Advertisement

Life pp 85-105 | Cite as

Enculturation Of The Life-World

  • Jozef Sivak
Chapter
Part of the Analecta Husserliana book series (ANHU, volume 57)

Abstract

One of the most important phases of life-world constitution–what Husserl calls being-for-us–is the phase of its historical and cultural dimension. By the term “culture” Husserl seems to mean what others would call civilisation.1 Culture and history, synonymous in the large sense, are not so in the strict sense. In this sense history is concerned with a “setting in the community” (Vergemeinschaftung). A culture is an affair of the creative life of humanity and is objectivised in doing, the performances of communities.2 History is the history of culture too; in regard to it culture is that which makes of humanity a concrete being.

Keywords

Ethical Personality Ethical Life Philosophical Culture Creative Life Spiritual Formation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. 1.
    Cf. Hua. XIV., p. 206 (Hua.=Husserliana).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    “Kultur ist ein Titel für das schaffende Menschheitsleben, für das sich in Gemeinschaftsleistungen objektivierende” (ibid., p. 207).Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Cf. Hua. VI, p. 491.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Systematic knowledge of all these problems is divided into three fundamental sciences: physical science, the science of man creating spiritual values and the science of humanity. This is Husserl’s response to the development of so-called sciences of a spirit of his time.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Cf. Hua. XIII, p. 452.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Cf. ibid., p. 443.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Cf. Hua. XIV, pp. 330, 336.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Cf. Ms A VI 10, p. 10.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
  10. 10.
    In order to have more details on this (noematic) constitution of person in comparison with that of thing and as a reflexive thematizing inside of ego, see our study “Du moi-pur à la personne” (in Analecta Husserliana XL (1993), pp. 357-374).Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    The level of motivation contains analogous differences: reason and unreason, equitable and unequitable, willing and evaluating, etc.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Cf. Hua. XXVII, p. 37.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    “… Anstelle der habituellen Form der Normgemäβheit hat das Leben in der’ sündhaftigkeit’ die der Normwidrigkeit: statt der Form der Erfünlung der absoluten Sollensforderung die ihrer unethischen Preisgabe des ethischen Falles und Verfalles” (ibid., p. 38).Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    “Merkwürdig genug erweist sich in unserem formal-allgemeinen Wesensbetrachtungen die ideale Struktur des echt humanen Lebens als ein ‘Panmethodismus’. Er ist…ein in freien und vernünftigen Tat sich über das Tier erhebendes Wesen…Als vernun-ftiges und nach eigener Einsicht kann es nur durch Selbstregierung und Selbstkultur gemäβ der zentrierenden Idee der praktischen Vernunft zu reiner Zufriedenheit kommen, und es muβ dann ein entsprechendes Leben von sich kategorisch fordern” (ibid., p. 39).Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Cf. Hua. VI, p. 241.Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Ethical love is situated on the highest plane, yet through it not one personal subject is aimed but a community of subjects, nay all men. Such is the case, for example, of fellowmen.Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    “Sei ein wahrer Mensch: führe ein Leben, das du durchgängig einsichtig rechtfertigen kannst, ein Leben aus praktischen Vernunft” (Hua XXVII, p. 36).Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    The final aim of phenomenology was nothing other than to contribute to a manifestation of the reason contained in man after the fashion of the ancient world (Cf. Hua. VI, par. 6).Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    J. Derrida, Introduction à l’“Origine de la géometrie” (Paris, PUF, 1962), pp.161–162Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    P. Ricoeur enumerates three of such features, diverging from Derrida’s interpretation: “…premièrement, l’histoire est mue du dedans par le telos de l’idée d’humanité qui fait de cette histoire une approximation indéfinie de son sens immanent; deuxièmement le telos de l’idée d’humanité a son logos dans la raison, en tant qu’unité profonde de la raison théorique et de la raison pratique; troisièmement, la raison elle-même a son sens immanent, archontique, dans la philosophic européenne issue des Grecs et culminant dans la philosophic transcendantale. Husserl résume tous ces traits dans cette formule d’une extrême densité: ‘la ratio se trouve dans un procès continuel d’éclaircissement pour elle-même à partir de la première irruption de la philosophic dans 1’humanité’”. P. Ricoeur, “Conclusion Arezzo”, in Analecta Husserliana IX (1979).Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    P. Ricoeur, “Conclusion Arezzo”, in Analecta Husserliana IX (1979), p. 425Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    In these terms I. Kern characterizes the last text of Vol. XV of Husserliana, of which he is editorGoogle Scholar
  23. 23.
