Abstract
In daily life we meet and engage with other people. We are confronted with their ways of life, their values and their projects. To a certain extent we take into consideration these other people, their well-being, their ways of life, their values and their projects. We try to avoid harming them when we enter a crowded place, we try to be decent to most of them and we try to be a good friend to some of them, and so on. Because we are capable of doing this, we are capable of exercising different degrees of ill will or goodwill towards them. We can insult someone we dislike, we can ‘forget’ a friend’s birthday out of malice, and so on. People react to this displayed degree of ill will or goodwill with attitudes and feelings of resentment, moral blame, moral indignation or gratitude.
The investigations were supported (partly) by the Fundation for Research in the field of Philosophy and Theology, which is subsidized by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).
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Sie, M. (1998). Goodwill, Determinism and Justification. In: Bransen, J., Cuypers, S.E. (eds) Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 77. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5082-8_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5082-8_6
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