provision of medicine is discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 8.
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These remarks are of general nature. Both systems have individual institutions that are markedly better at least than their average and others, of course, that are markedly worse.
Julian LeGrand’s study shows that in England the poor do in fact get more medical attention per capita than the well off. This is, however, because they have a poor state of health and are ill more. Their attention per illness is less than that of the upper-income brackets. LeGrand, The Strategy of Equality.
Some people would say this might not be true because the expenditure of the additional $20 on medicine for him would be of more value to him than the $50 that they would allege he would waste on something else, like drink or the numbers game. I do not regard this as a truthful description of the behavior of the poor, but there are people who believe this.
People who actually had no income before must at any event have consumed food if they were to stay alive. Presumably this would be slightly more expensive because of the tax increase.
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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Tullock, G. (1997). General Welfare or Welfare for the Poor Only. In: Economics of Income Redistribution. Studies in Public Choice, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5378-2_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5378-2_6
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