    Hua. XV, p. 669. A part of this absolute is formed by an irrational absolute, absolute as “unreason” (“Unvernunft”), “without it the rational’ is impossible‘”.Google Scholar
  24. 24.
  25. 25.
  26. 26.
    “Die Gesamtheit der in personalen Tätigkeiten (und speziell in vernunftigen Handlungen) verwirkten subjektiven Güter (…) könnte bezeichnet werden als das Reich seiner individuellen Kultur…” (Hua. XXVII, p. 41).Google Scholar
  27. 27.
    “Es (work of art) erhält wirklichen Wert in Beziehung zu einer wirklichen Individualität (…) und innerhalb der Universalit…t ihrer ganzen Vernunft und ethischen Lebens. Nur darin erhälte die Seligkeit der Hingabe and dasselble seine letzte, aber auch begrenzende Rechtsnorm: so für alle Gattungen von ‘Werten an sich’. Nur ethisches Recht ist letztes Recht” (ibid., p. 42).Google Scholar
  28. 28.
    Cf. Hua. VI, par. 73.Google Scholar
  29. 29.
    Cf. Hua. XIII, p. 426. (“In der personalen Umwelt finde ich gegenüber der leblossen materiellen Natur personale Gebilde [Meinungen, Meinuugsgebilde, Werke] verschiedener Stufe. Endlich finde ich in ihr Personen und Personengemeischaften. Personen sind gesetzt als Wirklichkeiten, ebenso personale Verbände. Ferner Kulturobjekte und alle Erzeugnisse im weitesten Sinne als von der betreffenden Personen erzeugte.”)Google Scholar
  30. 30.
    Cf. Hua. XV, p. 144. Husserl tries to define normality by analyzing the pathological phenomenon. Normality on a social level is defined by morals, habits, etc. Did he not confound the normality with normativity?Google Scholar
  31. 31.
    Cf. ibid., p. 476.Google Scholar
  32. 32.
    The communal subjectivity is a subjectivity “with many heads”. Each ego so “socialised” should be finally connected with the universal communal consciousness.Google Scholar
  33. 33.
    This constitution would be the topic of a “phenomenological anthropology” defined as a formal science about associations and about social-personal being, and as a “universal science of spirit”.Google Scholar
  34. 34.
    A home is not be limited to our habitation only, but it has its proper natural and social gradation. Family is followed by society, and that is followed by the State, communities, civilization. A home is in this sense to be opposed to strangeness, the finite to the infinite, the known to the unknown, the near to the far, the real to the possible. This possible can nevertheless become real: unknown countries, seas, great cities, deserts. In this sense man inhabits the entire Earth, he is a universal animal.Google Scholar
  35. 35.
    Cf. ibid., p. 429.Google Scholar
  36. 36.
    In the strict sense it is necessary to make a distinction between the culture and the mythical which Husserl places by the side of animism (Cf. ibid., p. 433, n. 1).Google Scholar
  37. 37.
    Cf. ibid., p. 436.Google Scholar
  38. 38.
    More exactly, if people are the carriers of the morals of a culture, the nation is to be defined in comparison with other nations in contrast to internationality.Google Scholar
  39. 39.
    This conclusion is that of K. Schuhmann, author of the book Husserls Staatsphilosophie (Freiburg/München, 1988), p. 28Google Scholar
  40. 40.
