Abstract
We explained in the last chapter that our view is that in a single-member constituency the best candidate to elect is that candidate, if any, who in a direct vote against each of the others would be able to get at least a simple majority over them; and that if no majority candidate exists, the best to elect is that candidate who stands highest on the average on the schedules of the electors, as judged by the Borda count.
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Notes
If the voter is indifferent as between two or more candidates, each of whom he prefers to any of the others, the single vote falsifies his schedule even in regard to his expression of a first preference.
If some voters show only the order of preference in which they place certain of the candidates and not others, the quota can vary at different stages in the count.
If two places were to be filled the candidates selected would be a 1 and a 5.
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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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McLean, I., McMillan, A., Monroe, B.L. (1998). Examination of Some Methods of Election in Single-Member Constituencies. In: McLean, I., McMillan, A., Monroe, B.L. (eds) The Theory of Committees and Elections by Duncan Black and Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuation by Duncan Black and R.A. Newing. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4860-3_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4860-3_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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