Abstract
Since John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, elaborated the method of reflective equilibrium, it has gained much attention and popularity. Rawls introduced the method as a way of developing a general theory of justice, i.e. as an argumentative method for developing and justifying theories and principles to evaluate institutions and practices (Rawls 1971, 1985, 1987, 1993). Subsequent work by others has shown that a reflective equilibrium approach may be successfully used for various other purposes as well. It offers a promising coherentist account of justification, but it also gives guidance to philosophical thinking in more specific, practical contexts (e.g., Daniels 1979a, 1988; Heeger 1990a, 1992a and b; Kymlicka 1993; Carens 1995). Reflective equilibrium has especially proved to be a useful method for tackling practical moral problems (Beauchamp and Childress 1994).
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However, some authors, e.g. Ebertz (1993), have argued that Rawls’s version of reflective equilibrium is less coherentist than he claims it to be; Ebertz calls him a moderate foundationalist.
As Nielsen phrases it (1994b, 90), it ‘travels metaphysically and epistemologically light’. Cf. Norman (1998).
This line of argument corresponds with what Dworkin (1978) called a ‘constructive’ model of reflective equilibrium, which he regarded as the best interpretation of Rawls(1971).
This line of argument corresponds with Dworkin’s ‘natural’ model of reflective equilibrium, which aims to describe an objective moral reality (Dworkin 1978).
Singer (1974); Brandt (1979); Aronovitch (1996); cf. also Cladis (1994); Walker (1995); Räikkä (1996–97, 185). Nielsen 1991 argues that reflective equilibrium is historicist and contextualist but not relativist.
Dworkin’s constructivist interpretation of reflective equilibrium and the justification he gives for this interpretation in terms of a public standpoint already suggested some of the ideas elaborated in Rawls (1993). Cf. Dworkin (1978, 163).
Klosko (1993, 353), however, argues that the idea of an overlapping consensus on liberal ideas fails on empirical grounds, at least for concrete issues: ‘The unavoidable conclusion of decades of empirical studies, then, is that significant majorities of Americans, like citizens of other liberal societies, do not uphold basic liberties in the strong sense Rawls requires.’ For a similar criticism see Walker (1995, 102).
In the fourth edition of their book (1994, 20–37), however, they explicitly subscribe to a very wide version of reflective equilibrium.
The idea that empirical research on moral views is relevant to reflective equilibrium methods has been suggested by various authors (Ebertz 1993, 208 ff.; Miller 1994), yet attempts to integrate them are still scarce. Another example is Klosko (1993).
Of course, Rawls (1971) presents his theory as one in which various persons convene to decide on principles of justice, but many critics have convincingly argued that, in fact, there is only one — imagined — person doing the reasoning. Aronovitch (1996, 401) argues that is the ‘typical person’ rather than a special person.
Dworkin (1978, 163 and 1986); cf. Shiner (1992, 229). Compare also a similar point in Glover (1977, 28), on scientific integrity as the basis for coherence.
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van der Burg, W., van Willigenburg, T. (1998). Introduction. In: van der Burg, W., van Willigenburg, T. (eds) Reflective Equilibrium. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4972-3_1
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