    Cf. Hua. VI, compl. Die Krisis des europäischen Menschentums und der Philosophie (Crisis article). The rationlist conception which is exposed here also offers a decisive argument against the possibility of “breeding humans”, a concept and even a practice accepted during the Third Reich at that time.Google Scholar
  41. 41.
    Eo ipso Husserl gives a response to a possible question of nationalism. Husserl along with his family was seduced in his youth by nationalism and during the First World War gave proofs of an exemplary patriotism. After the rise of Hitler he incurred the displeasure of the regime. In spite of that, he declared that he never ceased to be a “German philosopher”.Google Scholar
  42. 42.
    Hua. I, p. 161.Google Scholar
  43. 43.
    Ricoeur commenting on this passage underlines even more the impossibility of overcoming this fundamental opposition between what is one’s “own” and the “strange” since a simple postulate of universal nature, of science and community is not sufficient: “De même que I’on ne peut considérer de haut le rapport de personne à personne, nul survol ne nous permet de considérer I’ensemble des cultures à partir de nulle part. Ainsi est exclu tout comparatisme sans point de vue; dans nos rapports aux autres cultures, I’opposition du primordial et du dérivé, du ici et du là-bas est insurmontable. De même que mon corps est le point zéro d’où je considère toute chose, ma communauté est le’ membre zéro ‘(Nullglied) de la communaté humaine”. P. Ricoeur, A I’école de la phénoménologie (Paris, 1987), p. 220 (emphasis mine)Google Scholar
  44. 44.
    Hua. XV, p. 205.Google Scholar
  45. 45.
    Cf. Hua. I, p. 162.Google Scholar
  46. 46.
    The politics which transform communal life into a universal praxis are a part of the practical level too. Husserl holds a high opinion of politics. And when he applies it to his political philosophy, he assigns to it a role of supporting and guaranteeing the legal character of the State as a form of domination (see Hua XV, p. 414 apud Schuhmann, op. cit., p. 123).Google Scholar
  47. 47.
    Cf. Hua. XV, p. 471. What holds good for the static constitution of a person, holds for its genetic constitution too: “Ihr Sein (of a person) ist immerfort Werden, and das gilt bel den Korrelation von einzelpersonalen und Gemeinschatfspersonalen Sein für beides, für den Menschen und die einheitlichen Menschheiten” (Hua. VI, p. 272).Google Scholar
  48. 48.
    In Philosophy as Rigorous Science Husserl calls systematizers such as Hegel, Schelling and Fichte “romantic” philosophers and German idealism a “romantic philosophy”. According to G. E. Overvold (see “Husserl’s rationalism”, in Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 441–52) Husserl would not succeed in resolving his dilemma, maintaining “both that philosophy must seek certainty and that it must avoid a prioristic systematizing”.}Google Scholar
  49. 49.
    P. Ricoeur, “Conclusion Arezzo”, pp.423–424Google Scholar
  50. 50.
    Subjectivities are to be developed for themselves although in a community one with others becomes at the same time an object for others when objectivity keeps its objective character. The point of arrival of this constitution is thus the constitution of a supra-personal subjectivity, that of “communified humanity” (“vergemeinschaftete Menschheit”) (see Hua. XIV, p. 205).Google Scholar
  51. 51.
    “Sans doute l’ldée et la Raison cachée dans l’histoire et dans l’homme comme’ animal rational’ sont-elles éternelles…Mais cette éternité n’est qu’une historicité. Elle est la possibilité de l’histoire elle-même. Sa supra-temporalité-au regard de la temporalité empirique–n’est qu’une omnitemporalit’” (J. Derrida, op. cit., p. 156).Google Scholar
  52. 52.
    Hua. I, p. 163.Google Scholar
  53. 53.
