Abstract
Leibniz maintained that the logical difference between truths of reason and truths of fact consists in the fact that the former are finitely demonstrable while the latter are not. He stated this criterion quite often, clearly, and unambiguously as he does here:
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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Savage, R.O. (1998). Infinite Analysis and Counterfactuals. In: Real Alternatives, Leibniz’s Metaphysics of Choice. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 74. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4968-6_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4968-6_7
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