Abstract
If we are to talk about the methodology and classification of Wissenschaft, it is necessary, before anything else, to make clear the peculiarity of science as differentiated from logic and mathematics. More often than not logic and mathematics are dealt with conjointly and they are generally taken as belonging to one and the same category, while science is regarded as an intellectual enterprise which belongs to another category. This contrast of logic and mathematics vs science may not be as precise and accurate as it appears. Nevertheless it will not be denied that a certain contrast exists. The aim of the present paper is to elucidate the nature of the contrast from a particular viewpoint, namely in terms of the concept of “inference.”
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Notes
J.L. Austin, How do Do Things with Words (Oxford University Press, 1962) pp. 45–54. Following the context I will present his points of argument in a simplified form.
S. Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science (Hutchinson, 1953) p. 107.
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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Kurosaki, H. (1998). On Inference in Science. In: Nagasaka, F.GI., Cohen, R.S. (eds) Japanese Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 45. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5175-7_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5175-7_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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