    A text which follows closely the Cartesian Meditations brings out some supplementary details concerning this life-world which “…konstituiert sich as eine individuelle (z. B. als europäische Kulturwelt, als die der englischen Nation etc.) durch eine individ-ualtypische Universaltruktur, die jeder ‘normale’ Mensch…hat, als ‘Form’, die er nach seinen individuellen Vermögen und aus seinem persönlichen Leben her konkretisiert, unvollkommen in unzähligen Stufen der Unvollkomenheit” (Hua. XV, pp. 141-142).Google Scholar
  54. 54.
    Husserl in using this expression doubtless could not foresee its political destiny in the Europe of the fifties and sixties, as it frightened member states of European communities with interpretation of it as a limited sovereignity. And so it was replaced in the meantime by a more acceptable notion of “subsidiarity”.Google Scholar
  55. 55.
    “Schlieβlich ist dann die Frage, ob jede abgeschlossene Kulturmenschheit, wenn sie als ethische die Gestallt einer ‘Übernation’ über alien Einzelnationen, evtl. eines Überstaates über alien einzelnen Staaten, angenommen hat, sich als geschlossene auch nach aussen abschlieβen zu lassen über die ganze Welt so weit die Möglichkeit der Wechselverständigung und somit Vergemeinschaftung reiche” (Hua. XXVII, p. 85).Google Scholar
  56. 56.
    Husserl will deduce two determinants of each spiritual formation: “historical space” and “historical time”.Google Scholar
  57. 57.
    “…der Mensch wird zum unbeteiligten Zuschauer, Überschauer der Welt, er wird zum Philosophen; oder vielmehr von da aus gewinnt sein Leben Empfänglichkeit für nur in dieser Einstellung mögliche Motivationen und Methoden, in denen schlieβlich Philosphie und er selbst zum Philosophen wird” (Hua. VI, p. 331).Google Scholar
  58. 58.
    “Auch Fremd-Nationale lernen nachverstehen und nehmen überhaupt Anteil zu den gewaltigen Kulturverwandlung, die von der Philosphie austrahlt” (ibid., p. 333). If in this sense the problem of a national philosophy is not Husserl’s problem, why did he want to be taken for a German philosopher?Google Scholar
  59. 59.
    Cf. ibid. p. 336 and supra.Google Scholar
  60. 60.
    However Husserl excludes from it Eskimos, Indians and others. Does he exclude them also from the European philosophical culture?Google Scholar
  61. 61.
    This European Husserl’s faith was so strong that in predicting the Second World War he would also predict the birth of a new spiritualisation of Europe thanks to the “heroism of reason”.Google Scholar
  62. 62.
    Cf. Husserl, op. cit., p. 320.Google Scholar
  63. 63.
    Cf. Id., ibid., p. 319.Google Scholar
  64. 64.
    Cf. id., ibid., p. 347.Google Scholar
  65. 65.
    “…Schlieβlich sind es auch menschliche Ideale für die sich ausbreitende Synthese der Nationen, in welcher jede dieser Nationen gerade dadurch, daβ sie ihre eigene ideale Aufgabe im Geiste der Unendlichkeit anstrebt, ihr Bestes den mitvereinten Nationen schenkt. In diesem Schenken und Empfangen steigt das übernationale Ganze mit all seinen aufgestuften Sozietäten empor, erfüllt von dem Geiste einer überschwenglichen in vielfachen Unendlichkeit gegliederten, und doch einzigen unendlichen Aufgabe” (ibid., p. 336). After more than fifty years, this ideal surplus, this ideal increase in value, recommended by Husserl, is still absent in Europe which has the status of a large free trade zone only.Google Scholar
  66. 66.
    Ibid., p. 346. The “love community” projected by Husserl is also of the order of the Ineinander.Google Scholar
  67. 67.
