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Coasean Economics Law and Economics and the New Institutional Economics pp 65–94Cite as

The Cost of Accosting Coase: A Reconciliatory Survey of Proofs and Disproofs of the Coase Theorem

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Part of the book series: Recent Economic Thought Series ((RETH,volume 60))

Abstract

Growing up has not been easy for the “Coase Theorem.” Reluctance of others to accept him is mourned by an inevitably overproud parent and blamed on an uncomprehending world. Naturally, the parent, even one who refers to its little one as an “argument,” is not primarily to blame: “I do not believe that a failure of exposition is the main reason why economists have found my argument so difficult to assimilate” (Coase, 1988, p. 1). Perhaps the fault lies with the “extraordinary hold” that the incantations of the old sorcerer Pigou have “on the minds of modern economists” (Coase, 1988, p. 159).

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Authors
  1. Martin Zelder
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  1. University of Colorado at Denver, USA

    Steven G. Medema

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Zelder, M. (1998). The Cost of Accosting Coase: A Reconciliatory Survey of Proofs and Disproofs of the Coase Theorem. In: Medema, S.G. (eds) Coasean Economics Law and Economics and the New Institutional Economics. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 60. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5350-8_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5350-8_4

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