    Cf. ibid., p. 275. Another text confirms it: “Jeder lernt sich an einem offenen und fortwachsenden Gemeinschaft der Philosphen (…) fühlen und fülhlt die Freude an der Schönheit einer solchen Gemeinschaft und and dem Wert einer durch gemeinsame Beziehung zu einem fortwachsenden Reich gestigen Werte, an dem alle nicht nur Freude haben, sondern auch alle mitarbeiten” (Hua. XXVII, p. 85).Google Scholar
  68. 68.
    We have in mind a set of articles written for the Japanese journal Kaizo.Google Scholar
  69. 69.
    “Kaizo-Artikel” (Ms M III 4 la), p. 7.Google Scholar
  70. 70.
    Ibid., p. 8.Google Scholar
  71. 71.
    Hua. XXVII, p. 40. According to T. de Boer “the Husserlian idea of phenomenology was an ethical idea”.Google Scholar
  72. 72.
    A philosophy which wants to serve practical aims deviates from its mission and a cosmological philosophy changes into sophistics: “…die Sophistik war wesentlich praktisch eingestellt. Wahrheit gibt die Philosophic nicht, aber ihre Begriffs-und Argumentationsformen sind für die politische Rhetorik sehr nützliche Künste” (Hua. XXVII, p. 86).Google Scholar
  73. 73.
    As regards the method, it is always the phenomenological reduction which sets a rational motivation for a humanity turned not to the world but to itself and following an ideal of a “progressive ethical socialisation” (Hua. VII, p. 283; apud Schuhmann, op. cit., p. 161).Google Scholar
  74. 74.
    This idea in the meantime persisted since the end of the Second World War. Tens of colleges, centers and universities paying attention to European studies in all parts of Europe attest to it.Google Scholar
  75. 75.
    W. Biemel, “Les phases décisives dans le développement de la philosophic de Husserl”, in Husserl (Cahiers du Royaumont, Philosophic III) (Paris, 1959), p.58Google Scholar
  76. 76.
    E. Weil, Logique de la philosophie (Paris, J. Vrin, 1967), p.11Google Scholar
  77. 77.
    Hua. VI, p. 273. Husserl distinguishes three stages of the rational movement. The first is connected with fact that the life of a spirit is “generative historicity”, that reason crosses generations and unifies it on the cultural level. The second concerns conditions of development of reason beginning at the level of an individual person: a behavior of self-responsibility seeking an idea of autonomy, and that in connection with other contemporary persons and communities. Husserl underlines that this realization of the reason of an individual person would be conceivable only as a communitary realization and vice versa. The third stage is a realization of the autonomy of all of humanity by means of a universal science which would be founded and founding simultaneously, and become eo ipso the highest function of humanity. In this universal science one recognizes the phenomenology which called for the overcoming of all philosophical opposition and for scientifically founding each (objective) science (see ibid. par. 73 and Suppl. XXVI).Google Scholar
  78. 78.
    Hua. XV, pp. 20-21.Google Scholar
  79. 79.
    Cf. W. Welsch, Unsere postmoderne Moderne (Weinheim, 1991)Google Scholar
  80. 80.
    Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, Signes (Paris, 1960)Google Scholar
  81. 81.
    Cf. B. Waldenfels, In der Netzen der Lebenswelt (Frankfurt a.M., 1985)Google Scholar
  82. 82.
    According to Pato**;ka the radicalism of certain thinkers themselves–he does not name them–who disaggregate the great spiritual motives and initiatives of the past, engenders a radicalism which combines in existence with ideologies and violence, and which make, “life within an idea” difficult.Google Scholar
  83. 83.
    Cf. J.-T. Desanti, La philosophic silencieuse ou critique dcs philosophies de la science (Paris, 1975)Google Scholar
  84. 84.
    Cf. S. Strasser, Welt im Widerspruch. Gedanken zu einer Phänomenologie als ethischer Fundamentalphilosophie (Dordrecht-Boston-London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991) (Phaenomenologica 124)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jozef Sivak
    • 1
  1. 1.Slovak Academy of SciencesBratislavaUSA

Personalised recommendations